开源软件构建与测试

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Changes of Revision 2

_service:tar_scm:shadow.spec Changed

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Name: shadow
-Version: 4.13
-Release: 7
+Version: 4.14.3
+Release: 1
 Epoch: 2
 License: BSD and GPLv2+
 Summary: Tools for managing accounts and shadow password files
@@ -17,21 +17,8 @@
 
 # fix unknown item 'LASTLOG_MAX_UID'
 Patch0: usermod-unlock.patch
-Patch1: backport-useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists-for-user.patch
-Patch2: shadow-add-sm3-crypt-support.patch
-Patch3: backport-Fix-off-by-one-mistakes.patch
-Patch4: backport-Fix-typos-in-length-calculations.patch
-Patch5: backport-Correctly-handle-illegal-system-file-in-tz.patch
-Patch6: backport-Explicitly-override-only-newlines.patch
-Patch7: backport-Prevent-out-of-boundary-access.patch
-Patch8: backport-Added-control-character-check.patch 
-Patch9: backport-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
-Patch10: backport-Read-whole-line-in-yes_or_no.patch
-Patch11: backport-commonio-free-removed-database-entries.patch
-Patch12: backport-semanage-disconnect-to-free-libsemanage-internals.patch
-Patch13: backport-run_parts-for-groupadd-and-groupdel.patch
-Patch14: shadow-Remove-encrypted-passwd-for-useradd-gr.patch
-Patch15: backport-chgpasswd-fix-segfault-in-command-line-options.patch
+Patch1: shadow-add-sm3-crypt-support.patch
+Patch2: shadow-Remove-encrypted-passwd-for-useradd-gr.patch
 
 BuildRequires: gcc, libselinux-devel, audit-libs-devel, libsemanage-devel
 BuildRequires: libacl-devel, libattr-devel
@@ -82,7 +69,9 @@
         --with-selinux \
         --without-libcrack \
         --with-libpam \
+        --without-libbsd \
         --enable-shared \
+        --enable-lastlog \
         --with-group-name-max-length=32
 %make_build
 
@@ -199,6 +188,13 @@
 %{_mandir}/*/*
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Feb 1 2024 zhengxiaoxiao <zhengxiaoxiao2@huawei.com> - 2:4.14.3-1
+- update version to 4.14.3
+  -Avoid null pointer dereference
+  -Update utmp at an initial login
+  -Merge libshadow and libmisc into a single libshadow
+  -Adding the userdel and groupdel hooks to release tarball
+
 * Wed Sep 20 2023 lvgenggeng <lvgenggeng@uniontech.com> - 2:4.13-7
 - backport patches from upstream

_service:tar_scm:backport-Added-control-character-check.patch Deleted

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
-Subject: PATCH Added control character check
-
-Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
----
- lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
-index 640be931..fb51b582 100644
---- a/lib/fields.c
-+++ b/lib/fields.c
-@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
-  *
-  * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
-  * characters.
-- *  + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
-- *  +  1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
-- *       contains a non-printable character.
-+ *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
-+ *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
-+ *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
-  *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
-  */
- int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
-@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (0 == err) {
--		/* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
-+		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
- 		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
- 			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
- 				err = 1;
-+			}
-+			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
-+				err = -1;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 		}
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-Correctly-handle-illegal-system-file-in-tz.patch Deleted

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From 37ae2320809cb16afa9dacd8e5ea317ae216ee36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
-Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 11:57:51 +0000
-Subject: PATCH Correctly handle illegal system file in tz
-
-If the file referenced by ENV_TZ has a zero length string, then an out
-of boundary write occurs. Also the result can be wrong because it is
-assumed that the file will always end with a newline.
-
-Only override a newline character with '\0' to avoid these cases.
-
-This cannot be considered to be security relevant because login.defs
-and its contained references to system files should be trusted to begin
-with.
-
-Proof of Concept:
-
-1. Compile shadow's su with address sanitizer and --without-libpam
-
-2. Setup your /etc/login.defs to contain ENV_TZ=/etc/tzname
-
-3. Prepare /etc/tzname to contain a '\0' byte at the beginning
-
-`python -c "print('\x00')" > /etc/tzname`
-
-4. Use su
-
-`su -l`
-
-You can see the following output:
-
-`tz.c:45:8: runtime error: index 18446744073709551615 out of bounds for type 'char 8192'`
-
-Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
----
- libmisc/tz.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/libmisc/tz.c b/libmisc/tz.c
-index f3f5733e..9f3a41f2 100644
---- a/libmisc/tz.c
-+++ b/libmisc/tz.c
-@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@
- 
- 		strcpy (tzbuf, def_tz);
- 	} else {
--		tzbufstrlen (tzbuf) - 1 = '\0';
-+		/* Remove optional trailing '\n'. */
-+		tzbufstrcspn (tzbuf, "\n") = '\0';
- 	}
- 
- 	if (NULL != fp) {
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-Explicitly-override-only-newlines.patch Deleted

