开源软件构建与测试

Changes of Revision 9

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils.spec Changed

@@ -1,18 +1,15 @@
 Name:         ima-evm-utils
-Version:      1.3.2
-Release:      9
+Version:      1.5
+Release:      1
 Summary:      IMA/EVM control utilities
 License:      GPLv2
 URL:          http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/
-Source0:      http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/files/ima-evm-utils/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source0:      https://github.com/mimizohar/ima-evm-utils/releases/download/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 
-Patch6000:    ima-evm-utils-Support-SM2-3-algorithm-for-sign-and-v.patch
-Patch6001:    ima-evm-utils-Fix-incorrect-algorithm-name-in-hash_i.patch
-
-Patch9000:    add-save-command-to-support-digest-list-building.patch
-Patch9001:    fix-caps-parameter-cannot-be-parsed.patch
-Patch9002:    add-sm3-option.patch
-Patch9003:    skip-test-error-in-docker.patch
+Patch9000:    0001-add-save-command-to-support-digest-list-building.patch
+Patch9001:    0002-fix-caps-parameter-cannot-be-parsed.patch
+Patch9002:    0003-add-sm3-option.patch
+Patch9003:    0004-Skip-test-error-in-docker.patch
 
 BuildRequires: autoconf automake libtool asciidoc vim-common
 BuildRequires: libxslt openssl openssl-devel keyutils-libs-devel tpm2-tss-devel
@@ -54,6 +51,9 @@
 %make_install
 find %{buildroot} -type f -name "*.la" -delete -print
 
+cp -a %{_libdir}/libimaevm.so.2.0.0 %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/libimaevm.so.2.0.0
+ln -s -f %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/libimaevm.so.2.0.0 %{buildroot}%{_libdir}/libimaevm.so.2
+
 %check
 make check
 
@@ -80,6 +80,15 @@
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Fri Jul 28 2023 zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com> - 1.5-1
+- Upgrade to 1.5 with compatibility
+
+* Thu Jul 27 2023 zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com> - 1.3.2-10
+- Revert "Upgrade to 1.5"
+
+* Thu Jul 20 2023 zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com> - 1.5-1
+- Upgrade to 1.5
+
 * Mon Feb 6 2023 gaoyusong <gaoyusong2@huawei.com> - 1.3.2-9
 - fix i686 build issue

_service:tar_scm:0001-add-save-command-to-support-digest-list-building.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+From bf460c8e2001ec1227ce5a9ecf44d24782d43871 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 08:16:34 +0800
+Subject: PATCH add save command to support digest list building
+
+This patch adds save command to support IMA digest list.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tianxing Zhang <benjamin93@163.com>
+Signed-off-by: zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com>
+---
+ src/evmctl.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
+index 6d2bb67..70d07a5 100644
+--- a/src/evmctl.c
++++ b/src/evmctl.c
+@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ static int sigdump;
+ static int digest;
+ static int digsig;
+ static int sigfile;
++static int datafile;
+ static char *uuid_str;
+ static char *ino_str;
+ static char *uid_str;
+@@ -173,7 +174,8 @@ static unsigned npcrfile;
+ #define log_errno_reset(level, fmt, args...) \
+ 	{do_log(level, fmt " (errno: %s)\n", ##args, strerror(errno)); errno = 0; }
+ 
+-static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data, int len)
++static int _bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext,
++		     const unsigned char *data, int len, const char *mode)
+ {
+ 	FILE *fp;
+ 	char namestrlen(file) + (ext ? strlen(ext) : 0) + 2;
+@@ -186,7 +188,7 @@ static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data
+ 
+ 	log_info("Writing to %s\n", name);
+ 
+-	fp = fopen(name, "w");
++	fp = fopen(name, mode);
+ 	if (!fp) {
+ 		log_err("Failed to open: %s\n", name);
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -196,6 +198,18 @@ static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
++static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext,
++		    const unsigned char *data, int len)
++{
++	return _bin2file(file, ext, data, len, "w");
++}
++
++static int bin2file_append(const char *file, const char *ext,
++			   const unsigned char *data, int len)
++{
++	return _bin2file(file, ext, data, len, "a");
++}
++
+ static unsigned char *file2bin(const char *file, const char *ext, int *size)
+ {
+ 	FILE *fp;
+@@ -365,6 +379,9 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (datafile)
++		bin2file(file, "data", NULL, 0);
++
+ 	if (generation_str)
+ 		generation = strtoul(generation_str, NULL, 10);
+ 	if (ino_str)
+@@ -376,7 +393,7 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
+ 	if (mode_str)
+ 		st.st_mode = strtoul(mode_str, NULL, 10);
+ 
+-	if (!evm_immutable) {
++	if (!evm_immutable && !evm_portable) {
+ 		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && !generation_str) {
+ 			int fd = open(file, 0);
+ 
+@@ -478,7 +495,11 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
+ 		log_info("name: %s, size: %d\n",
+ 			 use_xattr_ima ? xattr_ima : *xattrname, err);
+ 		log_debug_dump(xattr_value, err);
+-		err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, xattr_value, err);
++		if (datafile)
++			err = bin2file_append(file, "data",
++				(const unsigned char *)xattr_value, err);
++		else
++			err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, xattr_value, err);
+ 		if (!err) {
+ 			log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -532,7 +553,11 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
+ 	log_debug("hmac_misc (%d): ", hmac_size);
+ 	log_debug_dump(&hmac_misc, hmac_size);
+ 
+-	err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, &hmac_misc, hmac_size);
++	if (datafile)
++		err = bin2file_append(file, "data",
++			(const unsigned char *)&hmac_misc, hmac_size);
++	else
++		err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, &hmac_misc, hmac_size);
+ 	if (!err) {
+ 		log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -593,6 +618,9 @@ static int sign_evm(const char *file, const char *key)
+ 	if (sigdump || imaevm_params.verbose >= LOG_INFO)
+ 		imaevm_hexdump(sig, len);
+ 
++	if (sigfile)
++		bin2file(file, "sig", sig, len);
++
+ 	if (xattr) {
+ 		err = lsetxattr(file, xattr_evm, sig, len, 0);
+ 		if (err < 0) {
+@@ -605,6 +633,21 @@ static int sign_evm(const char *file, const char *key)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++static int save_evm(const char *file)
++{
++	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
++	int len;
++
++	datafile = 1;
++
++	len = calc_evm_hash(file, hash);
++	if (len <= 1)
++		return len;
++	assert(len <= sizeof(hash));
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ static int hash_ima(const char *file)
+ {
+ 	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; /* +2 byte xattr header */
+@@ -717,7 +760,7 @@ static int get_file_type(const char *path, const char *search_type)
+ 
+ static int do_cmd(struct command *cmd, find_cb_t func)
+ {
+-	char *path = g_argvoptind++;
++	char *path = g_argvoptind++, *path_ptr;
+ 	int err, dts = REG_MASK; /* only regular files by default */
+ 
+ 	if (!path) {
+@@ -726,6 +769,10 @@ static int do_cmd(struct command *cmd, find_cb_t func)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	path_ptr = path + strlen(path) - 1;
++	if (*path_ptr == '/')
++		*path_ptr = '\0';
++
+ 	if (recursive) {
+ 		if (search_type) {
+ 			dts = get_file_type(path, search_type);
+@@ -905,6 +952,11 @@ static int cmd_sign_evm(struct command *cmd)
+ 	return do_cmd(cmd, sign_evm_path);
+ }
+ 
++static int cmd_save_evm(struct command *cmd)
++{
++	return do_cmd(cmd, save_evm);
++}
++
+ static int verify_evm(const char *file)
+ {
+ 	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
+@@ -2874,6 +2926,7 @@ struct command cmds = {
+ 	{"import", cmd_import, 0, "pubkey keyring", "Import public key into the keyring.\n"},
+ #endif
+ 	{"sign", cmd_sign_evm, 0, "-r --imahash | --imasig  --key key --pass=<password> file", "Sign file metadata.\n"},
++	{"save", cmd_save_evm, 0, "-r --imahash | --imasig  file", "Save file metadata.\n"},
+ 	{"verify", cmd_verify_evm, 0, "file", "Verify EVM signature (for debugging).\n"},
+ 	{"ima_sign", cmd_sign_ima, 0, "--sigfile --key key --pass=<password> file", "Make file content signature.\n"},
+ 	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

_service:tar_scm:0002-fix-caps-parameter-cannot-be-parsed.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 24c9623f563646695f6d219b2414b23f36378b42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: shenxiangwei <shenxiangwei1@huawei.com>
+Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 12:05:11 +0800
+Subject: PATCH fix caps parameter cannot be parsed
+
+Signed-off-by: shenxiangwei <shenxiangwei1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com>
+---
+ src/evmctl.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
+index 70d07a5..19175b8 100644
+--- a/src/evmctl.c
++++ b/src/evmctl.c
+@@ -472,14 +472,14 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
+ 		} else if (!strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) && (hmac_flags & HMAC_FLAG_CAPS_SET)) {
+ 			if (!caps_str)
+ 				continue;
+-			err = strlen(caps_str);
++			hex2bin(xattr_value, caps_str, strlen(caps_str) >> 1);
++			err = strlen(caps_str) >> 1;
+ 			if (err >= sizeof(xattr_value)) {
+ 				log_err("caps%u value is too long to fit into xattr%zu\n",
+ 					err + 1, sizeof(xattr_value));
+ 				err = -1;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+-			strcpy(xattr_value, caps_str);
+ 		} else {
+ 			err = lgetxattr(file, *xattrname, xattr_value, sizeof(xattr_value));
+ 			if (err < 0) {
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

_service:tar_scm:0003-add-sm3-option.patch Added

_service:tar_scm:0004-Skip-test-error-in-docker.patch Added

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From c152f534a661e9f2cb0ee125e1087df3c389dcd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: shenxiangwei <shenxiangwei1@huawei.com>
+Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 19:36:25 +0800
+Subject: PATCH Skip test error in docker
+
+Signed-off-by: zhoushuiqing <zhoushuiqing2@huawei.com>
+---
+ tests/ima_hash.test    |  5 +++++
+ tests/sign_verify.test | 10 ++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tests/ima_hash.test b/tests/ima_hash.test
+index e88fd59..abf544a 100755
+--- a/tests/ima_hash.test
++++ b/tests/ima_hash.test
+@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ trap _report_exit_and_cleanup EXIT
+ set -f # disable globbing
+ 
+ check() {
++  cat /proc/fs/ext4/sda1/options | grep xattr
++  if  `echo $?` -ne 0 ;then
++          return "$SKIP"
++  fi
++
+   local alg=$1 prefix=$2 chash=$3 hash
+   local file=$alg-hash.txt
+ 
+diff --git a/tests/sign_verify.test b/tests/sign_verify.test
+index 2bc365a..eeb75ef 100755
+--- a/tests/sign_verify.test
++++ b/tests/sign_verify.test
+@@ -136,6 +136,11 @@ check_sign() {
+   # PREFIX (signature header prefix in hex),
+   # OPTS (additional options for evmctl),
+   # FILE (working file to sign).
++  cat /proc/fs/ext4/sda1/options | grep xattr
++  if  `echo $?` -ne 0 ;then
++          return "$SKIP"
++  fi
++
+   local "$@"
+   local key verifykey
+   local FILE=${FILE:-$ALG.txt}
+@@ -246,6 +251,11 @@ check_verify() {
+   # ALG (hash algo),
+   # OPTS (additional options for evmctl),
+   # FILE (filename to verify).
++  cat /proc/fs/ext4/sda1/options | grep xattr
++  if  `echo $?` -ne 0 ;then
++	  return "$SKIP"
++  fi
++
+   local "$@"
+ 
+   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

_service:tar_scm:add-save-command-to-support-digest-list-building.patch Deleted

@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-From 6e607f4c5b3a608477bfc10405fb3c1f2ef93024 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
-Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 08:16:34 +0800
-Subject: PATCH add save command to support digest list building
-
-This patch adds save command to support IMA digest list.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tianxing Zhang <benjamin93@163.com>
----
- src/evmctl.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
-index 1815f55..439713d 100644
---- a/src/evmctl.c
-+++ b/src/evmctl.c
-@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static int sigdump;
- static int digest;
- static int digsig;
- static int sigfile;
-+static int datafile;
- static char *uuid_str;
- static char *ino_str;
- static char *uid_str;
-@@ -165,7 +166,8 @@ struct tpm_bank_info {
- static char *pcrfileMAX_PCRFILE;
- static unsigned npcrfile;
- 
--static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data, int len)
-+static int _bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext,
-+		     const unsigned char *data, int len, const char *mode)
- {
- 	FILE *fp;
- 	char namestrlen(file) + (ext ? strlen(ext) : 0) + 2;
-@@ -178,7 +180,7 @@ static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data
- 
- 	log_info("Writing to %s\n", name);
- 
--	fp = fopen(name, "w");
-+	fp = fopen(name, mode);
- 	if (!fp) {
- 		log_err("Failed to open: %s\n", name);
- 		return -1;
-@@ -188,6 +190,18 @@ static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data
- 	return err;
- }
- 
-+static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext,
-+		    const unsigned char *data, int len)
-+{
-+	return _bin2file(file, ext, data, len, "w");
-+}
-+
-+static int bin2file_append(const char *file, const char *ext,
-+			   const unsigned char *data, int len)
-+{
-+	return _bin2file(file, ext, data, len, "a");
-+}
-+
- static unsigned char *file2bin(const char *file, const char *ext, int *size)
- {
- 	FILE *fp;
-@@ -353,6 +367,9 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (datafile)
-+		bin2file(file, "data", NULL, 0);
-+
- 	if (generation_str)
- 		generation = strtoul(generation_str, NULL, 10);
- 	if (ino_str)
-@@ -364,7 +381,7 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
- 	if (mode_str)
- 		st.st_mode = strtoul(mode_str, NULL, 10);
- 
--	if (!evm_immutable) {
-+	if (!evm_immutable && !evm_portable) {
- 		if ((S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) && !generation_str) {
- 			/* we cannot at the momement to get generation of
- 			   special files kernel API does not support it */
-@@ -444,7 +461,11 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
- 		/*log_debug("name: %s, value: %s, size: %d\n", *xattrname, xattr_value, err);*/
- 		log_info("name: %s, size: %d\n", *xattrname, err);
- 		log_debug_dump(xattr_value, err);
--		err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, xattr_value, err);
-+		if (datafile)
-+			err = bin2file_append(file, "data",
-+				(const unsigned char *)xattr_value, err);
-+		else
-+			err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, xattr_value, err);
- 		if (!err) {
- 			log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
- 			return 1;
-@@ -498,7 +519,11 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
- 	log_debug("hmac_misc (%d): ", hmac_size);
- 	log_debug_dump(&hmac_misc, hmac_size);
- 
--	err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, &hmac_misc, hmac_size);
-+	if (datafile)
-+		err = bin2file_append(file, "data",
-+			(const unsigned char *)&hmac_misc, hmac_size);
-+	else
-+		err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, &hmac_misc, hmac_size);
- 	if (!err) {
- 		log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
- 		return 1;
-@@ -555,6 +580,9 @@ static int sign_evm(const char *file, const char *key)
- 	if (sigdump || imaevm_params.verbose >= LOG_INFO)
- 		imaevm_hexdump(sig, len);
- 
-+	if (sigfile)
-+		bin2file(file, "sig", sig, len);
-+
- 	if (xattr) {
- 		err = lsetxattr(file, xattr_evm, sig, len, 0);
- 		if (err < 0) {
-@@ -566,6 +594,21 @@ static int sign_evm(const char *file, const char *key)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+static int save_evm(const char *file)
-+{
-+	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
-+	int len;
-+
-+	datafile = 1;
-+
-+	len = calc_evm_hash(file, hash);
-+	if (len <= 1)
-+		return len;
-+	assert(len <= sizeof(hash));
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int hash_ima(const char *file)
- {
- 	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 2; /* +2 byte xattr header */
-@@ -678,7 +721,7 @@ static int get_file_type(const char *path, const char *search_type)
- 
- static int do_cmd(struct command *cmd, find_cb_t func)
- {
--	char *path = g_argvoptind++;
-+	char *path = g_argvoptind++, *path_ptr;
- 	int err, dts = REG_MASK; /* only regular files by default */
- 
- 	if (!path) {
-@@ -687,6 +730,10 @@ static int do_cmd(struct command *cmd, find_cb_t func)
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	path_ptr = path + strlen(path) - 1;
-+	if (*path_ptr == '/')
-+		*path_ptr = '\0';
-+
- 	if (recursive) {
- 		if (search_type) {
- 			dts = get_file_type(path, search_type);
-@@ -793,6 +840,11 @@ static int cmd_sign_evm(struct command *cmd)
- 	return do_cmd(cmd, sign_evm_path);
- }
- 
-+static int cmd_save_evm(struct command *cmd)
-+{
-+	return do_cmd(cmd, save_evm);
-+}
-+
- static int verify_evm(const char *file)
- {
- 	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
-@@ -807,7 +859,7 @@ static int verify_evm(const char *file)
- 		return len;
- 	}
- 
--	if (sig0 != 0x03) {
-+	if (sig0 != 0x03 && sig0 != 0x05) {
- 		log_err("%s has no signature\n", xattr_evm);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -2479,6 +2531,7 @@ struct command cmds = {
- 	{"import", cmd_import, 0, "--rsa pubkey keyring", "Import public key into the keyring.\n"},
- 	{"convert", cmd_convert, 0, "key", "convert public key into the keyring.\n"},
- 	{"sign", cmd_sign_evm, 0, "-r --imahash | --imasig  --key key --pass password file", "Sign file metadata.\n"},
-+	{"save", cmd_save_evm, 0, "-r --imahash | --imasig  file", "Save file metadata.\n"},
- 	{"verify", cmd_verify_evm, 0, "file", "Verify EVM signature (for debugging).\n"},
- 	{"ima_sign", cmd_sign_ima, 0, "--sigfile --key key --pass password file", "Make file content signature.\n"},
- 	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
--- 
-2.25.1
-

_service:tar_scm:add-sm3-option.patch Deleted

_service:tar_scm:fix-caps-parameter-cannot-be-parsed.patch Deleted

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 40602a7926ec13819a5926d4ac451becb44b7d98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: shenxiangwei <shenxiangwei1@huawei.com>
-Date: Fri, 19 Aug 2022 12:05:11 +0800
-Subject: PATCH fix caps parameter cannot be parsed
-
-Signed-off-by: shenxiangwei <shenxiangwei1@huawei.com>
----
- src/evmctl.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/evmctl.c b/src/evmctl.c
-index 28f4b8d..6ef2f68 100644
---- a/src/evmctl.c
-+++ b/src/evmctl.c
-@@ -440,13 +440,13 @@ static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
- 		} else if (!strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) && (hmac_flags & HMAC_FLAG_CAPS_SET)) {
- 			if (!caps_str)
- 				continue;
--			err = strlen(caps_str);
-+			hex2bin(xattr_value, caps_str, strlen(caps_str) >> 1);
-+			err = strlen(caps_str) >> 1;
- 			if (err >= sizeof(xattr_value)) {
- 				log_err("caps%u value is too long to fit into xattr%zu\n",
- 					err + 1, sizeof(xattr_value));
- 				return -1;
- 			}
--			strcpy(xattr_value, caps_str);
- 		} else {
- 			err = lgetxattr(file, *xattrname, xattr_value, sizeof(xattr_value));
- 			if (err < 0) {
--- 
-2.27.0
-

