开源软件构建与测试

Changes of Revision 10

_service:tar_scm:ghostscript.spec Changed

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 Name:             ghostscript
 Version:          9.56.1
-Release:          3
+Release:          5
 Summary:          An interpreter for PostScript and PDF files
 License:          AGPLv3+
 URL:              https://ghostscript.com/
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
 # see https://bugs.ghostscript.com/show_bug.cgi?id=701819
 Patch103:  CVE-2023-38559.patch
 Patch104:  backport-CVE-2023-46751.patch
+Patch105:  fix-cve-2023-52722.patch
+Patch106:  fix-CVE-2024-29510.patch
+Patch107:  fix-CVE-2024-33869.patch
+Patch108:  fix-CVE-2024-33870.patch
+Patch109:  fix-CVE-2024-33871.patch
 
 BuildRequires:    automake gcc
 BuildRequires:    adobe-mappings-cmap-devel adobe-mappings-pdf-devel
@@ -112,6 +117,11 @@
 %patch102 -p0
 %patch103 -p0
 %patch104 -p1
+%patch105 -p1
+%patch106 -p1
+%patch107 -p1
+%patch108 -p1
+%patch109 -p1
 
 # Libraries that we already have packaged(see Build Requirements):
 rm -rf cups/libs freetype ijs jbig2dec jpeg lcms2* libpng openjpeg tiff zlib
@@ -205,6 +215,18 @@
 %{_bindir}/dvipdf
 
 %changelog
+* Fri May 10 2024 xuchenchen <xuchenchen@kylinos.cn> - 9.56.1-5
+- Type:CVE
+- ID:NA
+- SUG:NA
+- DECS: fix CVE-2024-29510 CVE-2024-33869 CVE-2024-33870 CVE-2024-33871
+
+* Sun Apr 28 2024 xuchenchen <xuchenchen@kylinos.cn> - 9.56.1-4 
+- Type:CVE
+- ID:NA
+- SUG:NA
+- DECS: fix CVE-2023-52722
+
 * Mon Dec 25 2023 liningjie <liningjie@xfusion.com> - 9.56.1-3
 - Type:CVE
 - ID:NA

_service:tar_scm:fix-CVE-2024-29510.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 3b1735085ecef20b29e8db3416ab36de93e86d1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Sharp <Ken.Sharp@artifex.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2024 09:01:15 +0000
+Subject: PATCH Uniprint device - prevent string configuration changes when SAFER
+
+Bug #707662
+
+We cannot sanitise the string arguments used by the Uniprint device
+because they can potentially include anything.
+
+This commit ensures that these strings are locked and cannot be
+changed by PostScript once SAFER is activated. Full configuration from
+the command line is still possible (see the *.upp files in lib).
+
+This addresses CVE-2024-29510
+---
+ devices/gdevupd.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/devices/gdevupd.c b/devices/gdevupd.c
+index 179c400..7826507 100644
+--- a/devices/gdevupd.c
++++ b/devices/gdevupd.c
+@@ -1887,6 +1887,16 @@ out on this copies.
+       if(!upd_stringsi) continue;
+       UPD_PARAM_READ(param_read_string,upd_stringsi,value,udev->memory);
+       if(0 == code) {
++        if (gs_is_path_control_active(udev->memory)) {
++            if (stringsi.size != value.size)
++              error = gs_error_invalidaccess;
++            else {
++                if (stringsi.data && memcmp(stringsi.data, value.data, stringsi.size) != 0)
++                    error = gs_error_invalidaccess;
++            }
++            if (error < 0)
++                goto exit;
++        }
+          if(0 <= error) error |= UPD_PUT_STRINGS;
+          UPD_MM_DEL_PARAM(udev->memory, stringsi);
+          if(!value.size) {
+@@ -1904,6 +1914,26 @@ out on this copies.
+       if(!upd_string_ai) continue;
+       UPD_PARAM_READ(param_read_string_array,upd_string_ai,value,udev->memory);
+       if(0 == code) {
++          if (gs_is_path_control_active(udev->memory)) {
++              if (string_ai.size != value.size)
++                  error = gs_error_invalidaccess;
++              else {
++                  int loop;
++                  for (loop = 0;loop < string_ai.size;loop++) {
++                      gs_param_string *tmp1 = (gs_param_string *)&(string_ai.dataloop);
++                      gs_param_string *tmp2 = (gs_param_string *)&value.dataloop;
++
++                      if (tmp1->size != tmp2->size)
++                          error = gs_error_invalidaccess;
++                      else {
++                          if (tmp1->data && memcmp(tmp1->data, tmp2->data, tmp1->size) != 0)
++                              error = gs_error_invalidaccess;
++                      }
++                  }
++              }
++            if (error < 0)
++                goto exit;
++          }
+          if(0 <= error) error |= UPD_PUT_STRING_A;
+          UPD_MM_DEL_APARAM(udev->memory, string_ai);
+          if(!value.size) {
+@@ -2098,6 +2128,7 @@ transferred into the device-structure. In the case of "uniprint", this may
+       if(0 > code) error = code;
+    }
+ 
++exit:
+    if(0 < error) { /* Actually something loaded without error */
+ 
+       if(!(upd = udev->upd)) {
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