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-From ffc480c2e93f05266e4b130229877ad13f71a8c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 11:53:47 +0000
-Subject: PATCH Explicitly override only newlines
-
-Override only newlines with '\0' to avoid undesired truncation of
-actual line content.
-
-Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
----
- lib/port.c        | 6 +++---
- libmisc/console.c | 3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/port.c b/lib/port.c
-index 0bea2ef4..90eb1498 100644
---- a/lib/port.c
-+++ b/lib/port.c
-@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ static struct port *getportent (void)
-       again:
- 
- 	/*
--	 * Get the next line and remove the last character, which
--	 * is a '\n'.  Lines which begin with '#' are all ignored.
-+	 * Get the next line and remove optional trailing '\n'.
-+	 * Lines which begin with '#' are all ignored.
- 	 */
- 
- 	if (fgets (buf, (int) sizeof buf, ports) == 0) {
-@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static struct port *getportent (void)
- 	 * TTY devices.
- 	 */
- 
--	bufstrlen (buf) - 1 = 0;
-+	bufstrcspn (buf, "\n") = 0;
- 
- 	port.pt_names = ttys;
- 	for (cp = buf, j = 0; j < PORT_TTY; j++) {
-diff --git a/libmisc/console.c b/libmisc/console.c
-index bc024eba..63d3ceb3 100644
---- a/libmisc/console.c
-+++ b/libmisc/console.c
-@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin, const char *tty, bool def)
- 	 */
- 
- 	while (fgets (buf, (int) sizeof (buf), fp) != NULL) {
--		bufstrlen (buf) - 1 = '\0';
-+		/* Remove optional trailing '\n'. */
-+		bufstrcspn (buf, "\n") = '\0';
- 		if (strcmp (buf, tty) == 0) {
- 			(void) fclose (fp);
- 			return true;
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-Fix-off-by-one-mistakes.patch Deleted

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-From 587ce83e3ff4bea64ac028149ac9b66df37f688c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 00:52:27 +0100
-Subject: PATCH Fix off-by-one mistakes
-
-The buffers have a size of 512 (see xmalloc() above), which is what
-snprintf(3) expects.
-
-Link: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/607>
-Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
----
- src/groupmod.c | 16 ++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/groupmod.c b/src/groupmod.c
-index 006eca1c..828c7c0b 100644
---- a/src/groupmod.c
-+++ b/src/groupmod.c
-@@ -554,13 +554,13 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (void)
- #endif
- 	info_passwd.audit_msg  = xmalloc (512);
- 
--	(void) snprintf (info_group.audit_msg, 511,
-+	(void) snprintf (info_group.audit_msg, 512,
- 	                 "changing %s; ", gr_dbname ());
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
--	(void) snprintf (info_gshadow.audit_msg, 511,
-+	(void) snprintf (info_gshadow.audit_msg, 512,
- 	                 "changing %s; ", sgr_dbname ());
- #endif
--	(void) snprintf (info_passwd.audit_msg, 511,
-+	(void) snprintf (info_passwd.audit_msg, 512,
- 	                 "changing %s; ", pw_dbname ());
- 
- 	info_group.action   =   info_group.audit_msg
-@@ -573,16 +573,16 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (void)
- 	                      + strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg);
- 
- 	(void) snprintf (info_group.action,
--	                 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
-+	                 512 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
- 	                 "group %s/%lu",
- 	                 group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
- 	(void) snprintf (info_gshadow.action,
--	                 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
-+	                 512 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
- 	                 "group %s", group_name);
- #endif
- 	(void) snprintf (info_passwd.action,
--	                 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
-+	                 512 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
- 	                 "group %s/%lu",
- 	                 group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
- 
-@@ -617,13 +617,13 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (void)
- 		strncat (info_group.action, ", new gid: ",
- 		         511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg));
- 		(void) snprintf (info_group.action+strlen (info_group.action),
--		                 511 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
-+		                 512 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
- 		                 "%lu", (unsigned long int) group_newid);
- 
- 		strncat (info_passwd.action, ", new gid: ",
- 		         511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg));
- 		(void) snprintf (info_passwd.action+strlen (info_passwd.action),
--		                 511 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg),
-+		                 512 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg),
- 		                 "%lu", (unsigned long int) group_newid);
- 	}
- 	info_group.audit_msg511   = '\0';
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-Fix-typos-in-length-calculations.patch Deleted