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-Fix-incorrect-algorithm-name-in-hash_i.patch Deleted

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From 455a399c1f1605d3a96fa8b89b48f4c203a48951 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
-Date: Sat, 24 Jul 2021 17:56:47 +0800
-Subject: PATCH 2/2 ima-evm-utils: Fix incorrect algorithm name in
- hash_info.gen
-
-There is no such an algorithm name as sm3-256. This is an ambiguity
-caused by the definition of the macro HASH_ALGO_SM3_256. The sed
-command is only a special case of sm3, so sm3 is used to replace
-the sm3-256 algorithm name.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
-Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
-Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
-Signed-off-by: luhuaxin <luhuaxin1@huawei.com>
----
- src/.gitignore    | 1 +
- src/hash_info.gen | 7 ++++---
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/.gitignore b/src/.gitignore
-index 38e8e3c..69d2988 100644
---- a/src/.gitignore
-+++ b/src/.gitignore
-@@ -1 +1,2 @@
- hash_info.h
-+tmp_hash_info.h
-diff --git a/src/hash_info.gen b/src/hash_info.gen
-index 5f7a97f..08d4a94 100755
---- a/src/hash_info.gen
-+++ b/src/hash_info.gen
-@@ -84,9 +84,10 @@ echo "};"
- echo "const char *const hash_algo_nameHASH_ALGO__LAST = {"
- sed -n 's/HASH_ALGO_$.*$,/\1 \L\1\E/p' $HASH_INFO | \
-   while read a b; do
--    # Normalize text hash name: if it contains underscore between
--    # digits replace it with a dash, other underscores are removed.
--    b=$(echo "$b" | sed "s/$0-9$_$0-9$/\1-\2/g;s/_//g")
-+    # Normalize text hash name: sm3 algorithm name is different from
-+    # the macro definition, which is also the only special case of an
-+    # underscore between digits. Remove all other underscores.
-+    b=$(echo "$b" | sed "s/sm3_256/sm3/g;s/_//g")
-     printf '\t%-26s = "%s",\n' "HASH_ALGO_$a" "$b"
-   done
- echo "};"
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-Support-SM2-3-algorithm-for-sign-and-v.patch Deleted

@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
-From 17b9fc3fdbc3545efe9be6482bd7cc0a9fe30791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 2021 11:16:59 +0800
-Subject: PATCH 1/2 ima-evm-utils: Support SM2/3 algorithm for sign and
- verify
-
-Keep in sync with the kernel IMA, IMA signature tool supports SM2/3
-algorithm combination. Because in the current version of OpenSSL 1.1.1,
-the SM2 algorithm and the public key using the EC algorithm share the
-same ID 'EVP_PKEY_EC', and the specific algorithm can only be
-distinguished by the curve name used. This patch supports this feature.
-
-Secondly, the openssl 1.1.1 tool does not fully support the signature
-of SM2/3 algorithm combination, so the openssl3 tool is used in the
-test case, and there is no this problem with directly calling the
-openssl 1.1.1 API in evmctl.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
-zohar@linux.ibm.com: "COMPILE_SSL: " -> "COMPILE_SSL=" in .travis.yml
-Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
-Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
-
-Signed-off-by: luhuaxin <luhuaxin1@huawei.com>
----
- .travis.yml               |  6 +++---
- src/libimaevm.c           | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
- tests/gen-keys.sh         | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tests/ima_hash.test       |  3 +--
- tests/install-openssl3.sh | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
- tests/sign_verify.test    | 10 ++++++++++
- 6 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
- create mode 100755 tests/install-openssl3.sh
-
-diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml
-index 9bea5d1..9063b04 100644
---- a/.travis.yml
-+++ b/.travis.yml
-@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ matrix:
-     include:
-         # 32 bit build
-         - os: linux
--          env: DISTRO=debian:stable VARIANT=i386 ARCH=i386 TSS=tpm2-tss
-+          env: DISTRO=debian:stable VARIANT=i386 ARCH=i386 TSS=tpm2-tss COMPILE_SSL=openssl-3.0.0-beta1
-           compiler: gcc
- 
-         # cross compilation builds
-@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ matrix:
- 
-         # glibc (gcc/clang)
-         - os: linux
--          env: DISTRO=opensuse/tumbleweed TSS=ibmtss
-+          env: DISTRO=opensuse/tumbleweed TSS=ibmtss COMPILE_SSL=openssl-3.0.0-beta1
-           compiler: clang
- 
-         - os: linux
-@@ -75,4 +75,4 @@ before_install:
- script:
-     - INSTALL="${DISTRO%%:*}"
-     - INSTALL="${INSTALL%%/*}"
--    - docker run -t ima-evm-utils /bin/sh -c "cd travis && if  \"$VARIANT\" ; then ARCH=\"$ARCH\" ./$INSTALL.$VARIANT.sh; fi && ARCH=\"$ARCH\" CC=\"$CC\" TSS=\"$TSS\" ./$INSTALL.sh && if  ! \"$VARIANT\" ; then which tpm_server || which swtpm || ../tests/install-swtpm.sh; fi && CC=\"$CC\" VARIANT=\"$VARIANT\" ../build.sh"
-+    - docker run -t ima-evm-utils /bin/sh -c "cd travis && if  \"$VARIANT\" ; then ARCH=\"$ARCH\" ./$INSTALL.$VARIANT.sh; fi && ARCH=\"$ARCH\" CC=\"$CC\" TSS=\"$TSS\" ./$INSTALL.sh && if  "$COMPILE_SSL" ; then COMPILE_SSL="$COMPILE_SSL" ./tests/install-openssl3.sh; fi  && if  ! \"$VARIANT\" ; then which tpm_server || which swtpm || ../tests/install-swtpm.sh; fi && CC=\"$CC\" VARIANT=\"$VARIANT\" ../build.sh"
-diff --git a/src/libimaevm.c b/src/libimaevm.c
-index fa6c278..423d9dc 100644
---- a/src/libimaevm.c
-+++ b/src/libimaevm.c
-@@ -518,6 +518,16 @@ static int verify_hash_v2(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash, int size,
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+#if defined(EVP_PKEY_SM2) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000
-+	/* If EC key are used, check whether it is SM2 key */
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-+		EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
-+		int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
-+		if (curve == NID_sm2)
-+			EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	st = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_new";
- 	if (!(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)))
- 		goto err;
-@@ -932,6 +942,16 @@ static int sign_hash_v2(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash,
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+#if defined(EVP_PKEY_SM2) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000
-+	/* If EC key are used, check whether it is SM2 key */
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-+		EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
-+		int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
-+		if (curve == NID_sm2)
-+			EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	calc_keyid_v2(&keyid, name, pkey);
- 	hdr->keyid = keyid;
- 
-diff --git a/tests/gen-keys.sh b/tests/gen-keys.sh
-index 407876b..ae72487 100755
---- a/tests/gen-keys.sh
-+++ b/tests/gen-keys.sh
-@@ -92,6 +92,31 @@ for m in \
-     fi
- done
- 
-+# SM2, If openssl 3.0 is installed, gen SM2 keys using
-+if  -x /opt/openssl3/bin/openssl ; then
-+  (PATH=/opt/openssl3/bin:$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/openssl3/lib
-+  for curve in sm2; do
-+    if  "$1" = clean  ||  "$1" = force ; then
-+      rm -f test-$curve.cer test-$curve.key test-$curve.pub
-+    fi
-+    if  "$1" = clean ; then
-+      continue
-+    fi
-+    if  ! -e test-$curve.key ; then
-+      log openssl req -verbose -new -nodes -utf8 -days 10000 -batch -x509 \
-+        -sm3 -sigopt "distid:1234567812345678" \
-+        -config test-ca.conf \
-+        -copy_extensions copyall \
-+        -newkey $curve \
-+        -out test-$curve.cer -outform DER \
-+        -keyout test-$curve.key
-+      if  -s test-$curve.key ; then
-+        log openssl pkey -in test-$curve.key -out test-$curve.pub -pubout
-+      fi
-+    fi
-+  done)
-+fi
-+
- # This script leaves test-ca.conf, *.cer, *.pub, *.key files for sing/verify tests.
- # They are never deleted except by `make distclean'.
- 
-diff --git a/tests/ima_hash.test b/tests/ima_hash.test
-index 8d66e59..6e0e463 100755
---- a/tests/ima_hash.test
-+++ b/tests/ima_hash.test
-@@ -70,8 +70,7 @@ expect_pass check  sha256     0x0404 e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649
- expect_pass check  sha384     0x0405 38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b
- expect_pass check  sha512     0x0406 cf83e1357eefb8bdf1542850d66d8007d620e4050b5715dc83f4a921d36ce9ce47d0d13c5d85f2b0ff8318d2877eec2f63b931bd47417a81a538327af927da3e
- expect_pass check  rmd160     0x0403 9c1185a5c5e9fc54612808977ee8f548b2258d31
--expect_fail check  sm3        0x01
--expect_fail check  sm3-256    0x01
-+expect_pass check  sm3        0x0411 1ab21d8355cfa17f8e61194831e81a8f22bec8c728fefb747ed035eb5082aa2b
- _enable_gost_engine
- expect_pass check  md_gost12_256 0x0412 3f539a213e97c802cc229d474c6aa32a825a360b2a933a949fd925208d9ce1bb
- expect_pass check  streebog256   0x0412 3f539a213e97c802cc229d474c6aa32a825a360b2a933a949fd925208d9ce1bb
-diff --git a/tests/install-openssl3.sh b/tests/install-openssl3.sh
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..1b63468
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/install-openssl3.sh
-@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
-+#!/bin/bash
-+
-+set -ex
-+
-+if  -z "$COMPILE_SSL" ; then
-+    echo "Missing \$COMPILE_SSL!" >&2
-+    exit 1
-+fi
-+
-+version=${COMPILE_SSL}
-+
-+wget --no-check-certificate https://github.com/openssl/openssl/archive/refs/tags/${version}.tar.gz
-+tar --no-same-owner -xzf ${version}.tar.gz
-+cd openssl-${version}
-+
-+./Configure --prefix=/opt/openssl3 --openssldir=/opt/openssl3/ssl
-+make -j$(nproc)
-+# only install apps and library
-+sudo make install_sw
-+
-+cd ..
-+rm -rf ${version}.tar.gz
-+rm -rf openssl-${version}
-diff --git a/tests/sign_verify.test b/tests/sign_verify.test
-index 288e133..f716319 100755
---- a/tests/sign_verify.test
-+++ b/tests/sign_verify.test
-@@ -198,6 +198,10 @@ check_sign() {
-   # This is all we can do for evm.
-    "$TYPE" =~ evm  && return "$OK"
- 
-+  # When using the SM2/3 algorithm, the openssl tool uses USERID for verify,
-+  # which is incompatible with calling API directly, so skip it.
-+   "$ALG" == sm3  && return "$OK"
-+
-   # Extract signature to a file
-   _extract_xattr "$FILE" "$(_xattr "$TYPE")" "$FILE.sig2" "$PREFIX"
- 
-@@ -366,6 +370,12 @@ sign_verify  rsa1024  sha384  0x030205:K:0080
- sign_verify  rsa1024  sha512  0x030206:K:0080
- sign_verify  rsa1024  rmd160  0x030203:K:0080
- 
-+# If openssl 3.0 is installed, test the SM2/3 algorithm combination
-+if  -x /opt/openssl3/bin/openssl ; then
-+  PATH=/opt/openssl3/bin:$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/openssl3/lib \
-+    sign_verify  sm2    sm3    0x030211:K:004345678
-+fi
-+
- # Test v2 signatures with EC-RDSA
- _enable_gost_engine
- sign_verify  gost2012_256-A md_gost12_256 0x030212:K:0040
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-

_service:tar_scm:skip-test-error-in-docker.patch Deleted

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From d3a4e24f6a2bac023f7e7c0eda403f0d8e25996d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: shenxiangwei <shenxiangwei1@huawei.com>
-Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 19:36:25 +0800
-Subject: PATCH Skip test error in docker
-
----
- tests/ima_hash.test    |  5 +++++
- tests/sign_verify.test | 10 ++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tests/ima_hash.test b/tests/ima_hash.test
-index 8d66e59..cd97e1d 100644
---- a/tests/ima_hash.test
-+++ b/tests/ima_hash.test
-@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ trap _report_exit EXIT
- set -f # disable globbing
- 
- check() {
-+  cat /proc/fs/ext4/sda1/options | grep xattr
-+  if  `echo $?` -ne 0 ;then
-+          return "$SKIP"
-+  fi
-+
-   local alg=$1 prefix=$2 chash=$3 hash
-   local file=$alg-hash.txt
- 
-diff --git a/tests/sign_verify.test b/tests/sign_verify.test
-index 288e133..e1899df 100644
---- a/tests/sign_verify.test
-+++ b/tests/sign_verify.test
-@@ -130,6 +130,11 @@ check_sign() {
-   # PREFIX (signature header prefix in hex),
-   # OPTS (additional options for evmctl),
-   # FILE (working file to sign).
-+  cat /proc/fs/ext4/sda1/options | grep xattr
-+  if  `echo $?` -ne 0 ;then
-+          return "$SKIP"
-+  fi
-+
-   local "$@"
-   local KEY=${KEY%.*}.key
-   local FILE=${FILE:-$ALG.txt}
-@@ -225,6 +230,11 @@ check_verify() {
-   # ALG (hash algo),
-   # OPTS (additional options for evmctl),
-   # FILE (filename to verify).
-+  cat /proc/fs/ext4/sda1/options | grep xattr
-+  if  `echo $?` -ne 0 ;then
-+	  return "$SKIP"
-+  fi
-+
-   local "$@"
- 
-   # shellcheck disable=SC2086
--- 
-2.37.3.windows.1
-

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis/alpine.sh Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis/centos.sh Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis/debian.sh Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis/fedora.sh Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis/opensuse.sh Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis/tumbleweed.sh Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/travis/ubuntu.sh Deleted

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/.github Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/.github/workflows Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/.github/workflows/ci.yml Added

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2021 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
+name: "distros"
+on: push, pull_request
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    outputs:
+      LINUX_SHA: ${{ steps.last-commit.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}
+    name: build
+    timeout-minutes: 100
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v3
+
+      - name: Determine last kernel commit
+        id: last-commit
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          mkdir linux-integrity
+          pushd linux-integrity
+          git init
+          LINUX_URL=${{ vars.LINUX_URL }}
+          if  -z "$LINUX_URL" ; then
+              LINUX_URL=https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
+          fi
+          LINUX_BRANCH=${{ vars.LINUX_BRANCH }}
+          if  -z "$LINUX_BRANCH" ; then
+              LINUX_BRANCH=next-integrity
+          fi
+          git remote add origin $LINUX_URL
+          LINUX_SHA=$(git ls-remote origin $GITHUB_REF_NAME | awk '{print $1}')
+           -z "$LINUX_SHA"  && LINUX_SHA=$(git ls-remote origin $LINUX_BRANCH | awk '{print $1}')
+          echo "LINUX_SHA=$LINUX_SHA" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
+          popd
+
+      - name: Cache UML kernel
+        id: cache-linux
+        uses: actions/cache@v3
+        with:
+          path: linux
+          key: linux-${{ steps.last-commit.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/kernel-configs/*') }}
+
+      - name: Cache signing key
+        id: cache-key
+        uses: actions/cache@v3
+        with:
+          path: signing_key.pem
+          key: signing_key.pem-${{ steps.last-commit.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/kernel-configs/*') }}
+
+      - name: Compile UML kernel
+        if: steps.cache-linux.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' || steps.cache-key.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
+        shell: bash
+        run: |
+          if  "$DEVTOOLSET" = "yes" ; then
+                  source /opt/rh/devtoolset-10/enable
+          fi
+          if  "$ARCH" = "i386" ; then
+                  CROSS_COMPILE_OPT="CROSS_COMPILE=i686-linux-gnu-"
+          fi
+          pushd linux-integrity
+          git pull --depth 1 origin ${{ steps.last-commit.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}
+          make ARCH=um defconfig
+          ./scripts/kconfig/merge_config.sh -m .config $(ls ../kernel-configs/*)
+          # Update manually, to specify ARCH=um
+          make ARCH=um olddefconfig
+          # Make everything built-in
+          make ARCH=um localyesconfig
+          make ARCH=um $CROSS_COMPILE_OPT -j$(nproc)
+          chmod +x linux
+          cp linux ..
+          cp certs/signing_key.pem ..
+          popd
+
+  job:
+    needs: build
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        include:
+          # 32bit build
+          - container: "debian:stable"
+            env:
+              CC: gcc
+              ARCH: i386
+              TSS: tpm2-tss
+              VARIANT: i386
+              COMPILE_SSL: openssl-3.0.5
+
+          # cross compilation builds
+          - container: "debian:stable"
+            env:
+              ARCH: ppc64el
+              CC: powerpc64le-linux-gnu-gcc
+              TSS: ibmtss
+              VARIANT: cross-compile
+
+          - container: "debian:stable"
+            env:
+              ARCH: arm64
+              CC: aarch64-linux-gnu-gcc
+              TSS: tpm2-tss
+              VARIANT: cross-compile
+
+          - container: "debian:stable"
+            env:
+              ARCH: s390x
+              CC: s390x-linux-gnu-gcc
+              TSS: ibmtss
+              VARIANT: cross-compile
+
+          # musl (native)
+          - container: "alpine:latest"
+            env:
+              CC: gcc
+              TSS: tpm2-tss
+
+          # glibc (gcc/clang)
+          - container: "opensuse/tumbleweed"
+            env:
+              CC: clang
+              TSS: ibmtss
+
+          - container: "opensuse/leap"
+            env:
+              CC: gcc
+              TSS: tpm2-tss
+
+          - container: "ubuntu:jammy"
+            env:
+              CC: gcc
+              TSS: ibmtss
+              COMPILE_SSL: openssl-3.0.5
+
+          - container: "ubuntu:xenial"
+            env:
+              CC: clang
+              TSS: tpm2-tss
+
+          - container: "fedora:latest"
+            env:
+              CC: clang
+              TSS: ibmtss
+
+          - container: "fedora:latest"
+            env:
+              CC: clang
+              TSS: ibmtss
+              TST_ENV: um
+              TST_KERNEL: ../linux
+
+          - container: "centos:7"
+            env:
+              CC: gcc
+              TSS: tpm2-tss
+
+          - container: "debian:testing"
+            env:
+              CC: clang
+              TSS: tpm2-tss
+
+          - container: "debian:stable"
+            env:
+              CC: clang
+              TSS: ibmtss
+
+          - container: "alt:sisyphus"
+            env:
+              CC: gcc
+              TSS: libtpm2-tss-devel
+
+    container:
+      image: ${{ matrix.container }}
+      env: ${{ matrix.env }}
+      options: --privileged --device /dev/loop-control -v /dev/shm:/dev/shm
+
+    steps:
+    - name: Show OS
+      run: cat /etc/os-release
+
+    - name: Git checkout
+      uses: actions/checkout@v1
+
+    - name: Install additional packages
+      run: |
+        INSTALL=${{ matrix.container }}
+        INSTALL="${INSTALL%%:*}"
+        INSTALL="${INSTALL%%/*}"
+        if  "$VARIANT" ; then ARCH="$ARCH" ./ci/$INSTALL.$VARIANT.sh; fi
+        ARCH="$ARCH" CC="$CC" TSS="$TSS" ./ci/$INSTALL.sh
+
+    - name: Build openSSL
+      run: |
+        if  "$COMPILE_SSL" ; then
+          COMPILE_SSL="$COMPILE_SSL" VARIANT="$VARIANT" ./tests/install-openssl3.sh; \
+        fi
+
+    - name: Build swtpm
+      run: |
+        if  ! "$VARIANT" ; then
+          which tpm_server || which swtpm || \
+            if which tssstartup; then
+              ./tests/install-swtpm.sh;
+            fi
+        fi
+
+    - name: Retrieve UML kernel
+      if: ${{ matrix.env.TST_ENV }}
+      uses: actions/cache@v3
+      continue-on-error: false
+      with:
+        path: linux
+        key: linux-${{ needs.build.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/kernel-configs/*') }}
+
+    - name: Retrieve signing key
+      if: ${{ matrix.env.TST_ENV }}
+      continue-on-error: false
+      uses: actions/cache@v3
+      with:
+        path: signing_key.pem
+        key: signing_key.pem-${{ needs.build.outputs.LINUX_SHA }}-${{ hashFiles('**/kernel-configs/*') }}
+
+    - name: Compiler version
+      run: $CC --version
+
+    - name: Compile
+      run: CC="$CC" VARIANT="$VARIANT" COMPILE_SSL="$COMPILE_SSL" TST_ENV="$TST_ENV" TST_KERNEL="$TST_KERNEL" ./build.sh