_service:tar_scm:fix-CVE-2024-33869.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 5ae2e320d69a7d0973011796bd388cd5befa1a43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Sharp <Ken.Sharp@artifex.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:02:57 +0000
+Subject: PATCH fix CVE-2024-33869
+
+Part 1; when stripping a potential Current Working Dirctory specifier
+from a path, make certain it really is a CWD, and not simply large
+ebough to be a CWD.
+
+Reasons are in the bug thread, this is not (IMO) serious.
+
+This is part of the fix for CVE-2024-33869
+---
+ base/gpmisc.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/base/gpmisc.c b/base/gpmisc.c
+index f9a9230..f6b8870 100644
+--- a/base/gpmisc.c
++++ b/base/gpmisc.c
+@@ -1136,8 +1136,8 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+             memcpy(buffer + cdirstrl, dirsepstr, dirsepstrl);
+             continue;
+         }
+-        else if (code < 0 && cdirstrl > 0 && prefix_len == 0 && buffer == bufferfull) {
+-            buffer = bufferfull + cdirstrl + dirsepstrl;
++        else if (code < 0 && cdirstrl > 0 && prefix_len == 0 && buffer == bufferfull
++            && memcmp(buffer, cdirstr, cdirstrl) && !memcmp(buffer + cdirstrl, dirsepstr, dirsepstrl)) {
+             continue;
+         }
+         break;
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

_service:tar_scm:fix-CVE-2024-33870.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+From 79aef19c685984dc3da2dc090450407d9fbcff80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ken Sharp <Ken.Sharp@artifex.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2024 12:00:14 +0000
+Subject: PATCH fix CVE-2024-33870
+
+See bug thread for details
+
+In addition to the noted bug; an error path (return from
+gp_file_name_reduce not successful) could elad to a memory leak as we
+did not free 'bufferfull'. Fix that too.
+
+This addresses CVE-2024-33870
+---
+ base/gpmisc.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/base/gpmisc.c b/base/gpmisc.c
+index f6b8870..cbc6139 100644
+--- a/base/gpmisc.c
++++ b/base/gpmisc.c
+@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+                      const uint         len,
+                      const char        *mode)
+ {
+-    char *buffer, *bufferfull;
++    char *buffer, *bufferfull = NULL;
+     uint rlen;
+     int code = 0;
+     const char *cdirstr = gp_file_name_current();
+@@ -1095,8 +1095,10 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+             return gs_error_VMerror;
+ 
+         buffer = bufferfull + prefix_len;
+-        if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != gp_combine_success)
+-            return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
++        if (gp_file_name_reduce(path, (uint)len, buffer, &rlen) != gp_combine_success) {
++            code = gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
++            goto exit;
++        }
+         bufferrlen = 0;
+     }
+     while (1) {
+@@ -1131,9 +1133,34 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+             code = gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
+         }
+         if (code < 0 && prefix_len > 0 && buffer > bufferfull) {
++            uint newlen = rlen + cdirstrl + dirsepstrl;
++            char *newbuffer;
++            int code;
++
+             buffer = bufferfull;
+             memcpy(buffer, cdirstr, cdirstrl);
+             memcpy(buffer + cdirstrl, dirsepstr, dirsepstrl);
++
++            /* We've prepended a './' or similar for the current working directory. We need
++             * to execute file_name_reduce on that, to eliminate any '../' or similar from
++             * the (new) full path.
++             */
++            newbuffer = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem->thread_safe_memory, newlen + 1, "gp_validate_path");
++            if (newbuffer == NULL) {
++                code = gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
++                goto exit;
++            }
++
++            memcpy(newbuffer, buffer, rlen + cdirstrl + dirsepstrl);
++            newbuffernewlen = 0x00;
++
++            code = gp_file_name_reduce(newbuffer, (uint)newlen, buffer, &newlen);
++            gs_free_object(mem->thread_safe_memory, newbuffer, "gp_validate_path");
++            if (code != gp_combine_success) {
++                code = gs_note_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
++                goto exit;
++            }
++
+             continue;
+         }
+         else if (code < 0 && cdirstrl > 0 && prefix_len == 0 && buffer == bufferfull
+@@ -1152,6 +1179,7 @@ gp_validate_path_len(const gs_memory_t *mem,
+                                            gs_path_control_flag_is_scratch_file);
+     }
+ 
++exit:
+     gs_free_object(mem->thread_safe_memory, bufferfull, "gp_validate_path");
+ #ifdef EACCES
+     if (code == gs_error_invalidfileaccess)
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