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From ed69feaaff3c86745390c9839ecfc4b8f9706075 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 01:08:12 +0100
-Subject: PATCH Fix typos in length calculations
-
-Link: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/607>
-Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
----
- src/groupmod.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/groupmod.c b/src/groupmod.c
-index 7802e5b1..8c219194 100644
---- a/src/groupmod.c
-+++ b/src/groupmod.c
-@@ -578,11 +578,11 @@ static void prepare_failure_reports (void)
- 	                 group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
- 	(void) snprintf (info_gshadow.action,
--	                 512 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
-+	                 512 - strlen (info_gshadow.audit_msg),
- 	                 "group %s", group_name);
- #endif
- 	(void) snprintf (info_passwd.action,
--	                 512 - strlen (info_group.audit_msg),
-+	                 512 - strlen (info_passwd.audit_msg),
- 	                 "group %s/%lu",
- 	                 group_name, (unsigned long int) group_id);
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-Overhaul-valid_field.patch Deleted

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
-Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
-Subject: PATCH Overhaul valid_field()
-
-e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
-control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
-characters that are not control ones.
-
-Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
-checking functions to avoid UB.
-
-Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
----
- lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
-index fb51b582..53929248 100644
---- a/lib/fields.c
-+++ b/lib/fields.c
-@@ -37,26 +37,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
- 
- 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
- 	 * of illegal characters. */
-+	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
- 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
--		if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
-+		unsigned char c = *cp;
-+		if (!isprint (c)) {
-+			err = 1;
-+		}
-+		if (iscntrl (c)) {
- 			err = -1;
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	if (0 == err) {
--		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
--		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
--			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
--				err = 1;
--			}
--			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
--				err = -1;
--				break;
--			}
--		}
--	}
--
- 	return err;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-Prevent-out-of-boundary-access.patch Deleted

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-From 8e0ad48c21bd7d5506ff44eb4c04f796b80045ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
-Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 11:54:49 +0000
-Subject: PATCH Prevent out of boundary access
-
-If lines start with '\0' then it is possible to trigger out of
-boundary accesses.
-
-Check if indices are valid before accessing them.
-
-Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
----
- src/login_nopam.c | 4 ++--
- src/suauth.c      | 3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/login_nopam.c b/src/login_nopam.c
-index b09cffe4..18072a43 100644
---- a/src/login_nopam.c
-+++ b/src/login_nopam.c
-@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ int login_access (const char *user, const char *from)
- 			int end;
- 			lineno++;
- 			end = (int) strlen (line) - 1;
--			if (lineend != '\n') {
-+			if (line0 == '\0' || lineend != '\n') {
- 				SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
- 					 "%s: line %d: missing newline or line too long",
- 					 TABLE, lineno));
-@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static bool from_match (const char *tok, const char *string)
- 		if (strchr (string, '.') == NULL) {
- 			return true;
- 		}
--	} else if (   (tok(tok_len = strlen (tok)) - 1 == '.') /* network */
-+	} else if (   (tok0 != '\0' && tok(tok_len = strlen (tok)) - 1 == '.') /* network */
- 		   && (strncmp (tok, resolve_hostname (string), tok_len) == 0)) {
- 		return true;
- 	}
-diff --git a/src/suauth.c b/src/suauth.c
-index 2641d334..d68a3340 100644
---- a/src/suauth.c
-+++ b/src/suauth.c
-@@ -68,8 +68,9 @@ int check_su_auth (const char *actual_id,
- 
- 	while (fgets (temp, sizeof (temp), authfile_fd) != NULL) {
- 		lines++;
-+		endline = strlen(temp) - 1;
- 
--		if (tempendline = strlen (temp) - 1 != '\n') {
-+		if (temp0 == '\0' || tempendline != '\n') {
- 			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
- 				 "%s, line %d: line too long or missing newline",
- 				 SUAUTHFILE, lines));
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-Read-whole-line-in-yes_or_no.patch Deleted

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-From 0c83b981053b65c9bab4f1c2e60d004e920f8faf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
-Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 11:53:57 +0000
-Subject: PATCH Read whole line in yes_or_no
-
-Do not stop after 79 characters. Read the complete line to avoid
-arbitrary limitations.
-
-Proof of Concept:
-
-```
-cat > passwd-poc << EOF
-root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
-root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
-root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
-EOF
-python -c "print(80*'y')" | pwck passwd-poc
-```
-
-Two lines should still be within the file because we agreed only once
-to remove a duplicated line.
-
-Signed-off-by: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
-Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-Conflict: NA
-Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/0c83b981053b65c9bab4f1c2e60d004e920f8faf
----
- libmisc/yesno.c | 13 ++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libmisc/yesno.c b/libmisc/yesno.c
-index 1a1a3714..d8847e40 100644
---- a/libmisc/yesno.c
-+++ b/libmisc/yesno.c
-@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@
-  */
- bool yes_or_no (bool read_only)
- {
--	char buf80;
-+	int c;
-+	bool result;
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * In read-only mode all questions are answered "no".
-@@ -46,11 +47,13 @@ bool yes_or_no (bool read_only)
- 	/*
- 	 * Get a line and see what the first character is.
- 	 */
-+	c = fgetc(stdin);
- 	/* TODO: use gettext */
--	if (fgets (buf, (int) sizeof buf, stdin) == buf) {
--		return buf0 == 'y' || buf0 == 'Y';
--	}
-+	result = (c == 'y' || c == 'Y');
-+
-+	while (c != '\n' && c != EOF)
-+		c = fgetc(stdin);
- 
--	return false;
-+	return result;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-chgpasswd-fix-segfault-in-command-line-options.patch Deleted