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/.travis.yml -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/.travis.yml Changed

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
-dist: bionic
+# Copyright (c) 2017-2021 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
+
+dist: focal
 language: C
 services:
     - docker
@@ -7,7 +9,7 @@
     include:
         # 32 bit build
         - os: linux
-          env: DISTRO=debian:stable VARIANT=i386 ARCH=i386 TSS=tpm2-tss
+          env: DISTRO=debian:stable VARIANT=i386 ARCH=i386 TSS=tpm2-tss COMPILE_SSL=openssl-3.0.5
           compiler: gcc
 
         # cross compilation builds
@@ -25,12 +27,12 @@
 
         # musl
         - os: linux
-          env: DISTRO=alpine:latest TSS=tpm2-tss
+          env: DISTRO=alpine:latest TSS=tpm2-tss CONTAINER=podman CONTAINER_ARGS="--runtime=/usr/bin/crun --network=host"
           compiler: gcc
 
         # glibc (gcc/clang)
         - os: linux
-          env: DISTRO=opensuse/tumbleweed TSS=ibmtss
+          env: DISTRO=opensuse/tumbleweed TSS=ibmtss CONTAINER=podman CONTAINER_ARGS="--runtime=/usr/bin/crun --network=host"
           compiler: clang
 
         - os: linux
@@ -38,7 +40,7 @@
           compiler: gcc
 
         - os: linux
-          env: DISTRO=ubuntu:eoan TSS=ibmtss
+          env: DISTRO=ubuntu:jammy TSS=ibmtss COMPILE_SSL=openssl-3.0.5
           compiler: gcc
 
         - os: linux
@@ -46,15 +48,15 @@
           compiler: clang
 
         - os: linux
-          env: DISTRO=fedora:latest TSS=ibmtss
+          env: DISTRO=fedora:latest TSS=ibmtss CONTAINER=podman CONTAINER_ARGS="--runtime=/usr/bin/crun --network=host"
           compiler: clang
 
         - os: linux
-          env: DISTRO=centos:7 TSS=tpm2-tss
+          env: DISTRO=centos:7 TSS=tpm2-tss CONTAINER=podman CONTAINER_ARGS="--runtime=/usr/bin/crun --network=host"
           compiler: gcc
 
         - os: linux
-          env: DISTRO=centos:latest TSS=tpm2-tss
+          env: REPO="quay.io/centos/" DISTRO="${REPO}centos:stream8" TSS=tpm2-tss CONTAINER=podman CONTAINER_ARGS="--runtime=/usr/bin/crun --network=host"
           compiler: clang
 
         - os: linux
@@ -65,14 +67,32 @@
           env: DISTRO=debian:stable TSS=ibmtss
           compiler: gcc
 
+        - os: linux
+          env: REPO="docker.io/library/" DISTRO=${REPO}alt:sisyphus TSS=libtpm2-tss-devel CONTAINER=podman CONTAINER_ARGS="--runtime=/usr/bin/crun --network=host"
+          compiler: gcc
+
 before_install:
-    - df -hT
+    # Tumbleweed requires podman due docker incompatible with glibc 2.33
+    # (faccessat2) and crun (for clone3).
+    - CONTAINER="${CONTAINER:-docker}"
+    - >
+        if  "$CONTAINER" = "podman" ; then
+            # podman
+            . /etc/os-release
+            sudo sh -c "echo 'deb http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/devel:/kubic:/libcontainers:/stable/xUbuntu_${VERSION_ID}/ /' > /etc/apt/sources.list.d/devel:kubic:libcontainers:stable.list"
+            wget -nv https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/devel:kubic:libcontainers:stable/xUbuntu_${VERSION_ID}/Release.key -O- | sudo apt-key add -
+            sudo apt update
+            sudo apt -y install fuse-overlayfs podman slirp4netns crun
+        fi
+    - $CONTAINER info
+
     - DIR="/usr/src/ima-evm-utils"
     - printf "FROM $DISTRO\nRUN mkdir -p $DIR\nWORKDIR $DIR\nCOPY . $DIR\n" > Dockerfile
     - cat Dockerfile
-    - docker build -t ima-evm-utils .
+    - $CONTAINER build $CONTAINER_ARGS -t ima-evm-utils .
 
 script:
-    - INSTALL="${DISTRO%%:*}"
+    - INSTALL="${DISTRO#${REPO}}"
+    - INSTALL="${INSTALL%%:*}"
     - INSTALL="${INSTALL%%/*}"
-    - docker run -t ima-evm-utils /bin/sh -c "cd travis && if  \"$VARIANT\" ; then ARCH=\"$ARCH\" ./$INSTALL.$VARIANT.sh; fi && ARCH=\"$ARCH\" CC=\"$CC\" TSS=\"$TSS\" ./$INSTALL.sh && if  ! \"$VARIANT\" ; then which tpm_server || which swtpm || ../tests/install-swtpm.sh; fi && CC=\"$CC\" VARIANT=\"$VARIANT\" ../build.sh"
+    - $CONTAINER run $CONTAINER_ARGS -t ima-evm-utils /bin/sh -c "if  \"$VARIANT\" ; then ARCH=\"$ARCH\" ./ci/$INSTALL.$VARIANT.sh; fi && ARCH=\"$ARCH\" CC=\"$CC\" TSS=\"$TSS\" ./ci/$INSTALL.sh && if  \"$COMPILE_SSL\" ; then COMPILE_SSL=\"$COMPILE_SSL\" VARIANT=\"$VARIANT\" ./tests/install-openssl3.sh; fi && if  ! \"$VARIANT\" ; then which tpm_server || which swtpm || if which tssstartup; then ./tests/install-swtpm.sh; fi; fi && CC=\"$CC\" VARIANT=\"$VARIANT\" COMPILE_SSL=\"$COMPILE_SSL\" ./build.sh"

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/INSTALL -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/INSTALL Changed

@@ -9,10 +9,33 @@
 notice and this notice are preserved.  This file is offered as-is,
 without warranty of any kind.
 
+Prerequisites
+=============
+
+This project has the following prerequisites:
+
+(Ubuntu package names)
+	libkeyutils-dev
+	libtasn1-dev
+	libgmp-dev
+	libnspr4-dev
+	libnss3-dev
+
+These software TPMs are supported:
+      https://sourceforge.net/projects/ibmswtpm2/
+      https://github.com/stefanberger/swtpm
+
+      swtpm depends upon
+      https://github.com/stefanberger/libtpms
+
+Supported TSSes include these.  Both are included in some distros.
+	  IBM TSS https://sourceforge.net/projects/ibmtpm20tss/
+	  Intel TSS
+
 Basic Installation
 ==================
 
-   Briefly, the shell commands `./configure; make; make install' should
+   Briefly, the shell commands `autoreconf -i; ./configure; make; make install' should
 configure, build, and install this package.  The following
 more-detailed instructions are generic; see the `README' file for
 instructions specific to this package.  Some packages provide this
@@ -51,7 +74,7 @@
    The simplest way to compile this package is:
 
   1. `cd' to the directory containing the package's source code and type
-     `./configure' to configure the package for your system.
+     `autoreconf -i' and then `./configure' to configure the package for your system.
 
      Running `configure' might take a while.  While running, it prints
      some messages telling which features it is checking for.

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/Makefile.am -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/Makefile.am Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/NEWS -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/NEWS Changed

@@ -1,3 +1,52 @@
+2023-2-24  Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
+
+	version 1.5:
+
+	* CI changes:
+	  * New: UML kernel testing environment
+	  * Support for running specific test(s)
+	  * Update distros
+	  * Update software release versions
+	* New features:
+	  * Signing fs-verity signatures
+	  * Reading TPM 2.0 PCRs via sysfs interface
+	* New tests:
+	  * Missing IMA mmapped file measurements
+	  * Overlapping IMA policy rules
+	  * EVM portable signatures
+	  * fs-verity file measurements in the IMA measurement list
+	* Build and library changes:
+	  * OpenSSL 3.0 version related changes
+	  * New configuration options: --disable-engine, --enable-sigv1
+	  * Deprecate IMA signature v1 format
+	* Misc bug fixes and code cleanup:
+	  * memory leaks, bounds checking, use after free
+	  * Fix and update test output
+	  * Add missing sanity checks
+	* Documentation:
+	  * Store the sourceforge ima-evm-utils wiki for historical
+	    purposes.
+
+2021-10-22  Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
+
+	version 1.4:
+	* Elliptic curve support and tests
+	* PKCS11 support and tests
+	* Ability to manually specify the keyid included in the IMA xattr
+	* Improve IMA measurement list per TPM bank verification
+	* Linking with IBM TSS
+	* Set default hash algorithm in package configuration
+	* (Minimal) support and test EVM portable signatures
+	* CI testing:
+	  * Refresh and include new distros
+	  * Podman support
+	  * GitHub Actions
+	  * Limit "sudo" usage
+	* Misc bug fixes and code cleanup
+	  * Fix static analysis bug reports, memory leaks
+	  * Remove experimental code that was never upstreamed in the kernel
+	  * Use unsigned variable, remove unused variables, etc
+
 2020-10-28  Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
 
 	version 1.3.2:
@@ -44,7 +93,7 @@
 	    the TPM PCRs, verify the IMA template data digest against the
 	    template data.  (Based on LTP "--verify" option.)
 	  - Ignore file measurement violations while verifying the IMA
-	    measurment list. (Based on LTP "--validate" option.)
+	    measurement list. (Based on LTP "--validate" option.)
 	  - Verify the file data signature included in the measurement list
 	    based on the file hash also included in the measurement list
 	    (--verify-sig)
@@ -193,7 +242,7 @@
 2012-04-02  Dmitry Kasatkin  <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
 
 	version 0.1.0
-	* Fully functional version for lastest 3.x kernels
+	* Fully functional version for latest 3.x kernels
 
 2011-08-24  Dmitry Kasatkin  <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/README -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/README Changed

@@ -25,33 +25,43 @@
 
  --version
  help <command>
- import --rsa pubkey keyring
- sign -r --imahash | --imasig  --portable --key key --pass password file
+ import  --rsa (deprecated) pubkey keyring
+ sign -r --imahash | --imasig  --key key --pass=<password> file
  verify file
- ima_boot_aggregate --pcrs hash-algorithm,file TPM 1.2 BIOS event log
- ima_sign --sigfile --key key --pass password file
+ ima_sign --sigfile --key key --pass=<password> file
  ima_verify file
+ ima_setxattr --sigfile file
  ima_hash file
- ima_measurement --ignore-violations --verify-sig --key "key1, key2, ..."  --pcrs hash-algorithm,file --pcrs hash-algorithm,file ... file
+ ima_measurement --ignore-violations --verify-sig --key "key1, key2, ..."
+   --pcrs hash-algorithm,file --pcrs hash-algorithm,file ...
+   --verify-bank hash-algorithm file
+ ima_boot_aggregate --pcrs hash-algorithm,file TPM 1.2 BIOS event log
+   --hwtpm
  ima_fix -t fdsxm path
- sign_hash --key key --pass password
+ ima_clear -t fdsxm path
+ sign_hash --veritysig --key key --pass=<password>
  hmac --imahash | --imasig  file
 
 
 OPTIONS
 -------
 
-  -a, --hashalgo     sha1 (default), sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512
+  -a, --hashalgo     sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, streebog256, streebog512 (default: sha256)
   -s, --imasig       make IMA signature
+      --veritysig    sign an fs-verity file digest hash
   -d, --imahash      make IMA hash
   -f, --sigfile      store IMA signature in .sig file instead of xattr
       --xattr-user   store xattrs in user namespace (for testing purposes)
-      --rsa          use RSA key type and signing scheme v1
+      --rsa          use RSA key type and signing scheme v1 (deprecated)
   -k, --key          path to signing key (default: /etc/keys/{privkey,pubkey}_evm.pem)
+                     or a pkcs11 URI
+      --keyid n      overwrite signature keyid with a 32-bit value in hex (for signing)
+      --keyid-from-cert file
+                     read keyid value from SKID of a x509 cert file
   -o, --portable     generate portable EVM signatures
   -p, --pass         password for encrypted signing key
   -r, --recursive    recurse into directories (sign)
-  -t, --type         file types to fix 'fdsxm' (f: file, d: directory, s: block/char/symlink)
+  -t, --type         file types to fix 'fxm' (f: file)
                      x - skip fixing if both ima and evm xattrs exist (use with caution)
                      m - stay on the same filesystem (like 'find -xdev')
   -n                 print result to stdout instead of setting xattr
@@ -59,7 +69,15 @@
       --smack        use extra SMACK xattrs for EVM
       --m32          force EVM hmac/signature for 32 bit target system
       --m64          force EVM hmac/signature for 64 bit target system
-      --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)
+      --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost) is deprecated
+      --ino          use custom inode for EVM
+      --uid          use custom UID for EVM
+      --gid          use custom GID for EVM
+      --mode         use custom Mode for EVM
+      --generation   use custom Generation for EVM(unspecified: from FS, empty: use 0)
+      --ima          use custom IMA signature for EVM
+      --selinux      use custom Selinux label for EVM
+      --caps         use custom Capabilities for EVM(unspecified: from FS, empty: do not use)
       --pcrs         file containing TPM pcrs, one per hash-algorithm/bank
       --ignore-violations ignore ToMToU measurement violations
       --verify-sig   verify the file signature based on the file hash, both
@@ -67,6 +85,10 @@
   -v                 increase verbosity level
   -h, --help         display this help and exit
 
+Environment variables:
+
+EVMCTL_KEY_PASSWORD  : Private key password to use; do not use --pass option
+
 
 INTRODUCTION
 ------------
@@ -125,6 +147,9 @@
 Second key format uses X509 DER encoded public key certificates and uses asymmetric key support
 in the kernel (since kernel 3.9). CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS must be enabled (default).
 
+For v2 signatures x509 certificate (containing the public key) could be appended to the
+private key (they both are in PEM format) to automatically extract keyid from its Subject
+Key Identifier (SKID).
 