_service:tar_scm:fix-CVE-2024-33871.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 7145885041bb52cc23964f0aa2aec1b1c82b5908 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zdenek Hutyra <zhutyra@centrum.cz>
+Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 13:33:47 +0100
+Subject: OPVP device - prevent unsafe parameter change with SAFER
+
+Bug #707754 "OPVP device - Arbitrary code execution via custom Driver library"
+
+The "Driver" parameter for the "opvp"/"oprp" device specifies the name
+of a dynamic library and allows any library to be loaded.
+
+The patch does not allow changing this parameter after activating path
+control.
+
+This addresses CVE-2024-33871
+---
+ contrib/opvp/gdevopvp.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/contrib/opvp/gdevopvp.c b/contrib/opvp/gdevopvp.c
+index 5f20cac..327152d 100644
+--- a/contrib/opvp/gdevopvp.c
++++ b/contrib/opvp/gdevopvp.c
+@@ -3456,6 +3456,12 @@ _put_params(gx_device *dev, gs_param_list *plist)
+     code = param_read_string(plist, pname, &vdps);
+     switch (code) {
+     case 0:
++        if (gs_is_path_control_active(dev->memory)
++            && (!opdev->globals.vectorDriver || strlen(opdev->globals.vectorDriver) != vdps.size
++                || memcmp(opdev->globals.vectorDriver, vdps.data, vdps.size) != 0)) {
++            param_signal_error(plist, pname, gs_error_invalidaccess);
++            return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess);
++        }
+         buff = realloc(buff, vdps.size + 1);
+         memcpy(buff, vdps.data, vdps.size);
+         buffvdps.size = 0;
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

_service:tar_scm:fix-cve-2023-52722.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From afd7188f74918cb51b5fb89f52b54eb16e8acfd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Liddell <chris.liddell@artifex.com>
+Date: 2023-09-12 10:46:10 +0100
+Subject: PATCH In SAFER (default) don't allow eexec seeds other than the Type 1 standard
+ Type 1 standard
+
+---
+ psi/zmisc1.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/psi/zmisc1.c b/psi/zmisc1.c
+index 3c47e99..81556ac 100644
+--- a/psi/zmisc1.c
++++ b/psi/zmisc1.c
+@@ -93,6 +93,9 @@ zexE(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
+ 
+     if (code < 0)
+         return code;
++    if (gs_is_path_control_active(imemory) != 0 && state.cstate != 55665) {
++        return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
++    }
+     return filter_write(i_ctx_p, code, &s_exE_template, (stream_state *)&state, 0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -130,6 +133,11 @@ zexD(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
+     }
+     if (code < 0)
+         return code;
++
++    if (gs_is_path_control_active(imemory) != 0 && state.cstate != 55665) {
++        return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
++    }
++
+     /*
+      * If we're reading a .PFB file, let the filter know about it,
+      * so it can read recklessly to the end of the binary section.
+-- 
+2.43.0
+