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 53a17c1742a4b5fcf9280fd6dd85fc77588535c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jeffrey Bencteux <jeffbencteux@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 15:12:43 +0200
-Subject: PATCH chgpasswd: fix segfault in command-line options
-
-Using the --sha-rounds option without first giving a crypt method via the --crypt-method option results in comparisons with a NULL pointer and thus make chgpasswd segfault:
-
-$ chgpasswd -s 1
-zsh: segmentation fault  chgpasswd -s 1
-
-Current patch add a sanity check before these comparisons to ensure there is a defined encryption method.
----
- src/chgpasswd.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/chgpasswd.c b/src/chgpasswd.c
-index fe4055d8..7b773e2f 100644
---- a/src/chgpasswd.c
-+++ b/src/chgpasswd.c
-@@ -186,6 +186,13 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
- 		case 's':
- 			sflg = true;
-                         bad_s = 0;
-+
-+			if (!crypt_method) {
-+				fprintf (stderr,
-+				         _("%s: no crypt method defined\n"),
-+				         Prog);
-+				usage (E_USAGE);
-+			}
- #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT)
- 			if (  (   ((0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA256")) || (0 == strcmp (crypt_method, "SHA512")))
- 			       && (0 == getlong(optarg, &sha_rounds)))) {
--- 
-2.20.1
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-commonio-free-removed-database-entries.patch Deleted

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From a8dd8ce6c9a5f6e69ed4e9fa7b0c0976bb4ba332 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
-Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2023 13:36:51 +0200
-Subject: PATCH commonio: free removed database entries
-
-Free the actual struct of the removed entry.
-
-Example userdel report:
-
-    Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
-        #0 0x55b230efe857 in reallocarray (./src/userdel+0xda857)
-        #1 0x55b230f6041f in mallocarray ./lib/./alloc.h:97:9
-        #2 0x55b230f6041f in commonio_open ./lib/commonio.c:563:7
-        #3 0x55b230f39098 in open_files ./src/userdel.c:555:6
-        #4 0x55b230f39098 in main ./src/userdel.c:1189:2
-        #5 0x7f9b48c64189 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
-
-Conflict: NA
-Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/a8dd8ce6c9a5f6e69ed4e9fa7b0c0976bb4ba332
----
- lib/commonio.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/commonio.c b/lib/commonio.c
-index 40e62298..a0449c83 100644
---- a/lib/commonio.c
-+++ b/lib/commonio.c
-@@ -1060,6 +1060,8 @@ int commonio_remove (struct commonio_db *db, const char *name)
- 		db->ops->free (p->eptr);
- 	}
- 
-+	free(p);
-+
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-run_parts-for-groupadd-and-groupdel.patch Deleted