 Integrity keyrings
 ----------------
@@ -194,7 +219,7 @@
 
 Configuration file x509_evm.genkey:
 
-	# Begining of the file
+	# Beginning of the file
 	 req 
 	default_bits = 1024
 	distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
@@ -245,7 +270,7 @@
 
 Configuration file ima-local-ca.genkey:
 
-	# Begining of the file
+	# Beginning of the file
 	 req 
 	default_bits = 2048
 	distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
@@ -276,7 +301,7 @@
 
 Configuration file ima.genkey:
 
-	# Begining of the file
+	# Beginning of the file
 	 req 
 	default_bits = 1024
 	distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/acinclude.m4 -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/acinclude.m4 Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/build.sh -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/build.sh Changed

@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # Copyright (c) 2020 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
 
+if  -n "$CI" ; then
+	# If we under CI only thing we can analyze is logs so better to enable
+	# verbosity to a maximum.
+	set -x
+	# This is to make stdout and stderr synchronous in the logs.
+	exec 2>&1
+
+	mount -t securityfs -o rw securityfs /sys/kernel/security
+fi
+
 set -e
 
 CC="${CC:-gcc}"
@@ -32,6 +42,14 @@
 
 cd `dirname $0`
 
+if  "$COMPILE_SSL" ; then
+	echo "COMPILE_SSL: $COMPILE_SSL"
+	export CFLAGS="-I/opt/openssl3/include $CFLAGS"
+	export LD_LIBRARY_PATH="/opt/openssl3/lib64:/opt/openssl3/lib:$HOME/src/ima-evm-utils/src/.libs:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"
+	export LDFLAGS="-L/opt/openssl3/lib64 -L/opt/openssl3/lib $LDFLAGS"
+	export PATH="/opt/openssl3/bin:$HOME/src/ima-evm-utils/src/.libs:$PATH"
+fi
+
 case "$VARIANT" in
 	i386)
 		echo "32-bit compilation"
@@ -79,9 +97,7 @@
 
 title "logs"
 if  $ret -eq 0 ; then
-	tail -3 tests/ima_hash.log
-	tail -3 tests/sign_verify.log
-	tail -20 tests/boot_aggregate.log
+	cd tests; make check_logs; cd ..
 	exit 0
 fi

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/alpine.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/alt.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/centos.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/debian.cross-compile.sh Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/debian.i386.sh Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/debian.sh Added

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Copyright (c) 2020 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
+set -ex
+
+# workaround for Ubuntu impish asking to interactively configure tzdata
+export DEBIAN_FRONTEND="noninteractive"
+
+if  -z "$CC" ; then
+	echo "missing \$CC!" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+# debian.*.sh must be run first
+if  "$ARCH" ; then
+	ARCH=":$ARCH"
+	unset CC
+else
+	apt update
+fi
+
+# ibmswtpm2 requires gcc
+ "$CC" = "gcc"  || CC="gcc $CC"
+
+case "$TSS" in
+ibmtss) TSS="libtss-dev";;
+tpm2-tss) TSS="libtss2-dev";;
+'') echo "Missing TSS!" >&2; exit 1;;
+*)  "$TSS"  && echo "Unsupported TSS: '$TSS'!" >&2; exit 1;;
+esac
+
+apt="apt install -y --no-install-recommends"
+
+$apt \
+	$CC $TSS \
+	asciidoc \
+	attr \
+	autoconf \
+	automake \
+	diffutils \
+	debianutils \
+	docbook-xml \
+	docbook-xsl \
+	e2fsprogs \
+	gzip \
+	libattr1-dev$ARCH \
+	libkeyutils-dev$ARCH \
+	libssl-dev$ARCH \
+	libtool \
+	make \
+	openssl \
+	pkg-config \
+	procps \
+	sudo \
+	util-linux \
+	wget \
+	xsltproc \
+	gawk
+
+$apt xxd || $apt vim-common
+$apt libengine-gost-openssl1.1$ARCH || true
+$apt softhsm gnutls-bin libengine-pkcs11-openssl1.1$ARCH || true

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/fedora.sh Added

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Copyright (c) 2020 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
+set -e
+
+if  -z "$CC" ; then
+	echo "missing \$CC!" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+case "$TSS" in
+ibmtss) TSS="tss2-devel";;
+tpm2-tss) TSS="tpm2-tss-devel";;
+'') echo "Missing TSS!" >&2; exit 1;;
+*) echo "Unsupported TSS: '$TSS'!" >&2; exit 1;;
+esac
+
+# ibmswtpm2 requires gcc
+ "$CC" = "gcc"  || CC="gcc $CC"
+
+yum -y install \
+	$CC $TSS \
+	asciidoc \
+	attr \
+	autoconf \
+	automake \
+	diffutils \
+	docbook-xsl \
+	e2fsprogs \
+	git-core \
+	gnutls-utils \
+	gzip \
+	keyutils-libs-devel \
+	kmod \
+	libattr-devel \
+	libtool \
+	libxslt \
+	make \
+	openssl \
+	openssl-devel \
+	openssl-pkcs11 \
+	pkg-config \
+	procps \
+	sudo \
+	util-linux \
+	vim-common \
+	wget \
+	which \
+	zstd \
+	systemd \
+	keyutils \
+	e2fsprogs \
+	acl \
+	libcap
+
+yum -y install docbook5-style-xsl || true
+yum -y install swtpm || true
+
+# SoftHSM is available via EPEL on CentOS
+if  -f /etc/centos-release ; then
+	yum -y install epel-release
+fi
+yum -y install softhsm || true
+
+# haveged is available via EPEL on CentOS stream8.
+yum -y install haveged || true
+
+./tests/install-fsverity.sh
+./tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/opensuse.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/tumbleweed.sh Added

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# Copyright (c) 2020 Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
+set -ex
+
+if  -z "$CC" ; then
+	echo "missing \$CC!" >&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+case "$TSS" in
+ibmtss) TSS="ibmtss-devel";;
+tpm2-tss) TSS="tpm2-0-tss-devel";;
+'') echo "Missing TSS!" >&2; exit 1;;
+*) echo "Unsupported TSS: '$TSS'!" >&2; exit 1;;
+esac
+
+# clang has some gcc dependency
+ "$CC" = "gcc"  || CC="gcc $CC"
+
+zypper --non-interactive install --force-resolution --no-recommends \
+	$CC $TSS \
+	asciidoc \
+	attr \
+	autoconf \
+	automake \
+	diffutils \
+	docbook_5 \
+	docbook5-xsl-stylesheets \
+	e2fsprogs \
+	gzip \
+	ibmswtpm2 \
+	keyutils-devel \
+	libattr-devel \
+	libopenssl-devel \
+	libtool \
+	make \
+	openssl \
+	pkg-config \
+	procps \
+	sudo \
+	util-linux \
+	vim \
+	wget \
+	which \
+	xsltproc \
+	gawk
+
+zypper --non-interactive install --force-resolution --no-recommends \
+	gnutls openssl-engine-libp11 softhsm || true
+
+if  -f /usr/lib/ibmtss/tpm_server -a ! -e /usr/local/bin/tpm_server ; then
+	ln -s /usr/lib/ibmtss/tpm_server /usr/local/bin
+fi

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/ci/ubuntu.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/configure.ac -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/configure.ac Changed

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # autoconf script
 
 AC_PREREQ(2.65)
-AC_INIT(ima-evm-utils, 1.3.2, zohar@linux.ibm.com)
+AC_INIT(ima-evm-utils, 1.5, zohar@linux.ibm.com)
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(foreign)
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS(config.h)
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR(m4)
@@ -15,25 +15,28 @@
 #AC_PROG_CXX
 #AC_PROG_CPP
 AC_PROG_INSTALL
-AC_PROG_LIBTOOL
 #AC_PROG_LN_S
+AC_CHECK_PROG(have_pandoc, pandoc, yes, no)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_PANDOC, test "x$have_pandoc" = "xyes")
 LT_INIT
 
 # FIXME: Replace `main' with a function in `-lpthread':
 #AC_CHECK_LIB(pthread, main)
 
-# Checks for header files.
-AC_HEADER_STDC
-
 PKG_CHECK_MODULES(LIBCRYPTO, libcrypto >= 0.9.8 )
 AC_SUBST(KERNEL_HEADERS)
 AC_CHECK_HEADER(unistd.h)
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(openssl/conf.h)
 
+# Intel TSS
 AC_CHECK_LIB(tss2-esys, Esys_Free)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(tss2-rc, Tss2_RC_Decode)
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PCRTSS, test "x$ac_cv_lib_tss2_esys_Esys_Free" = "xyes")
 
+# IBM TSS include files
+AC_CHECK_HEADER(ibmtss/tss.h, , , #define TPM_POSIX)
+AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_IBMTSS, test "x$ac_cv_header_ibmtss_tss_h" = "xyes")
+
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(sys/xattr.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR(sys/xattr.h header not found. You need the c-library development package.))
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(keyutils.h, , AC_MSG_ERROR(keyutils.h header not found. You need the libkeyutils development package.))
 
@@ -48,6 +51,16 @@
 		AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_OPENSSL_CONF, 1, Define to disable loading of openssl config by evmctl.)
 	      fi, enable_openssl_conf=yes)
 
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(sigv1,
+	      AS_HELP_STRING(--enable-sigv1, Build ima-evm-utils with signature v1 support))
+	AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_SIGV1, test "x$enable_sigv1" = "xyes")
+	AS_IF(test "$enable_sigv1"  != "yes", enable_sigv1="no")
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(engine,
+	      AS_HELP_STRING(--disable-engine, build ima-evm-utils without OpenSSL engine support),,enable_engine=yes)
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crypto, ENGINE_init,, enable_engine=no)
+	AM_CONDITIONAL(CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE, test "x$enable_engine" = "xyes")
+
 #debug support - yes for a while
 PKG_ARG_ENABLE(debug, "yes", DEBUG, Enable Debug support)
 if test $pkg_cv_enable_debug = yes; then
@@ -57,6 +70,7 @@
 fi
 
 EVMCTL_MANPAGE_DOCBOOK_XSL
+AX_DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO($KERNEL_HEADERS)
 
 # for gcov
 #CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage"
@@ -67,6 +81,8 @@
 AC_CONFIG_FILES(Makefile
 		src/Makefile
 		tests/Makefile
+		doc/Makefile
+		doc/sf/Makefile
 		packaging/ima-evm-utils.spec
 		)
 AC_OUTPUT
@@ -76,8 +92,13 @@
 echo
 echo	"Configuration:"
 echo	"          debug: $pkg_cv_enable_debug"
+echo	"   default-hash: $HASH_ALGO"
 echo	"   openssl-conf: $enable_openssl_conf"
 echo	"      tss2-esys: $ac_cv_lib_tss2_esys_Esys_Free"
 echo	" tss2-rc-decode: $ac_cv_lib_tss2_rc_Tss2_RC_Decode"
+echo    "         ibmtss: $ac_cv_header_ibmtss_tss_h"
+echo    "         sigv1:  $enable_sigv1"
+echo    "         engine: $enable_engine"
 echo	"            doc: $have_doc"
+echo	"         pandoc: $have_pandoc"
 echo

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/doc Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/doc/Makefile.am Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/doc/sf Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/doc/sf/Makefile.am Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/doc/sf/sf-diagram.html Added

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
+<HTML>
+</STYLE>
+<BODY LANG="en-US" DIR="LTR">
+<p style="text-align: center; font-family:arial">
+<FONT SIZE=+3><b><a href="https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/wiki/Home">
+See documentation at Linux IMA/EVM Wiki</a></b></FONT>
+<br>
+<FONT SIZE=+3><b>Linux Integrity Subsystem</b></FONT>
+<p>The goals of the kernel integrity subsystem are to detect if files have
+been accidentally or maliciously altered, both remotely and locally,
+appraise a file's measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended
+attribute, and enforce local file integrity.  These goals are complementary
+to Mandatory Access Control(MAC) protections provided by LSM modules, such as
+SElinux and Smack, which, depending on policy, can attempt to protect file
+integrity. The following modules provide several integrity functions:</p>
+<object type="text/html" style="float:right" height=450 data="tcg.html-20100504"></object>
+<UL>
+<LI><B>Collect</B> - measure a file before it is accessed. </li>
+<LI><B>Store</B> - add the measurement to a kernel resident list and, if a
+hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is present, extend the IMA PCR </li>
+<LI><B>Attest</B> -if present, use the TPM to sign the IMA PCR value, to
+allow a remote validation of the measurement list.</li>
+<LI><B>Appraise</B> - enforce local validation of a measurement against a
+'good' value stored in an extended attribute of the file.</li>
+<LI><B>Protect</B> - protect a file's security extended attributes
+</UL>
+<p>The first three functions were introduced with Integrity Measurement
+Architecture (IMA) in 2.6.30.  The EVM/IMA-appraisal patches add support for
+the last two features.</p>
+<p>For additional information about the Linux integrity subsystem, refer to the
+<a href="http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/linux-ima/index.php?title=Main_Page">Wiki</a>.
+</p>
+<H3><a name="Trusted-Computing">Trusted Computing: architecture and opensource components</a></H3>
+<P> IMA measurement, one component of the kernel's integrity subsystem, is part
+of an overall Integrity Architecture based on the
+<a href="https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home">Trusted Computing Group's
+</a> open standards, including Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Boot,
+Trusted Software Stack (TSS), Trusted Network Connect (TNC), and Platform
+Trust Services (PTS). The diagram shows how these standards relate, and
+provides links to the respective specifications and open source
+implementations. IMA and EVM can still run on platforms without a
+hardware TPM, although without the hardware guarantee of compromise
+detection.
+</P>
+</BODY></HTML>

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/doc/sf/sf-tcg.html Added

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
+<HTML>
+<STYLE TYPE="text/css">
+.tcg TD, .tcgcell
+{
+background-color:lightblue;
+color:black;
+font-family:sans-serif;
+font-weight:700;
+padding:0;
+}
+
+.tcg2 TD, .tcg2cell
+{
+background-color:white;
+color:black;
+font-family:sans-serif;
+padding:5;
+border:0;
+}
+</STYLE>
+<table CLASS="tcg">
+<tr> <th COLSPAN=2 ><HREF="http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/trusted_computing"></A></th> </tr>
+<tr>
+<td><h3>Applications
+<table ALIGN=RIGHT CLASS="tcg2">
+<tr>
+<th>spec</th>
+<th>info</th>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/infrastructure_work_group_platform_trust_services_interface_specification_version_10" target="_top">PTS</a></td>
+<td><a href="http://openpts.sourceforge.jp" target="_top">OpenPTS</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td style="background-color: lightblue"></td>
+<td><a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/trousers/files/tpm-tools/tpm-tools-1.3.2.tar.gz/download" target="_top">tpm-tools</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+<h2></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><h3>Libraries
+<table ALIGN=RIGHT CLASS="tcg2">
+<tr>
+<th>spec</th>
+<th>info</th>
+</tr>
+<tr><td><a href="http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/developers/software_stack" target="_top">TSS</a></td>
+<td><a href="http://trousers.sourceforge.net/" target="_top">TrouSerS</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td><h3>Linux Kernel
+<table ALIGN=RIGHT CLASS="tcg2">
+<tr>
+<th>spec</th>
+<th>info</th>
+</tr>
+<tr><td style="background-color: lightblue"></td>
+<td><a href="http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#Integrity Measurement Architecture" target="_top">IMA</a>,
+<a href="http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#Linux Extended Verification Module" target="_top">EVM</a></td>
+</td>
+</tr>
+<td><a href="http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/files/resource_files/87BCE22B-1D09-3519-ADEBA772FBF02CBD/TCG_PCClientTPMSpecification_1-20_1-00_FINAL.pdf" target="_top">tpm-1.2</a></td>
+<td><a href="http://tpmdd.sourceforge.net" target="_top">TPM driver</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td><h3>Boot
+<table ALIGN=RIGHT CLASS="tcg2">
+<tr>
+<th>spec</th>
+<th>info</th>
+</tr>
+<tr><td><a href="http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/resources/pc_client_work_group_specific_implementation_specification_for_conventional_bios_specification_version_12" target="_top">BIOS</a></td>
+<td><a href="http://sourceforge.jp/projects/openpts/wiki/GRUB-IMA" target="_top">GRUB-IMA</a>,
+<a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot" target="_top"> TBOOT</a></td>
+</tr>
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+<tr><td><h3>Hardware
+<table ALIGN=RIGHT CLASS="tcg2">
+<tr>
+<th>spec</th>
+<th>info</th>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><a href="http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/developers/trusted_platform_module"  target="_top">TPM</a></td>
+<td><a href="http://ibmswtpm.sourceforge.net" target="_top">(swTPM)</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+</BODY>
+</HTML>

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/doc/sf/sf-wiki.md Added

@@ -0,0 +1,932 @@
+The goals of the kernel integrity subsystem are to detect if files have been accidentally or maliciously altered, both remotely and locally, appraise a file's measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute, and enforce local file integrity. These goals are complementary to Mandatory Access Control(MAC) protections provided by LSM modules, such as SElinux and Smack, which, depending on policy, can attempt to protect file integrity.
+
+TOC
+
+## Overview
+### Features
+
+The following modules provide several integrity functions:
+
+-   **Collect** – measure a file before it is accessed.
+-   **Store** – add the measurement to a kernel resident list and, if a
+    hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is present, extend the IMA
+    PCR
+-   **Attest** – if present, use the TPM to sign the IMA PCR value, to
+    allow a remote validation of the measurement list.
+-   **Appraise** – enforce local validation of a measurement against a
+    “good” value stored in an extended attribute of the file.
+-   **Protect** – protect a file's security extended attributes
+    (including appraisal hash) against off-line attack.
+
+ -   **Audit** – audit the file hashes.
+
+The first three functions were introduced with Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA(#integrity-measurement-architecture-ima)) in 2.6.30.   The "appraise" and "protect" features were originally posted as a single EVM(#linux-extended-verification-module-evm)/IMA-appraisal(#ima-appraisal) patch set for in the 2.6.36 timeframe, but were subsequently split.   EVM, the "protect" feature, was upstreamed in Linux 3.2, using a simplier and more secure method for loading the 'evm-key', based on the new Kernel Key Retention Trusted and Encrypted keys(#creating-trusted-and-evm-encrypted-keys).   EVM support for protecting file metadata based on digital signatures was upstreamed in the Linux 3.3.  IMA-appraisal, the fourth aspect, appraising a file's integrity, was upstreamed in Linux 3.7.
+
+The goals, design, and benefits of these features are further described in the whitepaper "An Overview of the Linux Integrity Subsystem"(http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf "http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf").
+
+### Components
+
+IMA-measurement, one component of the kernel's integrity subsystem, is part of an overall Integrity Architecture based on the Trusted Computing Group's open standards, including Trusted Platform Module (TPM), Trusted Boot, Trusted Software Stack (TSS), Trusted Network Connect (TNC), and Platform Trust Services (PTS). The linux-ima project page contains a diagram(http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/) showing how these standards relate, and provides links to the respective specifications and open source implementations. IMA-measurement and EVM can still run on platforms without a hardware TPM, although without the hardware guarantee of compromise detection.
+
+IMA-appraisal, a second component of the kernel's integrity subsystem,  extends the "secure boot" concept of verifying  a file's integrity, before transferring control or allowing the file to be accessed by the OS.
+
+IMA-audit, another component of the kernel's integrity subsystem, includes file hashes in the system audit logs, which can be used to augment existing system security analytics/forensics.
+
+The IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit aspects of the kernel's integrity subsystem complement each other, but can be configured and used independently of each other.
+
+## Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA-measurement)
+
+
+IMA-measurement is an open source trusted computing component. IMA maintains a runtime measurement list and, if anchored in a hardware Trusted Platform Module(TPM), an aggregate integrity value over this list. The benefit of anchoring the aggregate integrity value in the TPM is that the measurement list cannot be compromised by any software attack, without being detectable. Hence, on a trusted boot system, IMA-measurement can be used to attest to the system's runtime integrity.
+
+### Enabling IMA-measurement
+
+IMA was first included in the 2.6.30 kernel. For distros that enable IMA by default in their kernels, collecting IMA measurements simply requires rebooting the kernel with a builtin  "ima_policy=" on the boot command line. (Fedora/RHEL may also require the boot command line parameter 'ima=on'.)
+
+To determine if your distro enables IMA by default, mount securityfs (mount -t securityfs security /sys/kernel/security), if it isn't already mounted, and then check if '<securityfs>/integrity/ima' exists. If it exists, IMA is indeed enabled. On systems without IMA enabled, recompile the kernel(#compiling-the-kernel-with-evmima-appraisal-enabled) with the config option 'CONFIG_IMA' enabled.
+
+### Controlling IMA-measurement
+
+IMA is controlled with several kernel command line parameters:
+
+
+ima_audit= informational audit logging
+ Format: { "0" | "1" }
+ 0 -- normal integrity auditing messages. (Default)
+ 1 -- enable additional informational integrity auditing messages.
+
+ (eg. Although file measurements are only added to the measurement list once and cached, if the inode is flushed, subsequent access to the inode will result in re-measuring the file and attempting to add the measurement again to the measurement list. Enabling ima_audit will log such attempts.)
+
+ima_policy= builtin policy
+Format:  {"tcb" | "appraise_tcb" | "secure-boot"}
+**NEW** Linux-4.13 default: no policy
+
+ima_template= template used
+ Format: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
+ Linux 3.13 default: "ima-ng"
+
+ima_hash= hash used
+ Format: { "sha1" | "md5" | "sha256" | "sha512" | "wp512" | ... }
+  'ima' template default: "sha1"
+  Linux 3.13 default: "sha256"
+
+ ima_tcb  (deprecated)
+ If specified, enables the TCB policy, which meets the needs of the Trusted Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files opened for read by uid=0.
+
+### IMA Measurement List
+
+IMA-measurements maintains a runtime measurement list, which can be displayed as shown below.
+
+- mount securityfs as /sys/kernel/security
+
+    $ su -c 'mkdir /sys/kernel/security'
+    $ su -c 'mount -t securityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security'
+
+Modify /etc/fstab to mount securityfs on boot.
+
+- display the runtime measurement list    (Only root is allowed access to securityfs files.)
+
+Example 1: 'ima-ng' template
+    $ su -c 'head -5 /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements'
+
+    PCR     template-hash                           filedata-hash                           filename-hint
+    10 91f34b5c671d73504b274a919661cf80dab1e127 ima-ng sha1:1801e1be3e65ef1eaa5c16617bec8f1274eaf6b3 boot_aggregate
+    10 8b1683287f61f96e5448f40bdef6df32be86486a ima-ng sha256:efdd249edec97caf9328a4a01baa99b7d660d1afc2e118b69137081c9b689954 /init
+    10 ed893b1a0bc54ea5cd57014ca0a0f087ce71e4af ima-ng sha256:1fd312aa6e6417a4d8dcdb2693693c81892b3db1a6a449dec8e64e4736a6a524 /usr/lib64/ld-2.16.so
+    10 9051e8eb6a07a2b10298f4dc2342671854ca432b ima-ng sha256:3d3553312ab91bb95ae7a1620fedcc69793296bdae4e987abc5f8b121efd84b8 /etc/ld.so.cache
+
+PCR: default CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX is 10
+template-hash: sha1 hash(filedata-hash length, filedata-hash, pathname length, pathname)
+filedata-hash: sha256 hash(filedata)
+
+
+Example 2:  'ima-sig' template (same format as ima-ng, but with an appended signature when present)
+
+    PCR     template-hash                           filedata-hash                           filename-hint                         file-signature
+    10 f63c10947347c71ff205ebfde5971009af27b0ba ima-sig sha256:6c118980083bccd259f069c2b3c3f3a2f5302d17a685409786564f4cf05b3939 /usr/lib64/libgspell-1.so.1.0.0   0302046e6c10460100aa43a4b1136f45735669632ad ...
+    10 595eb9bf805874b459ce073af158378f274ea961 ima-sig sha256:8632769297867a80a9614caa98034d992441e723f0b383ca529faa306c640638 /usr/lib64/gedit/plugins/libmodelines.so 0302046e6c104601002394b70ab93 ...
+
+
+Example 3: *original* 'ima' template
+
+    PCR     template-hash                           filedata-hash                           filename-hint
+    10 7971593a7ad22a7cce5b234e4bc5d71b04696af4 ima b5a166c10d153b7cc3e5b4f1eab1f71672b7c524 boot_aggregate
+    10 2c7020ad8cab6b7419e4973171cb704bdbf52f77 ima e09e048c48301268ff38645f4c006137e42951d0 /init
+    10 ef7a0aff83dd46603ebd13d1d789445365adb3b3 ima 0f8b3432535d5eab912ad3ba744507e35e3617c1 /init
+    10 247dba6fc82b346803660382d1973c019243e59f ima 747acb096b906392a62734916e0bb39cef540931 ld-2.9.so
+    10 341de30a46fa55976b26e55e0e19ad22b5712dcb ima 326045fc3d74d8c8b23ac8ec0a4d03fdacd9618a ld.so.cache
+
+PCR: default CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX is 10
+template-hash: sha1 hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)
+filedata-hash: sha1 hash(filedata)
+
+The first element in the runtime measurement list, shown above, is the boot_aggregate. The boot_aggregate is a SHA1 hash over tpm registers 0-7, assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes, if the TPM chip does not exist.
+
+- display the bios measurement list entries, used in calculating the boot aggregate
+
+    $ su -c 'head /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/ascii_bios_measurements'
+
+    0 f797cb88c4b07745a129f35ea01b47c6c309cda9 08 S-CRTM Version
+    0 dca68da0707a9a52b24db82def84f26fa463b44d 01 POST CODE
+    0 dd9efa31c88f467c3d21d3b28de4c53b8d55f3bc 01 POST CODE
+    0 dd261ca7511a7daf9e16cb572318e8e5fbd22963 01 POST CODE
+    0 df22cabc0e09aabf938bcb8ff76853dbcaae670d 01 POST CODE
+    0 a0d023a7f94efcdbc8bb95ab415d839bdfd73e9e 01 POST CODE
+    0 38dd128dc93ff91df1291a1c9008dcf251a0ef39 01 POST CODE
+    0 dd261ca7511a7daf9e16cb572318e8e5fbd22963 01 POST CODE
+    0 df22cabc0e09aabf938bcb8ff76853dbcaae670d 01 POST CODE
+    0 a0d023a7f94efcdbc8bb95ab415d839bdfd73e9e 01 POST CODE
+
+### Verifying IMA Measurements
+
+The IMA tests programs are part of the Linux Test Project.(https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/wiki)
+
+- Download, compile, and install the standalone version of the IMA LTP test programs in /usr/local/bin.
+
+    $ wget -O ltp-ima-standalone-v2.tar.gz http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/ltp-ima-standalone-v2.tar.gz
+    $ tar -xvzf ltp-ima-standalone-v2.tar.gz
+    ima-tests/Makefile
+    ima-tests/README
+    ima-tests/ima_boot_aggregate.c
+    ima-tests/ima_measure.c
+    ima-tests/ima_mmap.c
+    ima-tests/ima_sigv2.c
+    ima-tests/ltp-tst-replacement.c
+    ima-tests/pkeys.c
+    ima-tests/rsa_oid.c
+    ima-tests/config.h
+    ima-tests/debug.h
+    ima-tests/hash_info.h
+    ima-tests/ima_sigv2.h
+    ima-tests/list.h
+    ima-tests/pkeys.h
+    ima-tests/rsa.h
+    ima-tests/test.h
+    $ cd ima-tests
+    $ make
+    $ su -c 'make install'
+
+- ima_boot_aggregate <tpm_bios file>
+
+Using the TPM's binary bios measurement list, re-calculate the boot aggregate.
+
+    $ su -c '/usr/local/bin/ima_boot_aggregate /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements'
+    000 f797cb88c4b07745a129f35ea01b47c6c309cda9
+    000 dca68da0707a9a52b24db82def84f26fa463b44d
+    < snip >
+    005 6895eb784cdaf843eaad522e639f75d24d4c1ff5
+    PCR-00: 07274edf7147abda49200100fd668ce2c3a374d7
+    PCR-01: 48dff4fbf3a34d56a08dfc1504a3a9d707678ff7
+    PCR-02: 53de584dcef03f6a7dac1a240a835893896f218d
+    PCR-03: 3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275
+    PCR-04: acb44e9dd4594d3f121df2848f572e4d891f0574
+    PCR-05: df72e880e68a2b52e6b6738bb4244b932e0f1c76
+    PCR-06: 585e579e48997fee8efd20830c6a841eb353c628
+    PCR-07: 3a3f780f11a4b49969fcaa80cd6e3957c33b2275
+    boot_aggregate:b5a166c10d153b7cc3e5b4f1eab1f71672b7c524
+
+and compare the value with the ascii_runtime_measurement list value.
+
+    $ su -c 'cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | grep boot_aggregate'
+    10 7971593a7ad22a7cce5b234e4bc5d71b04696af4 ima b5a166c10d153b7cc3e5b4f1eab1f71672b7c524 boot_aggregate
+
+<br>
+
+- ima_measure <binary_runtime_measurements> \--validate\ \--verify\ \--verbose\
+
+using the IMA binary measurement list, calculate the PCR aggregate value
+
+    $ su -c '/usr/local/bin/ima_measure /sys/kernel/security/ima/binary_runtime_measurements --validate'
+    PCRAggr (re-calculated): B4 D1 93 D8 FB 31 B4 DD 36 5D DA AD C1 51 AC 84 FA 88 78 1B
+
+and compare it against the PCR value
+
+    $ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00:0a/pcrs | grep PCR-10
+    PCR-10: B4 D1 93 D8 FB 31 B4 DD 36 5D DA AD C1 51 AC 84 FA 88 78 1B
+
+### IMA re-measuring files
+
+Part of the TCG requirement is that all Trusted Computing Base (TCB) files be measured, and re-measured if the file has changed, before reading/executing the file. IMA detects file changes based on i_version. To re-measure a file after it has changed, the filesystem must support i_version and, if needed, be mounted with i_version (eg. ext3, ext4).  Not all filesystems require the explicit mount option.   With commit a2a2c3c8580a ("ima: Use i_version only when filesystem supports it") i_version is considered an optimization.  If i_version is not enabled, either because the local filesystem does not support it or the filesystem was not mounted with i_version, the file will now always be re-measured, whether or not the file changed, but only new measurements will be added to the measurement list.
+
+-   Attempt to mount a filesystem with i_version support.
+
+        $ su -c 'mount -o remount,rw,iversion /home'
+
+        mount: you must specify the filesystem type
+
+    Attempt to remount '/home' with i_version support, shown above, failed. Please install a version of the util-linux-ng-2.15-rc1(http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux-ng/v2.15/ "http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux-ng/v2.15/") package or later.
+
+-   To automatically mount a filesystem with i_version support, update /etc/fstab.
+
+        UUID=blah  /home                   ext3    defaults,iversion
+
+-   Mount the root filesystem with i_version.
+    -   For systems with /etc/rc.sysinit, update the mount options
+        adding 'iversion':
+
+            # Remount the root filesystem read-write.
+            update_boot_stage RCmountfs
+            if remount_needed ; then
+              action $"Remounting root filesystem in read-write mode: " mount -n -o remount,rw,iversion /
+            fi
+
+    -   For systems using dracut, root 'mount' options can be specified on the boot
+        command line using 'rootflags'. Add 'rootflags=i_version'. Unlike 'mount',
+        which expects 'iversion', notice that on the boot command line 'i_version'
+        contains an underscore.
+
+### Linux-audit support
+
+As of Linux-audit(http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/ "http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/") 2.0, support for integrity auditing messages is available.
+
+### Defining an LSM specific policy
+
+The ima_tcb default measurement policy in linux-2.6.30 measures all system sensitive files - executables, mmapped libraries, and files opened for read by root. These measurements, the measurement list and the aggregate integrity value, can be used to attest to a system's
+runtime integrity. Based on these measurements, a remote party can detect whether critical system files have been modified or if malicious software has been executed.
+
+Default policy
+
+    dont_measure fsmagic=PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+    dont_measure fsmagic=SYSFS_MAGIC
+    dont_measure fsmagic=DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+    dont_measure fsmagic=TMPFS_MAGIC
+    dont_measure fsmagic=SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+    dont_measure fsmagic=SELINUX_MAGIC
+    measure func=BPRM_CHECK
+    measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+
+    < add LSM specific rules here >
+
+    measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+
+But not all files opened by root for read, are necessarily part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), and therefore do not need to be measured. Linux Security Modules (LSM) maintain file metadata, which can be leveraged to limit the number of files measured.
+
+Examples: adding LSM specific rules
+
+    SELinux:
+    dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
+    dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
+
+    Smack:
+    measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+
+To replace the default policy 'cat' the custom IMA measurement policy and redirect the output to "< securityfs >/ima/policy".  Both dracut and systemd have been modified to load the custom IMA policy.  If the IMA policy contains LSM labels, then the LSM policy must be loaded prior to the IMA policy. (eg. if systemd loads the SELinux policy, then systemd must also load the IMA policy.)
+
+systemd commit c8161158 adds support for loading a custom IMA measurement policy.  Simply place the custom IMA policy in /etc/ima/ima-policy.  systemd will automatically load the custom policy.
+
+dracut commit 0c71fb6 add initramfs support for loading the custom IMA measurement policy. Build and install dracut (git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/boot/dracut/dracut.git), to load the custom IMA measurement policy(default: /etc/sysconfig/ima-policy).
+
+For more information on defining an LSM specific measurement/appraisal/audit policy, refer to the kernel Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy.
+
+
+## IMA-appraisal
+
+IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used for remote attestation. The IMA-appraisal extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute 'security.ima'. The initial method for validating 'security.ima' are hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides authenticity.
+
+### Enabling IMA-appraisal
+
+IMA-appraisal was upstreamed in Linux 3.7.  For distros that enable IMA-appraisal by default in their kernels, appraising file measurements requires rebooting the kernel first with the boot command line parameters 'ima_appraise_tcb' and ima_appraise='fix' to label the filesystem(#labeling-the-filesystem-with-securityima-extended-attributes). Once labeled, reboot with just the 'ima_appraise_tcb' boot command line parameter.
+
+Refer to compiling the kernel(#compiling-the-kernel-with-evmima-appraisal-enabled) for directions on configuring and building a new kernel with IMA-appraisal support enabled.
+
+### Understanding the IMA-appraisal policy
+
+The IMA-appraisal policy extends the measurement policy ABI with two new keywords: appraise/dont_appraise. The default appraise policy appraises all files owned by root. Like the default measurement policy, the default appraisal policy does not appraise pseudo filesystem files (eg. debugfs, tmpfs, securityfs, or selinuxfs.)
+
+Additional rules can be added to the default IMA measurement/appraisal policy, which take advantage of the SELinux labels, for a more fine grained policy. Refer to Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy.
+
+### Labeling the filesystem with 'security.ima' extended attributes
+
+A new boot parameter 'ima_appraise=' has been defined in order to label existing file systems with the 'security.ima' extended attribute.
+
+-   ima_appraise= appraise integrity measurements\
+     Format: { "off" | "log" | "fix" } \
+
+
+off - is a runtime parameter that turns off integrity appraisal verification.
+enforce - verifies and enforces runtime file integrity. \default\
+fix - for non-digitally signed files, updates the 'security.ima' xattr to reflect the existing file hash.
+
+
+After building a kernel with IMA-appraisal enabled and verified that the filesystems are mounted with i_version(#ima-re-measuring-files) support, to label the filesystem, reboot with the boot command line options 'ima_appraise_tcb' and 'ima_appraise=fix'. Opening a file owned by root, will cause the 'security.ima' extended attributes to be written. For example, to label the entire filesystem, execute:
+
+`find / \$ -fstype rootfs -o ext4 -type f \$ -uid 0 -exec head -n 1
+'{}' >/dev/null \\;`
+
+### Labeling 'immutable' files with digital signatures
+
+'Immutable' files, such as ELF executables, can be digitally signed, storing the digital signature in the 'security.ima' xattr. Creating the digital signature requires generating an RSA private/public key pair. The private key is used to sign the file, while the public key is used to verify the signature. For example, to digitally sign all kernel modules, replace <RSA private key>, below, with the pathname to your RSA private key, and execute:
+
+`find /lib/modules -name "\*.ko" -type f -uid 0 -exec evmctl sign --imasig '{}' <RSA private key> \;`
+
+evmctl manual page is here evmctl.1.html(http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/evmctl.1.html)
+
+### Running with IMA-appraisal
+
+Once the filesystem has been properly labeled, before rebooting, re-install the new labeled kernel.  Modify the initramfs(#building-an-initramfs-to-load-keys) to load the RSA public key on the IMA keyring, using evmctl. Reboot with the 'ima_appraise_tcb' and, possibly, the 'rootflags=i_version' options.
+
+## Extending trusted and secure boot to the OS
+
+( Place holder )
+
+### Including file signatures in the measurement list
+
+The 'ima-sig' template, in addition to the file data hash and the full pathname, includes the file signature, as stored in the 'security.ima' extended attribute.
+
+    10 d27747646f317e3ca1205287d0615073fe676bc6 ima-sig sha1:08f8f20c14e89da468bb238
+    d2012c9458ae67f6a /usr/bin/mkdir 030202afab451100802b22e3ed9f6a70fb5babf030d1181
+    8152b493bd6bfd916005fad7fdcfd7f88d43f6cffaf6fd1ea3b75032dd702b661d4717729e4a3fa4
+    ee95a47f239955491fc8064eca8cb96302d305d59750ae4ffde0a5f615f910475eee72ae0306e4ae
+    0269d7d04af2a485898eec3286795d621e83b7dedc99f5019b7ee49b189f3ded0a2
+
+    # getfattr -m ^security --dump -e hex /usr/bin/mkdir
+    # file: usr/bin/mkdir
+    security.evm=0x0238b0cdd9e97d5bed3bcde5a4793ef8da6fe7c7cc
+    security.ima=0x030202afab451100802b22e3ed9f6a70fb5babf030d11818152b493bd6bfd916005fad
+    7fdcfd7f88d43f6cffaf6fd1ea3b75032dd702b661d4717729e4a3fa4ee95a47f239955491fc8064eca8cb
+    96302d305d59750ae4ffde0a5f615f910475eee72ae0306e4ae0269d7d04af2a485898eec3286795d621e8
+    3b7dedc99f5019b7ee49b189f3ded0a2
+
+
+### Signing IMA-appraisal keys
+
+( Place holder )
+
+## IMA-audit
+
+IMA-audit includes file hashes in the audit log, which can be used to augment existing system security analytics/forensics. IMA-audit extends the IMA policy ABI with the policy action keyword - "audit".
+
+Example policy to audit  executable file hashes
+
+    audit func=BPRM_CHECK
+
+
+
+## Linux Extended Verification Module (EVM)
+
+EVM detects offline tampering of the security extended attributes (e.g. security.selinux, security.SMACK64, security.ima), which is the basis for LSM permission decisions and, with the IMA-appraisal extension, integrity appraisal decisions. EVM provides a framework, and two methods for detecting offline tampering of the security extended attributes. The initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 across a set of security extended attributes, storing the HMAC as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. The other method is based on a digital signature of the security extended attributes hash. To verify the integrity of an extended attribute, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr(), which re-calculates either the HMAC or the hash, and compares it with the version stored in 'security.evm'.
+
+### Enabling EVM
+
+EVM was upstreamed in Linux 3.2. EVM-digital-signatures is currently in the Linux 3.3 release candidate.
+
+Refer to compiling the kernel(#compiling-the-kernel-with-evmima-appraisal-enabled), for directions on configuring and building a new kernel with EVM support.
+
+### Running EVM
+
+EVM is configured automatically to protect standard “security” extended attributes:
+
+-   security.ima (IMA's stored “good” hash for the file)
+-   security.selinux (the selinux label/context on the file)
+-   security.SMACK64 (Smack's label on the file)
+-   security.capability (Capability's label on executables)
+
+EVM protects the configured extended attributes with an HMAC across their data, keyed with an EVM key provided at boot time. EVM looks for this key named 'evm-key' on root's key ring. Refer to trusted and EVM encrypted keys(#creating-trusted-and-evm-encrypted-keys), for directions on creating EVM keys. Once loaded, EVM can be activated by writing a '1' to the evm securityfs file: `**echo "1" >/sys/kernel/security/evm**`
+
+Before EVM is activated, any requested integrity appraisals are unknown, so the EVM startup should be done early in the boot process, preferably entirely within the kernel and initramfs (which are measured by trusted grub) and before any reference to the real root filesystem. To build an initramfs with EVM enabled, build and install dracut (git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/boot/dracut/dracut.git), which contains the trusted and EVM dracut modules.
+
+### Labeling the filesystem with 'security.evm'
+
+A new boot parameter 'evm=fix' has been defined in order to label existing file systems with the 'security.evm' extended attribute.
+