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-From 4e1f674c41724dd96ad2c3a0c02ac9f6666697ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: ed neville <ed@s5h.net>
-Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2023 20:23:03 +0100
-Subject: PATCH run_parts for groupadd and groupdel
-
-run_parts currently exists in useradd and userdel, this commit mirrors
-the functionality with groupadd and groupdel
-
-Hook for group{add,del} to include killing processes that have group
-membership that would no longer exist to avoid membership ID reuse.
-
-Conflict: NA
-Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/4e1f674c41724dd96ad2c3a0c02ac9f6666697ba
----
- .../groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh     | 26 +++++++++++++++++++
- src/groupadd.c                                | 11 ++++++++
- src/groupdel.c                                | 11 ++++++++
- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh
-
-diff --git a/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh b/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..10db5279
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh
-@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
-+#!/bin/sh
-+
-+PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
-+GROUPID=`awk -F: '$1 == "'"${SUBJECT}"'" { print $3 }' /etc/group`
-+
-+if  "${GROUPID}" = "" ; then
-+    exit 0
-+fi
-+
-+for status in /proc/*/status; do
-+    # either this isn't a process or its already dead since expanding the list
-+     -f "$status"  || continue
-+
-+    tbuf=${status%/status}
-+    pid=${tbuf#/proc/}
-+    case "$pid" in
-+        "$$") continue;;
-+        0-9*) :;;
-+        *) continue
-+    esac
-+    
-+    grep -q '^Groups:.*\b'"${GROUPID}"'\b.*' "/proc/$pid/status" || continue
-+
-+    kill -9 "$pid" || echo "cannot kill $pid" 1>&2
-+done
-+
-diff --git a/src/groupadd.c b/src/groupadd.c
-index 31142101..2eda1c68 100644
---- a/src/groupadd.c
-+++ b/src/groupadd.c
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include "sgroupio.h"
- #endif
- #include "shadowlog.h"
-+#include "run_part.h"
- 
- /*
-  * exit status values
-@@ -603,6 +604,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	check_perms ();
- 
-+	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupadd-pre.d", group_name,
-+			"groupadd")) {
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+
- #ifdef SHADOWGRP
- 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
- #endif
-@@ -621,6 +627,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	grp_update ();
- 	close_files ();
-+	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupadd-post.d", group_name,
-+			"groupadd")) {
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
- 	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
-diff --git a/src/groupdel.c b/src/groupdel.c
-index fdccf5e1..bae4367b 100644
---- a/src/groupdel.c
-+++ b/src/groupdel.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- #include "sgroupio.h"
- #endif
- #include "shadowlog.h"
-+#include "run_part.h"
- /*
-  * Global variables
-  */
-@@ -461,6 +462,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 		group_busy (group_id);
- 	}
- 
-+	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-pre.d", group_name,
-+			"groupdel")) {
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Do the hard stuff - open the files, delete the group entries,
- 	 * then close and update the files.
-@@ -471,6 +477,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	close_files ();
- 
-+	if (run_parts ("/etc/shadow-maint/groupdel-post.d", group_name,
-+			"groupdel")) {
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
- 	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-semanage-disconnect-to-free-libsemanage-internals.patch Deleted

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 7078ed1e0b8a197aa9e5103986bce927abef87a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
-Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2023 14:11:06 +0200
-Subject: PATCH semanage: disconnect to free libsemanage internals
-
-Destroying the handle does not actually disconnect, see 1.
-Also free the key on user removal.
-
-1: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/blob/e9072e7d45f4559887d11b518099135cbe564163/libsemanage/src/direct_api.c#L330
-
-Example adduser leak:
-
-    Direct leak of 1008 byte(s) in 14 object(s) allocated from:
-        #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae)
-        #1 0x7fb5cfffad09 in dbase_file_init src/database_file.c:170:45
-
-    Direct leak of 392 byte(s) in 7 object(s) allocated from:
-        #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae)
-        #1 0x7fb5cfffc929 in dbase_policydb_init src/database_policydb.c:187:27
-
-    Direct leak of 144 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
-        #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae)
-        #1 0x7fb5cfffb519 in dbase_join_init src/database_join.c:249:28
-
-    ...
-
-Conflict: NA
-Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/7078ed1e0b8a197aa9e5103986bce927abef87a4
----
- lib/semanage.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/semanage.c b/lib/semanage.c
-index 5d336b08..d412186c 100644
---- a/lib/semanage.c
-+++ b/lib/semanage.c
-@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ static semanage_handle_t *semanage_init (void)
- 	return handle;
- 
- fail:
-+	if (handle)
-+		semanage_disconnect (handle);
- 	semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
- 	return NULL;
- }
-@@ -156,7 +158,7 @@ done:
- 
- 
- static int semanage_user_add (semanage_handle_t *handle,
--                             semanage_seuser_key_t *key,
-+                             const semanage_seuser_key_t *key,
-                              const char *login_name,
-                              const char *seuser_name)
- {
-@@ -279,6 +281,8 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name, const char *seuser_name)
- 
- done:
- 	semanage_seuser_key_free (key);
-+	if (handle)
-+		semanage_disconnect (handle);
- 	semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
- 	return ret;
- }
-@@ -353,6 +357,9 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)
- 
- 	ret = 0;
- done:
-+	semanage_seuser_key_free (key);
-+	if (handle)
-+		semanage_disconnect (handle);
- 	semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
- 	return ret;
- }
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:backport-useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists-for-user.patch Deleted

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From e0524e813a3bae2891b33a66f35876841c11cee7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 10:46:36 +0200
-Subject: PATCH 1/4 useradd: check if subid range exists for user
-
-Check if a user already has a subid range before assigning one.
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2012929
-
-Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-
-Reference: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e0524e813a3bae2891b33a66f35876841c11cee7
-Conflict: NA
----
- src/useradd.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
-index 7ea0a9c4..e784d602 100644
---- a/src/useradd.c
-+++ b/src/useradd.c
-@@ -2188,14 +2188,14 @@ static void usr_update (unsigned long subuid_count, unsigned long subgid_count)
- 		fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
- 	}
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
--	if (is_sub_uid &&
-+	if (is_sub_uid && !local_sub_uid_assigned(user_name) &&
- 	    (sub_uid_add(user_name, sub_uid_start, subuid_count) == 0)) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
- 		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
- 		         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
- 		fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
- 	}
--	if (is_sub_gid &&
-+	if (is_sub_gid && !local_sub_gid_assigned(user_name) &&
- 	    (sub_gid_add(user_name, sub_gid_start, subgid_count) == 0)) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
- 		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
--- 
-2.12.3
-