+After building a kernel with EVM, IMA-appraisal, and trusted and encrypted keys enabled, installed the trusted and EVM dracut modules, created the EVM key, and verified that the filesystems are mounted, including root, with i_version(#ima-re-measuring-files) support, to label the filesystem, reboot with the command line options 'ima_tcb', 'ima_appraise_tcb', 'ima_appraise=fix', 'evm=fix' and, possibly, 'rootflags=i_version'.
+
+Once EVM is started, as existing file metadata changes or as new files are created, EVM assumes that the LSM has approved such changes, and automatically updates the HMACs accordingly, assuming the existing value is valid. In fix mode, opening a file owned by root, will fix the 'security.ima' extended attribute, causing the 'security.evm' extended attribute to be written as well, regardless if the existing security 'ima' or 'evm' extended attributes are valid. To label the entire filesystem, execute:
+
+`find / -fstype ext4 -type f -uid 0 -exec head -n 1 '{}' >/dev/null \;`
+
+The following sign_file script can be used to label all 'ELF' files with EVM and IMA digital signatures, and all other files with just an EVM digital signature.
+
+sign_file:
+
+    #!/bin/sh
+    #label "immutable" files with EVM/IMA digital signatures
+    #label everything else with just EVM digital signatures
+
+    file $1 | grep 'ELF' > /dev/null
+    if  $? -eq 0 ; then
+         evmctl sign --imasig $1 /home/zohar/privkey_evm.pem
+    else
+         evmctl sign --imahash $1 /home/zohar/privkey_evm.pem
+    fi
+
+Instead of opening the file using head, digitally sign the files:
+
+`find / $ -fstype rootfs -o -fstype ext3 -o -fstype ext4 $ -type f -exec sign_file.sh {} \;`
+
+
+Once the filesystem has been properly labeled, before rebooting, re-install the new labeled kernel. Modify the initramfs to load the RSA public keys on the EVM and IMA keyring. Reboot with just the 'ima_tcb', 'ima_appraise_tcb' and, possibly, 'rootflags=i_version' options.
+
+## Compiling the kernel with EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled
+
+For those unfamiliar with building a linux kernel, here is a short list of existing websites.
+
+-   http://kernelnewbies.org/KernelBuild(http://kernelnewbies.org/KernelBuild "http://kernelnewbies.org/KernelBuild")
+-   http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BuildingUpstreamKernel(http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BuildingUpstreamKernel "http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/BuildingUpstreamKernel")
+-   https://wiki.ubuntu.com/KernelTeam/GitKernelBuild(https://wiki.ubuntu.com/KernelTeam/GitKernelBuild "https://wiki.ubuntu.com/KernelTeam/GitKernelBuild")
+
+###  Configuring the kernel
+
+Depending on the distro, some of these options might already be enabled, but not necessarily as builtin.  For distros with recent kernels, download the distro's kernel source and recompile the kernel with the additional .config options, below.  (Refer to the distro's documentation for building and installing the kernel from source.)
+
+For IMA, enable the following .config options:
+
+    CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
+    CONFIG_IMA=y
+    CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10
+    CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT=y
+    CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=y
+
+For IMA-appraisal, enable the following .config options:
+
+    CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y
+    CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
+    CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y
+
+EVM has a dependency on encrypted keys, which should be encrypted/decrypted using a trusted key. For those systems without a TPM, the EVM key could be encrypted/decrypted with a user-defined key instead.  For EVM, enable the following .config options:
+
+    CONFIG_TCG_TPM=y
+
+    CONFIG_KEYS=y
+    CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y
+    CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y
+
+    CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y
+    CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
+    CONFIG_EVM=y
+
+For the new 'ima-ng'/'ima-sig' template support(linux 3.13), clone the stable tree.
+
+    $ cd ~/src/kernel
+    $ git clone git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git
+
+    $ cd linux-stable
+    $ git remote update
+    $ git checkout --track -b linux-3.13.y origin/linux-3.13.y
+
+and enable these additional .config options:
+
+    CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=y
+    CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"
+    CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=y
+
+
+###  Installing the new kernel
+
+If enabling EVM, before installing the new kernel, follow the directions for creating the EVM encrypted key (#creating_trusted_and_evm_encrypted keys) and EVM/IMA public keys (#creating_and_loading_the_evm_and_ima_publicprivate_keypairs).
+
+Install the kernel as normal.
+
+    $ su -c "make modules_install install"
+
+## Creating trusted and EVM encrypted keys
+
+Trusted and encrypted keys are two new key types (upstreamed in 2.6.38) added to the existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable length symmetic keys and, in both cases, are created in the kernel. User space sees, stores, and loads only encrypted blobs. Trusted Keys require the availability of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip for greater security, while encrypted keys can be used on any system. All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ascii for convenience, and are integrity verified.
+
+Depending on the distro, trusted and encrypted keys might not be enabled. Refer to compiling the kernel(#compiling-the-kernel-with-evmima-appraisal_enabled), for directions on configuring and building a new kernel with trusted and encrypted key support.
+
+The trusted and EVM dracut modules, by default, looks for the trusted and EVM encrypted keys in /etc/keys. To create and save the kernel master and EVM keys,
+
+    $ su -c 'mkdir -p /etc/keys'
+
+    # To create and save the kernel master key (trusted type):
+    $ su -c 'modprobe trusted encrypted'
+    $ su -c 'keyctl add trusted kmk-trusted "new 32" @u'
+    $ su -c 'keyctl pipe `keyctl search @u trusted kmk-trusted` >/etc/keys/kmk-trusted.blob'
+
+    # Create the EVM encrypted key
+    $ su -c 'keyctl add encrypted evm-key "new trusted:kmk-trusted 32" @u'
+    $ su -c 'keyctl pipe `keyctl search @u encrypted evm-key` >/etc/keys/evm-trusted.blob'
+
+For those systems which don't have a TPM, but want to experiment with EVM, create a user key of 32 random bytes, and an EVM user encrypted key. Unlike trusted/encrypted keys, user type key data is visible to userspace.
+
+    $ su -c 'mkdir -p /etc/keys'
+
+    # To create and save the kernel master key (user type):
+    $ su -c 'modprobe trusted encrypted'
+    $ su -c 'keyctl add user kmk-user "`dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 2>/dev/null`" @u'
+    $ su -c 'keyctl pipe `keyctl search @u user kmk-user` > /etc/keys/kmk-user.blob'
+
+    # Create the EVM encrypted key
+    $ su -c 'keyctl add encrypted evm-key "new user:kmk-user 32" @u'
+    $ su -c 'keyctl pipe `keyctl search @u encrypted evm-key` >/etc/keys/evm-user.blob'
+
+Update /etc/sysconfig/masterkey to reflect using a 'user-defined' master key type.
+
+    MULTIKERNELMODE="NO"
+    MASTERKEYTYPE="user"
+    MASTERKEY="/etc/keys/kmk-${MASTERKEYTYPE}.blob"
+
+Similarly update /etc/sysconfig/evm or on the boot command line specify the EVM key filename (eg. 'evmkey=/etc/keys/evm-user.blob'.)
+<br>
+## Creating and loading the EVM and IMA public/private keypairs
+### Digital Signatures: generating an RSA public/private key pair
+
+    # generate unencrypted private key
+    openssl genrsa -out privkey_evm.pem 1024
+
+    # or generate encrypted (password protected) private key
+    openssl genrsa -des3 -out privkey_evm.pem 1024
+
+    # or convert unencrypted key to encrypted on
+    openssl rsa -in /etc/keys/privkey_evm.pem -out privkey_evm_enc.pem -des3
+    or
+    openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -in /etc/keys/privkey_evm.pem -out privkey_evm_enc.pem
+
+    openssl rsa -pubout -in privkey_evm.pem -out pubkey_evm.pem
+
+### ima-evm-utils: installing the package from source
+
+ima-evem-utils is used to sign files, using the private key, and to load the public keys on the ima/evm keyrings.  ima-evm-utils can be cloned from git repo with the following command:
+
+    git clone git://linux-ima.git.sourceforge.net/gitroot/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils.git
+    cd ima-evm-utils
+    ./autogen.sh
+    ./configure
+    make
+    sudo make install
+
+evmctl manual page is here evmctl.1.html(http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/evmctl.1.html)
+
+### IMA/EVM keyrings: loading the public keys
+
+    ima_id=`keyctl newring _ima @u`
+    evmctl import /etc/keys/pubkey_ima.pem $ima_id
+
+    evm_id=`keyctl newring _evm @u`
+    evmctl import /etc/keys/pubkey_evm.pem $evm_id
+
+## Building an initramfs to load keys
+
+Modify the initramfs to load the EVM encrypted key and the EVM/IMA public keys on their respective keyrings.
+
+### dracut
+
+Dracut commits 0c71fb6 and e1ed2a2 add support for loading the masterkey and the EVM encrypted key, not the EVM/IMA public keys (todo).
+
+    0c71fb6 dracut: added new module integrityy
+    e1ed2a2 dracut: added new module masterkey
+
+Clone dracut (git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/boot/dracut/dracut.git). By default, the masterkey and integrity modules are not enabled in the dracut git tree.  Edit module-setup in both directories, changing the check() return value to 0.  'make' and 'install' dracut.
+
+Create an initramfs:
+
+    # dracut -H -f /boot/initramfs-<kernel> <kernel> -M
+
+And add a grub2 menu entry:
+
+    # grub2-mkconfig -o /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
+
+
+### initramfs-tools
+
+To enable IMA/EVM in initramfs-tools it is necessary to add just 2 files to /etc/initramfs-tools directory.
+
+/etc/initramfs-tools/hooks/ima.sh:
+
+    #!/bin/sh
+
+    echo "Adding IMA binaries"
+
+    . /usr/share/initramfs-tools/hook-functions
+
+    copy_exec /etc/keys/evm-key
+    copy_exec /etc/keys/pubkey_evm.pem
+    copy_exec /etc/ima_policy
+    copy_exec /bin/keyctl
+    copy_exec /usr/bin/evmctl /bin/evmctl
+
+/etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/local-top/ima.sh:
+
+    #!/bin/sh -e
+
+    PREREQ=""
+
+    # Output pre-requisites
+    prereqs()
+    {
+            echo "$PREREQ"
+    }
+
+    case "$1" in
+        prereqs)
+            prereqs
+            exit 0
+            ;;
+    esac
+
+    grep -q "ima=off" /proc/cmdline && exit 1
+
+    mount -n -t securityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security
+
+    IMA_POLICY=/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
+    LSM_POLICY=/etc/ima_policy
+
+    grep -v "^#" $LSM_POLICY >$IMA_POLICY
+
+    # import EVM HMAC key
+    keyctl show |grep -q kmk || keyctl add user kmk "testing123" @u
+    keyctl add encrypted evm-key "load `cat /etc/keys/evm-key`" @u
+    #keyctl revoke kmk
+
+    # import Module public key
+    mod_id=`keyctl newring _module @u`
+    evmctl import /etc/keys/pubkey_evm.pem $mod_id
+
+    # import IMA public key
+    ima_id=`keyctl newring _ima @u`
+    evmctl import /etc/keys/pubkey_evm.pem $ima_id
+
+    # import EVM public key
+    evm_id=`keyctl newring _evm @u`
+    evmctl import /etc/keys/pubkey_evm.pem $evm_id
+
+    # enable EVM
+    echo "1" > /sys/kernel/security/evm
+
+    # enable module checking
+    #echo "1" > /sys/kernel/security/module_check
+
+
+generate new initramfs:
+
+    update-initramfs -k 3.4.0-rc5-kds+ -u
+
+Edit GRUB bootloader /boot/grub/custom.cfg:
+
+    menuentry 'IMA' {
+        set gfxpayload=$linux_gfx_mode
+        insmod gzio
+        insmod part_msdos
+        insmod ext2
+        set root='(hd0,msdos1)'
+        # add following string to kernel command line to enable "fix" mode: "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix"
+        linux   /boot/vmlinuz-3.4.0-rc5-kds+ root=/dev/sda1 ro nosplash ima_audit=1 ima_tcb=1 ima_appraise_tcb=1
+        initrd  /boot/initrd.img-3.4.0-rc5-kds+
+    }
+
+## IMA policy examples
+### Builtin policys
+
+**Enabled on the boot command line:**
+
+*ima_tcb* - measures all files read as root and all files executed
+*ima_appraise_tcb* - appraises all files owned by root
+
+### audit log all executables
+
+    # audit log all executables
+    audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
+
+### Measure nothing, appraise everything
+
+    #
+    # Integrity measure policy
+    #
+    # Do not measure anything, but appraise everything
+    #
+    # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x9fa0
+    # SYSFS_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x62656572
+    # DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x64626720
+    # TMPFS_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
+    # RAMFS_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+    # DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+    # BIFMT
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+    # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+    # SELINUXFS_MAGIC
+    dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+    appraise
+
+
+## ima-evm-utils
+
+ima-evm-utils package provides the *evmctl* utility that can be used for producing and verifying digital signatures, which are used by Linux kernel integrity subsystem. It can be also used to import keys into the kernel keyring.
+
+evmctl manual page is located here: http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/evmctl.1.html(http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/evmctl.1.html)
+
+
+<br>
+
+## Using IMA/EVM on Android
+
+Enabling IMA/EVM is not very difficult task but involves few tricky steps related to file system creation and labeling.
+
+Android source code is kept in GIT repositories and usually downloaded using 'repo' tool.
+
+IMA/EVM support was implemented using Android 5.0.2 source tree and tested on Huawei P8.
+
+Set of patches is located here(https://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/files/Android%20patches/).
+
+### Kernel configuration
+
+Kernel source code is usually located in the 'kernel' folder in the root of the Android source tree.
+Huawei P8 runs on HiSilicon Kirin 930/935 64 bit ARM CPU.
+
+Default kernel configuration file is 'kernel/arch/arm64/configs/hisi_3635_defconfig'
+
+Following lines were added:
+
+	# Integrity
+	CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
+	CONFIG_IMA=y
+	CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10
+	CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT=y
+	CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=y
+	CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y
+	CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y
+	CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y
+	CONFIG_EVM=y
+
+	# Keys
+	CONFIG_KEYS=y
+	CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS=y
+	CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y
+	CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y
+
+
+
+### Kernel command line parameters
+
+Kernel command line parameters are usually specified in board configuration files, such as BoardConfig.mk, for example, 'device/hisi/hi3635/BoardConfig.mk
+
+Add following lines to the file:
+
+	BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE += ima_audit=1
+	BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE += ima_tcb ima_appraise_tcb
+	# enable fix mode while testing
+	BOARD_KERNEL_CMDLINE += ima_appraise=fix evm=fix
+
+
+### IMA boot initialization
+
+To boot Android, devices usually have boot partition which is flashed with boot.img.
+boot.img consist of the kernel and compressed ramdisk which includes Android root filesystem.
+boot.img is usually protected using digital signature which is verified by the Android bootloader as a part of Secure Boot process.
+
+Root filesystem contains Android 'init' system and minimal set of tools, which is required to initialize and mount rest of filesystems, including '/system' and '/data'.
+
+Android uses own 'init' system (system/core/init) which reads configuration from '/init.rc' and multiple sourced '/init.*.rc' scripts located in the root folder.
+
+We used to use shell scripts to load IMA/EVM keys and policy. On desktop systems there is no limitation on ramdisk size, but on Android devices it is limited by the size of the boot partition. Android ramdisk/root filesystem does not include shell, but including adding shell, keyctl, evmctl makes ramdisk so big so that boot.img does not fit to the boot partition.
+
+For that reason it was necessary to implement IMA/EVM initialization functionality as native program 'ima-init'.
+
+This patch (0004-ima_init-tool-to-load-IMA-EVM-keys-and-policy.patch(http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/files/Android%20patches/0004-ima_init-tool-to-load-IMA-EVM-keys-and-policy.patch/view)) adds 'system/extras/ima-init' project to the Android source tree. It builds '/ima-init' initialization program and generates private and public keys to sign filesystem image usign EVM signatures and verify them during runtime.
+
+ima-init project also includes 'ima_key_gen.sh' script to generate keys and certificates and also basic 'ima_policy', which needs to be changed based on the particular need.
+
+ima-init and public keys are included in the ramdisk root filesystem.
+
+In order to initialize IMA/EVM it is necessary add like following configuration to relevant init.rc file:
+
+	service ima /sbin/ima_init
+	    class main
+	    user root
+	    group root
+	    disabled
+	    seclabel u:r:init:s0
+	    oneshot
+
+Above example add 'ima' service which is used to initialize IMA.
+
+IMA service needs to be started using 'start ima' before mounting any real filesystem. For example it was added to the 'on fs' target before mounting 'system' partition.
+
+	on fs
+	    mount securityfs none /sys/kernel/security
+	    start ima
+
+	    wait /dev/block/mmcblk0p38
+	    mount ext4 /dev/block/mmcblk0p38 /system ro
+
+	    wait /dev/block/mmcblk0p40
+	    mount ext4 /dev/block/mmcblk0p40 /data nosuid nodev noatime data=ordered,i_version
+
+
+### Mounting filesystems (with iversion)
+
+In order IMA would update 'security.ima' when file changes, it is necessary to mount filesystems with i_version support. Android usually mounts all filesystems in init.rc scripts using 'mount' command. Notice in the example above that '/data' partition is mounted using 'i_version' options.
+
+Desktop mount tool from mount package recognizes iversion option and pass necessary flag to mount system call. Unrecognized options are passed as a string in the last argument of the mount system call to the kernel filesystem module. Kernel filesystem modules recognize 'i_version' option instead of 'iversion'. Thus on the desktop systems it is possible to use both iversion and i_version options.
+
+Android tools do not recognize 'iversion' option. It is necessary to use 'i_version' option.
+
+init.rc 'mount' command options are located after the mount point. All except last are 'init' builtin options and *only* the last option is passed as a string to the mount system call. Thus it is necessary to put 'i_version' option as a last option or to add it to the comma separated option list as above.
+
+
+### Filesystem labeling
+
+Filesystem labeling with digital signatures has to be done during image creation process. It can be done using two approaches.
+
+The easiest approach is to label ready image. It requires following steps:
+
+1. convert sparse image to normal image using simg2img tool
+1. 'loop mount' the image
+1. label filesystem using evmctl tool
+1. unmount image
+1. convert image back to sparse image using img2simg tool
+
+But mount operation would require root privileges to mount filesystem.
+
+Android 'make_ext4fs' tool is used to create filesystem image. It provides support for labeling filesystem using 'security labels' (SELinux). We extended make_ext4fs to compute and set IMA/EVM signatures while creating a filesystem. It uses extended version of 'evmctl' to compute signatures by passing all relevant file metadata using evmctl command line parameters.
+
+Here is a patch that adds IMA/EVM support to the make_ext4fs (0003-IMA-EVM-labelling-support.patch(http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/files/Android%20patches/0003-IMA-EVM-labelling-support.patch/view)).
+
+
+### Additional tools
+
+It is convenient for testing and debugging to have additional tools such as keyctl and getfattr tools on the device.
+
+#### evmctl
+
+For Android, 'evmct' is a host only tool to compute IMA/EVM signatures and convert RSA keys to the kernel binary format.
+
+'evmctl' was extended to pass file metadata using command line parameters:
+
+      --ino          use custom inode for EVM
+      --uid          use custom UID for EVM
+      --gid          use custom GID for EVM
+      --mode         use custom Mode for EVM
+      --generation   use custom Generation for EVM(unspecified: from FS, empty: use 0)
+      --ima          use custom IMA signature for EVM
+      --selinux      use custom Selinux label for EVM
+      --caps         use custom Capabilities for EVM(unspecified: from FS, empty: do not use)
+
+
+#### keyctl
+
+This patch (0002-keyctl-tool.patch(http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/files/Android%20patches/0002-keyctl-tool.patch/view)) adds project system/extras/keyctl.
+
+#### getfattr
+
+This patch (0001-getfattr-tool.patch(http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/files/Android%20patches/0001-getfattr-tool.patch/view)) adds project system/extras/getfattr.
+
+<br>
+
+## Frequently asked questions
+
+-   Why is the first entry in the IMA measurement list (/sys/kernel/security ima/ascii_runtime_measurements) are 0's?
+
+    The first entry is the TPM boot aggregate containing PCR values 0 -
+    7. Enable the TPM in BIOS and take ownership.
+
+-   How do I take ownership of the TPM?
+
+    To take ownership of the TPM, download the tpm-tools, start tcsd (eg. 'service tcsd start'), and execute "tpm_takeownership -u -z". This will set the SRK key to the well-known secret(20 zeroes) and prompt for the TPM owner password.
+
+-   Why are there 0x00 entries in the measurement list?
+
+    The measurement list is invalidated, when a regular file is opened for read and, at the same time, opened for write. In the majority of cases, these files should not have been measured in the first place (eg. log files). In other cases, the application needs to be fixed.
+
+-   Why aren't files re-measured and added to the IMA measurement list
+    after being updated?
+
+    To detect files changing, the filesystem needs to be mounted with i_version support. For the root filesystem, either update /etc/rc.sysinit or add 'rootflags=i_version' boot command line option. For all other filesystems, modify /etc/fstab.
+
+-   Why doesn't the measurement list verify?
+
+    On some systems, after a suspend/resume, the TPM measurement list does not verify. On those systems, add the boot command line option "tpm.suspend_pcr=< unused PCR >".
+
+-   Why are there two /init entries in the measurement list?
+
+    The first '/init' is from the initramfs. The second /init is from the root filesystem (eg. /sbin/init). The IMA ng/nglong template patches will provide additional metadata to help correlate measurement entries and files.
+
+-   Why am I unable to boot the new EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled kernel?
+
+    After building a new kernel with EVM/IMA-appraisal enabled, the filesystem must be labeled with 'security.evm' and 'security.ima' extended attributes. After creating an EVM
+    key(#creating_trusted_and_evm_encrypted_keys), boot the new kernel with the 'ima_tcb', 'evm=fix', 'ima_appraise_tcb', 'ima_appraise=fix', and, possibly, 'rootflags=i_version' boot
+    command line options. Refer to labeling the filesystem(#labeling-the-filesystem-with-securityima-extended-attributes) with 'security.evm'.
+
+-   How do I enable the measurement policy for local/remote attestation, without enabling IMA-appraisal?
+
+    Boot with the 'ima_tcb' command line option.
+
+-   How do I enable the appraise policy, without the measurement policy?
+
+    Boot with the 'ima_appraise_tcb' command line option.
+
+## Links
+
+-   IMA/EVM utils man page:
+    http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/evmctl.1.html(http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/evmctl.1.html)
+-   Linux IMA project page:
+    https://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/(https://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/ "https://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-ima/")
+-   Old web site:
+    http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/(http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/ "http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/")
+-   GIT repositories:
+    https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils(https://sourceforge.net/p/linux-ima/ima-evm-utils/)
+
+Old(/apps/mediawiki/linux-ima/index.php?title=Main_Page_OLD "Old")
+
+Converted from http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/linux-ima/index.php?title=Main_Page_OLD
+
+project_screenshots
+project_admins
+download_button

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/kernel-configs Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/kernel-configs/base Added

@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+CONFIG_LOCALVERSION="-dont-use"
+CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE=y
+CONFIG_AUDIT=y
+CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=y
+CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=y
+CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT=17
+CONFIG_USER_NS=y
+CONFIG_PID_NS=y
+CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y
+CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION=y
+CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y
+CONFIG_CON_CHAN="xterm"
+CONFIG_SSL_CHAN="pty"
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH="sha1"
+CONFIG_MODULES_TREE_LOOKUP=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS=y
+CONFIG_ASN1=y
+CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK=y
+CONFIG_SLUB=y
+CONFIG_COMPACTION=y
+CONFIG_COMPACT_UNEVICTABLE_DEFAULT=1
+CONFIG_MIGRATION=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y
+CONFIG_LEGACY_PTY_COUNT=256
+CONFIG_NULL_TTY=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_DEV_BUS=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_DEV_CTRL_TTYPORT=y
+CONFIG_VALIDATE_FS_PARSER=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG=y
+CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_XATTR=y
+CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_FS_VERITY=y
+CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y
+CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR=y
+CONFIG_CONFIGFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_KEYS=y
+CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
+CONFIG_LSM="lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf"
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKCIPHER2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL2=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECC=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_ZSTD=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y
+CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE=y
+CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
+CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y
+CONFIG_PKCS8_PRIVATE_KEY_PARSER=y
+CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
+CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY=y
+CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY="certs/signing_key.pem"
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS=""
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE_SIZE=4096
+CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST=""
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST=y
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS=""
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE=y
+CONFIG_BINARY_PRINTF=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y
+CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
+CONFIG_XXHASH=y
+CONFIG_AUDIT_GENERIC=y
+CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS=y
+CONFIG_LZO_DECOMPRESS=y
+CONFIG_ZSTD_COMMON=y
+CONFIG_ZSTD_COMPRESS=y
+CONFIG_ZSTD_DECOMPRESS=y
+CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY=y
+CONFIG_SGL_ALLOC=y
+CONFIG_GLOB=y
+CONFIG_CLZ_TAB=y
+CONFIG_MPILIB=y
+CONFIG_SIGNATURE=y
+CONFIG_OID_REGISTRY=y
+CONFIG_STACKDEPOT=y
+CONFIG_STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT=y
+CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
+CONFIG_PRINTK_CALLER=y
+CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y
+CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_CORE=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF5=y
+CONFIG_GDB_SCRIPTS=y
+CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=2048
+CONFIG_READABLE_ASM=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN=y
+CONFIG_CC_HAS_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_ONLY_BOUNDS=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC_ENABLE_DEFAULT=y
+CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y
+CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_FREE=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_TIMERS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_RCU_HEAD=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_PERCPU_COUNTER=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_ENABLE_DEFAULT=1
+CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_MEM_POOL_SIZE=16000
+CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_AUTO_SCAN=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE=y
+CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y
+CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y
+CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE=1
+CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR=y
+CONFIG_SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y
+CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC=y
+CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK=y
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_HUNG_TASK_TIMEOUT=120
+CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC=y
+CONFIG_WQ_WATCHDOG=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_TIMEKEEPING=y
+CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y
+CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y
+CONFIG_LOCK_STAT=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC=y
+CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y
+CONFIG_LOCKDEP_BITS=15
+CONFIG_LOCKDEP_CHAINS_BITS=16
+CONFIG_LOCKDEP_STACK_TRACE_BITS=19
+CONFIG_LOCKDEP_STACK_TRACE_HASH_BITS=14
+CONFIG_LOCKDEP_CIRCULAR_QUEUE_BITS=12
+CONFIG_WW_MUTEX_SELFTEST=y
+CONFIG_CSD_LOCK_WAIT_DEBUG=y
+CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_IRQFLAGS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_PLIST=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS=y
+CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y
+CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y
+CONFIG_RCU_TRACE=y
+CONFIG_NOP_TRACER=y
+CONFIG_TRACE_CLOCK=y
+CONFIG_RING_BUFFER=y
+CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING=y
+CONFIG_CONTEXT_SWITCH_TRACER=y
+CONFIG_PREEMPTIRQ_TRACEPOINTS=y
+CONFIG_TRACING=y
+CONFIG_DRM=n
+CONFIG_USB=n
+CONFIG_SOUND=n
+CONFIG_9P_FS=y
+CONFIG_9P_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_9P_FS_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_ETHERNET=n
+CONFIG_WLAN=n

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/kernel-configs/integrity Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/m4/default-hash-algo.m4 Added

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+dnl Copyright (c) 2021 Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
+dnl Check hash algorithm availability in the kernel
+dnl
+dnl $1 - $KERNEL_HEADERS
+
+AC_DEFUN(AX_DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO, 
+	HASH_INFO_HEADER="$1/include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h"
+
+	AC_ARG_WITH(default_hash,
+		AS_HELP_STRING(--with-default-hash=ALGORITHM, specifies the default hash algorithm to be used),
+		HASH_ALGO=$withval,
+		HASH_ALGO=sha256)
+
+	AC_PROG_SED()
+	HASH_ALGO="$(echo $HASH_ALGO | $SED 's/$.*$/\L\1\E/')"
+
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER($HASH_INFO_HEADER,
+		HAVE_HASH_INFO_HEADER=yes,
+		AC_MSG_WARN($HASH_INFO_HEADER not found.))
+
+	if test "x$HAVE_HASH_INFO_HEADER" = "x"; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(using $HASH_ALGO algorithm as default hash algorith)
+		AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO, "$HASH_ALGO", Define default hash algorithm)
+	else
+		AC_PROG_GREP()
+		$SED -n 's/HASH_ALGO_$.*$,/\L\1\E/p' $HASH_INFO_HEADER | $GREP -w $HASH_ALGO > /dev/null
+		have_hash=$?
+
+		if test $have_hash -ne 0; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR($HASH_ALGO algorithm specified, but not provided by the kernel, 1)
+		else
+			AC_MSG_NOTICE(using $HASH_ALGO as default hash algorithm)
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO, "$HASH_ALGO", Define default hash algorithm)
+		fi
+	fi
+)

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/m4/manpage-docbook-xsl.m4 -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/m4/manpage-docbook-xsl.m4 Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/packaging/ima-evm-utils.spec -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/packaging/ima-evm-utils.spec Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/.gitignore -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/.gitignore Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/Makefile.am -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/Makefile.am Changed

@@ -4,9 +4,17 @@
 libimaevm_la_CPPFLAGS = $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(LIBCRYPTO_CFLAGS)
 # current:revision:age
 # result: current-age.age.revision
-libimaevm_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 2:0:0
+libimaevm_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 4:0:0
 libimaevm_la_LIBADD =  $(LIBCRYPTO_LIBS)
 
+if CONFIG_SIGV1
+libimaevm_la_CFLAGS = -DCONFIG_SIGV1
+endif
+
+if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+libimaevm_la_CFLAGS = -DCONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+endif
+
 include_HEADERS = imaevm.h
 
 nodist_libimaevm_la_SOURCES = hash_info.h
@@ -22,10 +30,31 @@
 evmctl_LDFLAGS = $(LDFLAGS_READLINE)
 evmctl_LDADD =  $(LIBCRYPTO_LIBS) -lkeyutils libimaevm.la
 
+# Enable IMA signature version 1
+if CONFIG_SIGV1
+evmctl_CFLAGS = -DCONFIG_SIGV1
+endif
+
+# Enable "--engine" support
+if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+evmctl_CFLAGS = -DCONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+endif
+
+# USE_PCRTSS uses the Intel TSS
 if USE_PCRTSS
-evmctl_SOURCES += pcr_tss.c
+ evmctl_SOURCES += pcr_tss.c
+
+# USE_IBMTSS uses the IBM TSS
+else
+if USE_IBMTSS
+ evmctl_SOURCES += pcr_ibmtss.c
+ evmctl_LDADD += -libmtss
+
+# uses the IBM TSS command line utilities
 else
-evmctl_SOURCES += pcr_tsspcrread.c
+ evmctl_SOURCES += pcr_tsspcrread.c
+
+endif
 endif
 
 AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir) -include config.h

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/evmctl.c -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/evmctl.c Changed

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -57,12 +58,17 @@
 #include <termios.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include "hash_info.h"
 #include "pcr.h"
 #include "utils.h"
@@ -125,12 +131,15 @@
 static char *ima_str;
 static char *selinux_str;
 static char *search_type;
+static char *verify_bank;
 static int verify_list_sig;
 static int recursive;
 static int msize;
 static dev_t fs_dev;
 static bool evm_immutable;
 static bool evm_portable;
+static bool veritysig;
+static bool hwtpm;
 
 #define HMAC_FLAG_NO_UUID	0x0001
 #define HMAC_FLAG_CAPS_SET	0x0002
@@ -141,10 +150,6 @@
 static int find(const char *path, int dts, find_cb_t func);
 
 #define REG_MASK	(1 << DT_REG)
-#define DIR_MASK	(1 << DT_DIR)
-#define LNK_MASK	(1 << DT_LNK)
-#define CHR_MASK	(1 << DT_CHR)
-#define BLK_MASK	(1 << DT_BLK)
 
 struct command cmds;
 static void print_usage(struct command *cmd);
@@ -165,6 +170,9 @@
 static char *pcrfileMAX_PCRFILE;
 static unsigned npcrfile;
 
+#define log_errno_reset(level, fmt, args...) \
+	{do_log(level, fmt " (errno: %s)\n", ##args, strerror(errno)); errno = 0; }
+
 static int bin2file(const char *file, const char *ext, const unsigned char *data, int len)
 {
 	FILE *fp;
@@ -326,11 +334,17 @@
 	return -1;
 }
 
+/*
+ * calc_evm_hash - calculate the file metadata hash
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for EVP_ function failures. Return -1 for other failures.
+ * Return hash algorithm size on success.
+ */
 static int calc_evm_hash(const char *file, unsigned char *hash)
 {
         const EVP_MD *md;
 	struct stat st;
-	int err;
+	int err = -1;
 	uint32_t generation = 0;
 	EVP_MD_CTX *pctx;
 	unsigned int mdlen;
@@ -344,12 +358,10 @@
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
 	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 	pctx = &ctx;
-#else
-	pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 #endif
 
 	if (lstat(file, &st)) {
-		log_err("Failed to stat: %s\n", file);
+		log_errno_reset(LOG_ERR, "Failed to stat: %s", file);
 		return -1;
 	}
 
@@ -365,9 +377,7 @@
 		st.st_mode = strtoul(mode_str, NULL, 10);
 
 	if (!evm_immutable) {
-		if ((S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) && !generation_str) {
-			/* we cannot at the momement to get generation of
-			   special files kernel API does not support it */
+		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && !generation_str) {
 			int fd = open(file, 0);
 
 			if (fd < 0) {
@@ -386,30 +396,42 @@
 
 	list_size = llistxattr(file, list, sizeof(list));
 	if (list_size < 0) {
-		log_err("llistxattr() failed\n");
+		log_errno_reset(LOG_ERR, "llistxattr() failed");
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
+	pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (!pctx) {
+		log_err("EVP_MD_CTX_new() failed\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	md = EVP_get_digestbyname(imaevm_params.hash_algo);
 	if (!md) {
 		log_err("EVP_get_digestbyname(%s) failed\n",
 			imaevm_params.hash_algo);
-		return 1;
+		err = 0;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	err = EVP_DigestInit(pctx, md);
 	if (!err) {
 		log_err("EVP_DigestInit() failed\n");
-		return 1;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
+		int use_xattr_ima = 0;
+
 		if (!strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) && selinux_str) {
 			err = strlen(selinux_str) + 1;
 			if (err > sizeof(xattr_value)) {
 				log_err("selinux%u value is too long to fit into xattr%zu\n",
 					err, sizeof(xattr_value));
-				return -1;
+				err = -1;
+				goto out;
 			}
 			strcpy(xattr_value, selinux_str);
 		} else if (!strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) && ima_str) {
@@ -417,9 +439,19 @@
 			if (err > sizeof(xattr_value)) {
 				log_err("ima%u value is too long to fit into xattr%zu\n",
 					err, sizeof(xattr_value));
-				return -1;
+				err = -1;
+				goto out;
 			}
 			hex2bin(xattr_value, ima_str, err);
+		} else if (!strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) && evm_portable){
+			err = lgetxattr(file, xattr_ima, xattr_value,
+					sizeof(xattr_value));
+			if (err < 0) {
+				log_err("EVM portable sig: %s required\n",
+					xattr_ima);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			use_xattr_ima = 1;
 		} else if (!strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) && (hmac_flags & HMAC_FLAG_CAPS_SET)) {
 			if (!caps_str)
 				continue;
@@ -427,7 +459,8 @@
 			if (err >= sizeof(xattr_value)) {
 				log_err("caps%u value is too long to fit into xattr%zu\n",
 					err + 1, sizeof(xattr_value));
-				return -1;
+				err = -1;
+				goto out;
 			}
 			strcpy(xattr_value, caps_str);
 		} else {
@@ -442,12 +475,13 @@
 			}
 		}
 		/*log_debug("name: %s, value: %s, size: %d\n", *xattrname, xattr_value, err);*/
-		log_info("name: %s, size: %d\n", *xattrname, err);
+		log_info("name: %s, size: %d\n",
+			 use_xattr_ima ? xattr_ima : *xattrname, err);
 		log_debug_dump(xattr_value, err);
 		err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, xattr_value, err);
 		if (!err) {
 			log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
-			return 1;
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -501,29 +535,33 @@
 	err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, &hmac_misc, hmac_size);
 	if (!err) {
 		log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
-		return 1;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (!evm_immutable && !evm_portable &&
 	    !(hmac_flags & HMAC_FLAG_NO_UUID)) {
 		err = get_uuid(&st, uuid);
 		if (err)
-			return -1;
+			goto out;
 
 		err = EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, (const unsigned char *)uuid, sizeof(uuid));
 		if (!err) {
 			log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
-			return 1;
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
 	err = EVP_DigestFinal(pctx, hash, &mdlen);
-	if (!err) {
+	if (!err)
 		log_err("EVP_DigestFinal() failed\n");
-		return 1;
-	}
 