_service:tar_scm:shadow-Remove-encrypted-passwd-for-useradd-gr.patch Changed

@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@
  4 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
 
 diff --git a/src/groupadd.c b/src/groupadd.c
-index d7f68b1..9b7a521 100644
+index 2eda1c6..d9b920f 100644
 --- a/src/groupadd.c
 +++ b/src/groupadd.c
-@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status)
+@@ -105,7 +105,9 @@ usage (int status)
  	(void) fputs (_("  -K, --key KEY=VALUE           override /etc/login.defs defaults\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow to create groups with duplicate\n"
  	                "                                (non-unique) GID\n"), usageout);
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
 +#endif
  	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --system                  create a system account\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
- 	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DI        directory prefix\n"), usageout);
-@@ -459,10 +461,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DIR       directory prefix\n"), usageout);
+@@ -435,10 +437,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
  		case 'o':
  			oflg = true;
  			break;
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@
  			rflg = true;
  			break;
 diff --git a/src/groupmod.c b/src/groupmod.c
-index acd6f35..f9dcabd 100644
+index 7fd02d6..522b65e 100644
 --- a/src/groupmod.c
 +++ b/src/groupmod.c
-@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void usage (int status)
+@@ -121,8 +121,10 @@ static void usage (int status)
  	(void) fputs (_("  -h, --help                    display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -n, --new-name NEW_GROUP      change the name to NEW_GROUP\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow to use a duplicate (non-unique) GID\n"), usageout);
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
  	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DIR       prefix directory where are located the /etc/* files\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -U, --users USERS             list of user members of this group\n"), usageout);
-@@ -449,10 +451,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -431,10 +433,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
  		case 'o':
  			oflg = true;
  			break;
@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@
  			break;
  		case 'P': /* no-op, handled in process_prefix_flag () */
 diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
-index 89abd5e..e5ba3dd 100644
+index 677ea5a..209ab9c 100644
 --- a/src/useradd.c
 +++ b/src/useradd.c
-@@ -907,7 +907,9 @@ static void usage (int status)
+@@ -970,7 +970,9 @@ static void usage (int status)
  	                "                                the user\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow to create users with duplicate\n"
  	                "                                (non-unique) UID\n"), usageout);
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
  	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --system                  create a system account\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DIR       prefix directory where are located the /etc/* files\n"), usageout);
-@@ -1366,6 +1368,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -1442,6 +1444,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
  			case 'o':
  				oflg = true;
  				break;
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
  			case 'p':	/* set encrypted password */
  				if (!VALID (optarg)) {
  					fprintf (stderr,
-@@ -1375,6 +1378,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -1451,6 +1454,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
  				}
  				user_pass = optarg;
  				break;
@@ -102,10 +102,10 @@
  				rflg = true;
  				break;
 diff --git a/src/usermod.c b/src/usermod.c
-index ca8db92..509a50b 100644
+index 0a18709..b40b569 100644
 --- a/src/usermod.c
 +++ b/src/usermod.c
-@@ -384,7 +384,9 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status)
+@@ -393,7 +393,9 @@ usage (int status)
  	(void) fputs (_("  -m, --move-home               move contents of the home directory to the\n"
  	                "                                new location (use only with -d)\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -o, --non-unique              allow using duplicate (non-unique) UID\n"), usageout);
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
  	(void) fputs (_("  -P, --prefix PREFIX_DIR       prefix directory where are located the /etc/* files\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --remove                  remove the user from only the supplemental GROUPS\n"
  	                "                                mentioned by the -G option without removing\n"
-@@ -1121,10 +1123,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -1128,10 +1130,12 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
  			case 'o':
  				oflg = true;
  				break;
@@ -129,5 +129,5 @@
  				rflg = true;
  				break;
 -- 
-2.12.3
+2.27.0

_service:tar_scm:shadow-add-sm3-crypt-support.patch Changed

@@ -4,23 +4,23 @@
 Subject: PATCH shadow add sm3 crypt support
 
 ---
- configure.ac      |   9 ++++
- etc/login.defs    |  17 ++++++++
- lib/encrypt.c     |   3 ++
- lib/getdef.c      |   4 ++
- libmisc/obscure.c |   3 ++
- libmisc/salt.c    | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/chgpasswd.c   |  48 +++++++++++++++------
- src/chpasswd.c    |  46 ++++++++++++++------
- src/newusers.c    |  61 +++++++++++++++++++-------
- src/passwd.c      |   7 ++-
- 10 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
+ configure.ac    |  9 +++++
+ etc/login.defs  | 17 +++++++++
+ lib/encrypt.c   |  3 ++
+ lib/getdef.c    |  4 ++
+ lib/obscure.c   |  3 ++
+ lib/salt.c      | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/chgpasswd.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++-------
+ src/chpasswd.c  | 44 ++++++++++++++++------
+ src/newusers.c  | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ src/passwd.c    |  7 +++-
+ 10 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
 
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 924254a..dde1de8 100644
+index 5dcd22e..c9cbbf7 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
+@@ -249,6 +249,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
  AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
  	AS_HELP_STRING(--with-sha-crypt, allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@),
  	with_sha_crypt=$withval, with_sha_crypt=yes)
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
  AC_ARG_WITH(bcrypt,
  	AS_HELP_STRING(--with-bcrypt, allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@),
  	with_bcrypt=$withval, with_bcrypt=no)
-@@ -307,6 +310,11 @@ if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
+@@ -285,6 +288,11 @@ if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
  	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms)
  fi
  
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_BCRYPT, test "x$with_bcrypt" = "xyes")
  if test "$with_bcrypt" = "yes"; then
  	AC_DEFINE(USE_BCRYPT, 1, Define to allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm)
-@@ -752,6 +760,7 @@ echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
+@@ -782,6 +790,7 @@ echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
  echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
  echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
  echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
@@ -93,10 +93,10 @@
  				method = "YESCRYPT";
  				break;
 diff --git a/lib/getdef.c b/lib/getdef.c
-index dcd1fe7..9a8089a 100644
+index 7fe6cef..7314399 100644
 --- a/lib/getdef.c
 +++ b/lib/getdef.c
-@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ static struct itemdef def_table = {
+@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ static struct itemdef def_table = {
  	{"SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
  	{"SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
  #endif
@@ -107,11 +107,11 @@
  #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
  	{"BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
  	{"BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
-diff --git a/libmisc/obscure.c b/libmisc/obscure.c
-index 3daaa95..644259d 100644
---- a/libmisc/obscure.c
-+++ b/libmisc/obscure.c
-@@ -246,6 +246,9 @@ static /*@observer@*//*@null@*/const char *obscure_msg (
+diff --git a/lib/obscure.c b/lib/obscure.c
+index 88a8773..b452092 100644
+--- a/lib/obscure.c
++++ b/lib/obscure.c
+@@ -198,6 +198,9 @@ static /*@observer@*//*@null@*/const char *obscure_msg (
  		    || (strcmp (result, "SHA256") == 0)
  		    || (strcmp (result, "SHA512") == 0)
  #endif
@@ -121,11 +121,11 @@
  #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
  		    || (strcmp (result, "BCRYPT") == 0)
  #endif
-diff --git a/libmisc/salt.c b/libmisc/salt.c
-index e5f633a..df4b328 100644
---- a/libmisc/salt.c
-+++ b/libmisc/salt.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,17 @@
+diff --git a/lib/salt.c b/lib/salt.c
+index dc242ff..e584cc1 100644
+--- a/lib/salt.c
++++ b/lib/salt.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,17 @@
  #define SHA_ROUNDS_MAX 999999999
  #endif
  
@@ -143,16 +143,7 @@
  #ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
  /*
   * Default number of base64 characters used for the salt.
-@@ -95,13 +106,17 @@ static long read_random_bytes (void);
- #if !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT
- static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size);
- #endif /* !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT */
--#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT)
-+#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_SM3_CRYPT)
- static long shadow_random (long min, long max);
--#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT */
-+#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_SM3_CRYPT*/
- #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
+@@ -93,6 +104,10 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size);
  static /*@observer@*/unsigned long SHA_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/const int *prefered_rounds);
  static /*@observer@*/void SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long rounds);
  #endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
@@ -163,25 +154,7 @@
  #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
  static /*@observer@*/unsigned long BCRYPT_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/const int *prefered_rounds);
  static /*@observer@*/void BCRYPT_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long rounds);
-@@ -195,7 +210,7 @@ end:
- 	return randval;
- }
- 
--#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT)
-+#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_SM3_CRYPT)
- /*
-  * Return a random number between min and max (both included).
-  *
-@@ -217,7 +232,7 @@ static long shadow_random (long min, long max)
- 	}
- 	return ret;
- }
--#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT */
-+#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_SM3_CRYPT*/
- 
- #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
- /* Return the the rounds number for the SHA crypt methods. */
-@@ -293,6 +308,80 @@ static /*@observer@*/void SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long round
+@@ -177,6 +192,80 @@ static /*@observer@*/void SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long round
  }
  #endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
  
@@ -211,7 +184,7 @@
 +				max_rounds = min_rounds;
 +			}
 +
-+			rounds = (unsigned long) shadow_random (min_rounds, max_rounds);
++			rounds = (unsigned long) csrand_interval (min_rounds, max_rounds);
 +		}
 +	} else if (0 == *prefered_rounds) {
 +		rounds = SM3_ROUNDS_DEFAULT;
@@ -262,7 +235,7 @@
  #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
  /* Return the the rounds number for the BCRYPT method. */
  static /*@observer@*/unsigned long BCRYPT_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/const int *prefered_rounds)
-@@ -463,7 +552,7 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)
+@@ -347,7 +436,7 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)
   * which can both be set inside the login.defs file.
   *
   * If meth is specified, an additional parameter can be provided.
@@ -271,8 +244,8 @@
   *    (if not NULL).
   *  * For the YESCRYPT method, this specifies the cost factor (if not NULL).
   */
-@@ -515,6 +604,13 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)
- 		rounds = SHA_get_salt_rounds ((int *) arg);
+@@ -399,6 +488,13 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)
+ 		rounds = SHA_get_salt_rounds (arg);
  		SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (result, rounds);
  #endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
 +#ifdef USE_SM3_CRYPT
@@ -286,7 +259,7 @@
  		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
  			 _("Invalid ENCRYPT_METHOD value: '%s'.\n"
 diff --git a/src/chgpasswd.c b/src/chgpasswd.c
-index d17acb6..9b00520 100644
+index 7b773e2..a751dda 100644
 --- a/src/chgpasswd.c
 +++ b/src/chgpasswd.c
 @@ -39,15 +39,18 @@
@@ -310,7 +283,7 @@
  #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
  static long bcrypt_rounds = 13;
  #endif
-@@ -119,6 +122,9 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status)
+@@ -121,6 +124,9 @@ usage (int status)
  #if defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
  	                " YESCRYPT"
  #endif
@@ -320,7 +293,7 @@
  	               );
  	(void) fputs (_("  -e, --encrypted               supplied passwords are encrypted\n"), usageout);
  	(void) fputs (_("  -h, --help                    display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
-@@ -126,11 +132,11 @@ static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status)
+@@ -128,11 +134,11 @@ usage (int status)

_service:tar_scm:usermod-unlock.patch Changed

@@ -2,14 +2,13 @@
 ===================================================================
 --- a/src/usermod.c
 +++ b/src/usermod.c
-@@ -466,14 +466,17 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pass)
+@@ -434,12 +434,17 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pass)
  		strcat (buf, pw_pass);
  		pw_pass = buf;
  	} else if (Uflg && pw_pass0 == '!') {
--		char *s;
-+		char *s = pw_pass;
- 
 -		if (pw_pass1 == '\0') {
++		char *s = pw_pass;
++
 +		while ('!' == *s)
 +			++s;
 +
@@ -23,16 +22,9 @@
  		}
  
  #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-@@ -482,12 +485,15 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pass)
- 		              user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 0);
- #endif
+@@ -449,6 +454,13 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pass)
  		SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "unlock user '%s' password", user_newname));
--		s = pw_pass;
--		while ('\0' != *s) {
--			*s = *(s + 1);
--			s++;
--		}
-+		memmove (pw_pass, s, strlen (s) + 1);
+ 		memmove(pw_pass, pw_pass + 1, strlen(pw_pass));
  	} else if (pflg) {
 +		if (strchr (user_pass, ':') != NULL) {
 +			fprintf (stderr,
@@ -43,8 +35,8 @@
 +		}
  #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
  		audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
- 		              "changing password",
-@@ -536,6 +542,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pwent)
+ 		              "changing password", user_newname, user_newid, 1);
+@@ -495,6 +507,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pwent)
  	if (   (!is_shadow_pwd)
  	    || (strcmp (pwent->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) != 0)) {
  		pwent->pw_passwd = new_pw_passwd (pwent->pw_passwd);
@@ -53,7 +45,7 @@
  	}
  
  	if (uflg) {
-@@ -650,6 +658,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spent)
+@@ -611,6 +625,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spent)
  	 *  + aging has been requested
  	 */
  	spent->sp_pwdp = new_pw_passwd (spent->sp_pwdp);
@@ -61,5 +53,5 @@
 +		fail_exit(E_PW_UPDATE);
  
  	if (pflg) {
- 		spent->sp_lstchg = (long) gettime () / SCALE;
+ 		spent->sp_lstchg = gettime () / SCALE;

_service:tar_scm:shadow-4.13.tar.xz Deleted

_service:tar_scm:shadow-1695232908.1dd69f1.tar -> _service:tar_scm:shadow-4.14.3.tar.xz Changed