-	return mdlen;
+out:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(pctx);
+#endif
+	if (err == 1)
+		return mdlen;
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int sign_evm(const char *file, const char *key)
@@ -558,7 +596,8 @@
 	if (xattr) {
 		err = lsetxattr(file, xattr_evm, sig, len, 0);
 		if (err < 0) {
-			log_err("setxattr failed: %s\n", file);
+			log_errno_reset(LOG_ERR, "Setting EVM xattr failed: %s",
+					file);
 			return err;
 		}
 	}
@@ -601,7 +640,9 @@
 	if (xattr) {
 		err = lsetxattr(file, xattr_ima, hash, len, 0);
 		if (err < 0) {
-			log_err("setxattr failed: %s\n", file);
+			log_errno_reset(LOG_ERR,
+					"Setting IMA hash xattr failed: %s",
+					file);
 			return err;
 		}
 	}
@@ -638,7 +679,9 @@
 	if (xattr) {
 		err = lsetxattr(file, xattr_ima, sig, len, 0);
 		if (err < 0) {
-			log_err("setxattr failed: %s\n", file);
+			log_errno_reset(LOG_ERR,
+					"Setting IMA sig xattr failed: %s",
+					file);
 			return err;
 		}
 	}
@@ -655,10 +698,6 @@
 		switch (search_typei) {
 		case 'f':
 			dts |= REG_MASK; break;
-		case 'd':
-			dts |= DIR_MASK; break;
-		case 's':
-			dts |= BLK_MASK | CHR_MASK | LNK_MASK; break;
 		case 'x':
 			check_xattr = true; break;
 		case 'm':
@@ -720,33 +759,106 @@
 	return do_cmd(cmd, sign_ima_file);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Sign file hash(es) provided in the format as produced by either
+ * sha*sum or "fsverity digest".
+ *
+ * sha*sum format: <hash> <pathname>
+ * fsverity digest format: <algo>:<hash> <pathname>
+ *
+ * To disambiguate the resulting file signatures, a new signature format
+ * version 3 (sigv3) was defined as the hash of the xattr type (enum
+ * evm_ima_xattr_type), the hash algorithm (enum hash_algo), and the hash.
+ *
+ * Either directly sign the sha*sum hash or indirectly sign the fsverity
+ * hash (sigv3).
+ *
+ * The output is the same format as the input with the resulting file
+ * signature appended.
+ */
 static int cmd_sign_hash(struct command *cmd)
 {
+	unsigned char sigv3_hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	unsigned char sigMAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	int siglen, algolen = 0, hashlen = 0;
+	char *line = NULL, *token, *hashp;
+	size_t line_len = 0;
 	const char *key;
-	char *token, *line = NULL;
-	int hashlen = 0;
-	size_t line_len;
+	char algo7;	/* Current maximum fsverity hash algo name length */
 	ssize_t len;
-	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	unsigned char sigMAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE = "\x03";
-	int siglen;
+	int ret;
 
 	key = imaevm_params.keyfile ? : "/etc/keys/privkey_evm.pem";
 
-	/* support reading hash (eg. output of shasum) */
 	while ((len = getline(&line, &line_len, stdin)) > 0) {
 		/* remove end of line */
 		if (linelen - 1 == '\n')
 			line--len = '\0';
 
-		/* find the end of the hash */
-		token = strpbrk(line, ", \t");
-		hashlen = token ? token - line : strlen(line);
+		/*
+		 * Before either directly or indirectly signing the hash,
+		 * convert the hex-ascii hash representation to binary.
+		 */
+		if (veritysig) {
+
+			/*
+			 * Split the hash algorithm from the hash
+			 * example format: sha256:51dda1..d7c6 <file pathname>
+			 */
+			hashp = strpbrk(line, ":");
+			if (hashp)	/* pointer to the delimiter */
+				algolen = hashp - line;
+
+			if (!hashp || algolen <= 0 ||
+			    algolen >= sizeof(algo)) {
+				log_err("Missing/invalid fsverity hash algorithm\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			strncpy(algo, line, algolen);
+			algoalgolen = '\0';	/* Nul terminate algorithm */
+
+			hashp++;
+			token = strpbrk(line, " ");
+			if (!token) {
+				log_err("Missing fsverity hash\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			hashlen = token - hashp;
+			if (hashlen <= 0) {
+				log_err("Missing fsverity hash\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			assert(hashlen / 2 <= sizeof(hash));
+			hex2bin(hash, hashp, hashlen / 2);
+
+			ret = calc_hash_sigv3(IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, algo, hash,
+					      sigv3_hash);
+			if (ret < 0 || ret == 1) {
+				log_info("Failure to calculate fs-verity hash\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			siglen = sign_hash(algo, sigv3_hash, hashlen / 2,
+					   key, NULL, sig + 1);
+
+			sig0 = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG;
+			sig1 = DIGSIG_VERSION_3;	/* sigv3 */
+		} else {
+			/* Parse the shaXsum output */
+			token = strpbrk(line, " \t");
+			hashlen = token ? token - line : strlen(line);
+			assert(hashlen / 2 <= sizeof(hash));
+			hex2bin(hash, line, hashlen / 2);
+
+			siglen = sign_hash(imaevm_params.hash_algo, hash,
+					   hashlen / 2, key, NULL, sig + 1);
+			sig0 = EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG;
+		}
 
-		assert(hashlen / 2 <= sizeof(hash));
-		hex2bin(hash, line, hashlen / 2);
-		siglen = sign_hash(imaevm_params.hash_algo, hash, hashlen / 2,
-				 key, NULL, sig + 1);
 		if (siglen <= 1)
 			return siglen;
 		assert(siglen < sizeof(sig));
@@ -807,11 +919,20 @@
 		return len;
 	}
 
-	if (sig0 != 0x03) {
+	if ((sig0 != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) &&
+	    (sig0 != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)) {
 		log_err("%s has no signature\n", xattr_evm);
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (sig0 == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
+		if (sig1 != DIGSIG_VERSION_2) {
+			log_err("Portable sig: invalid type\n");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		evm_portable = true;
+	}
+
 	sig_hash_algo = imaevm_hash_algo_from_sig(sig + 1);
 	if (sig_hash_algo < 0) {
 		log_err("unknown hash algo: %s\n", file);
@@ -824,7 +945,7 @@
 		return mdlen;
 	assert(mdlen <= sizeof(hash));
 
-	return verify_hash(file, hash, mdlen, sig + 1, len - 1);
+	return verify_hash(file, hash, mdlen, sig, len);
 }
 
 static int cmd_verify_evm(struct command *cmd)
@@ -893,7 +1014,6 @@
 			init_public_keys("/etc/keys/x509_evm.der");
 	}
 
-	errno = 0;
 	if (!file) {
 		log_err("Parameters missing\n");
 		print_usage(cmd);
@@ -910,6 +1030,7 @@
 	return fails > 0;
 }
 
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
 static int cmd_convert(struct command *cmd)
 {
 	char *inkey;
@@ -940,6 +1061,7 @@
 	RSA_free(key);
 	return err;
 }
+#endif
 
 static int cmd_import(struct command *cmd)
 {
@@ -994,6 +1116,7 @@
 		calc_keyid_v2((uint32_t *)keyid, name, pkey);
 		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 	} else {
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
 		RSA *key = read_pub_key(inkey, imaevm_params.x509);
 
 		if (!key)
@@ -1001,6 +1124,10 @@
 		len = key2bin(key, pub);
 		calc_keyid_v1(keyid, name, pub, len);
 		RSA_free(key);
+#else
+		log_info("Importing public RSA key is not supported\n");
+		return 1;
+#endif
 	}
 
 	log_info("Importing public key %s from file %s into keyring %d\n", name, inkey, id);
@@ -1014,7 +1141,7 @@
 		log_info("keyid: %d\n", id);
 		printf("%d\n", id);
 	}
-	if (imaevm_params.x509)
+	if (pub != _pub)
 		free(pub);
 	return err;
 }
@@ -1033,7 +1160,8 @@
 
 	err = lsetxattr(file, xattr_ima, sig, len, 0);
 	if (err < 0)
-		log_err("setxattr failed: %s\n", file);
+		log_errno_reset(LOG_ERR, "Setting IMA sig xattr failed: %s",
+				file);
 	free(sig);
 	return err;
 }
@@ -1057,14 +1185,14 @@
 
 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
 
-static int calc_evm_hmac(const char *file, const char *keyfile, unsigned char *hash)
+static int calc_evm_hmac(const char *file, const char *keyfile, unsigned char *sig)
 {
-        const EVP_MD *md;
+	size_t siglen = MAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *pctx;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	struct stat st;
 	int err = -1;
 	uint32_t generation = 0;
-	HMAC_CTX *pctx;
-	unsigned int mdlen;
 	char **xattrname;
 	unsigned char xattr_value1024;
 	unsigned char *key;
@@ -1075,10 +1203,8 @@
 	struct h_misc_64 hmac_misc;
 	int hmac_size;
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
-	HMAC_CTX ctx;
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
 	pctx = &ctx;
-#else
-	pctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
 #endif
 
 	key = file2bin(keyfile, NULL, &keylen);
@@ -1094,16 +1220,15 @@
 
 	/* EVM key is 128 bytes */
 	memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
-	memset(evmkey + keylen, 0, sizeof(evmkey) - keylen);
+	if (keylen < sizeof(evmkey))
+		memset(evmkey + keylen, 0, sizeof(evmkey) - keylen);
 
 	if (lstat(file, &st)) {
 		log_err("Failed to stat: %s\n", file);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
-		/* we cannot at the momement to get generation of special files..
-		 * kernel API does not support it */
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
 		int fd = open(file, 0);
 
 		if (fd < 0) {
@@ -1126,16 +1251,23 @@
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	md = EVP_get_digestbyname(imaevm_params.hash_algo);
-	if (!md) {
-		log_err("EVP_get_digestbyname(%s) failed\n",
-			imaevm_params.hash_algo);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
+	pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (!pctx) {
+		log_err("EVP_MD_CTX_new failed\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
+#endif
 
-	err = !HMAC_Init_ex(pctx, evmkey, sizeof(evmkey), md, NULL);
-	if (err) {
-		log_err("HMAC_Init() failed\n");
+	pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, evmkey, sizeof(evmkey));
+	if (!pkey) {
+		log_err("EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() failed\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = EVP_DigestSignInit(pctx, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL, pkey);
+	if (err != 1) {
+		log_err("EVP_DigestSignInit() failed\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1149,12 +1281,12 @@
 			log_info("skipping xattr: %s\n", *xattrname);
 			continue;
 		}
-		/*log_debug("name: %s, value: %s, size: %d\n", *xattrname, xattr_value, err);*/
 		log_info("name: %s, size: %d\n", *xattrname, err);
 		log_debug_dump(xattr_value, err);
-		err = !HMAC_Update(pctx, xattr_value, err);
-		if (err) {
-			log_err("HMAC_Update() failed\n");
+
+		err = EVP_DigestSignUpdate(pctx, xattr_value, err);
+		if (err != 1) {
+			log_err("EVP_DigestSignUpdate() failed\n");
 			goto out_ctx_cleanup;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1193,23 +1325,24 @@
 	log_debug("hmac_misc (%d): ", hmac_size);
 	log_debug_dump(&hmac_misc, hmac_size);
 
-	err = !HMAC_Update(pctx, (const unsigned char *)&hmac_misc, hmac_size);
-	if (err) {
-		log_err("HMAC_Update() failed\n");
+	err = EVP_DigestSignUpdate(pctx, &hmac_misc, hmac_size);
+	if (err != 1) {
+		log_err("EVP_DigestSignUpdate() failed\n");
 		goto out_ctx_cleanup;
 	}
-	err = !HMAC_Final(pctx, hash, &mdlen);
-	if (err)
-		log_err("HMAC_Final() failed\n");
+	err = EVP_DigestSignFinal(pctx, sig, &siglen);
+	if (err != 1)
+		log_err("EVP_DigestSignFinal() failed\n");
 out_ctx_cleanup:
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
-	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(pctx);
-#else
-	HMAC_CTX_free(pctx);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(pctx);
 #endif
 out:
 	free(key);
-	return err ?: mdlen;
+	if (err == 1)
+		return siglen;
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int hmac_evm(const char *file, const char *key)
@@ -1232,7 +1365,9 @@
 		sig0 = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
 		err = lsetxattr(file, xattr_evm, sig, len + 1, 0);
 		if (err < 0) {
-			log_err("setxattr failed: %s\n", file);
+			log_errno_reset(LOG_ERR,
+					"Setting EVM hmac xattr failed: %s",
+					file);
 			return err;
 		}
 	}
@@ -1349,9 +1484,6 @@
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (dts & DIR_MASK)
-		func(path);
-
 	closedir(dir);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1460,8 +1592,9 @@
 {
 	uint8_t *fieldp = entry->template;
 	uint32_t field_len;
-	int total_len = entry->template_len, digest_len, len, sig_len, fbuf_len;
+	int total_len = entry->template_len, digest_len, len, fbuf_len;
 	uint8_t *digest, *sig = NULL, *fbuf = NULL;
+	int sig_len = 0;
 	char *algo, *path;
 	int found;
 	int err;
@@ -1470,32 +1603,65 @@
 	field_len = *(uint32_t *)fieldp;
 	fieldp += sizeof(field_len);
 	total_len -= sizeof(field_len);
+	if (total_len < 0) {
+		log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid template data\n", entry->name);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	algo = (char *)fieldp;
-	len = strlen(algo) + 1;
+	len = strnlen(algo, field_len - 1) + 1;
 	digest_len = field_len - len;
+	if (digest_len < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH ||
+	    digest_len > MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+		log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid digest length\n", entry->name);
+		return;
+	}
 	digest = fieldp + len;
 
 	/* move to next field */
 	fieldp += field_len;
 	total_len -= field_len;
+	if (total_len < 0) {
+		log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid template data\n", entry->name);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	/* get path */
 	field_len = *(uint32_t *)fieldp;
 	fieldp += sizeof(field_len);
 	total_len -= sizeof(field_len);
+	if (field_len == 0 || field_len > PATH_MAX || total_len < field_len) {
+		log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid file pathname\n", entry->name);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	path = (char *)fieldp;
 
 	/* move to next field */
 	fieldp += field_len;
 	total_len -= field_len;
+	if (total_len < 0) {
+		log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid template data\n", entry->name);
+		return;
+	}
 
-	if (!strcmp(entry->name, "ima-sig")) {
-		/* get signature */
+	if (!strcmp(entry->name, "ima-sig") ||
+	    !strcmp(entry->name, "ima-sigv2")) {
+		/* get signature, if it exists */
 		field_len = *(uint32_t *)fieldp;
 		fieldp += sizeof(field_len);
+		if (field_len > MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
+			log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid file signature size\n",
+				entry->name);
+			return;
+		}
+
 		total_len -= sizeof(field_len);
+		if (total_len < 0) {
+			log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid template data\n",
+				entry->name);
+			return;
+		}
 
 		if (field_len) {
 			sig = fieldp;
@@ -1519,6 +1685,11 @@
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (total_len < 0) {
+		log_err("Template \"%s\" invalid template data\n", entry->name);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/* ascii_runtime_measurements */
 	if (imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO) {
 		log_info("%d ", entry->header.pcr);
@@ -1537,11 +1708,17 @@
 			log_info(" ");
 			log_dump(sig, sig_len);
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Either verify the signature against the hash contained in
+		 * the measurement list or calculate the hash.
+		 */
 		if (verify_list_sig)
 			err = ima_verify_signature(path, sig, sig_len,
 						   digest, digest_len);
 		else
 			err = ima_verify_signature(path, sig, sig_len, NULL, 0);
+
 		if (!err && imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO)
 			log_info("%s: verification is OK\n", path);
 	} else {
@@ -1578,8 +1755,10 @@
 	int i, j;
 
 	banks = calloc(num_algos, sizeof(struct tpm_bank_info));
-	if (!banks)
-		return banks;
+	if (!banks) {
+		log_err("Out of memory\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	/* re-calculate the PCRs digests for only known algorithms */
 	*num_banks = num_algos;
@@ -1588,16 +1767,22 @@
 			if (!strcmp(default_algosi, hash_algo_namej))
 				set_bank_info(&banksi, hash_algo_namej);
 		}
+		assert(banksi.algo_name);
 	}
 	return banks;
 }
 
 /*
  * Compare the calculated TPM PCR banks against the PCR values read.
+ * The banks_mask parameter allows to select which banks to consider.
+ * A banks_maks of 0x3 would consider banks 1 and 2, 0x2 would only
+ * consider the 2nd bank, ~0 would consider all banks.
+ *
  * On failure to match any TPM bank, fail comparison.
  */
 static int compare_tpm_banks(int num_banks, struct tpm_bank_info *bank,
-			     struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_bank)
+			     struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_bank,
+			     unsigned int banks_mask, unsigned long entry_num)
 {
 	int i, j;
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -1605,6 +1790,9 @@
 	for (i = 0; i < num_banks; i++) {
 		if (!banki.supported || !tpm_banki.supported)
 			continue;
+		/* do we need to look at the n-th bank ? */
+		if ((banks_mask & (1 << i)) == 0)
+			continue;
 		for (j = 0; j < NUM_PCRS; j++) {
 			if (memcmp(banki.pcrj, zero, banki.digest_size)
 			    == 0)
@@ -1625,8 +1813,8 @@
 			log_dump(tpm_banki.pcrj, tpm_banki.digest_size);
 
 			if (!ret)
-				log_info("%s PCR-%d: succeed\n",
-					 banki.algo_name, j);
+				log_info("%s PCR-%d: succeed at entry %lu\n",
+					 banki.algo_name, j, entry_num);
 			else
 				log_info("%s: PCRAgg %d does not match TPM PCR-%d\n",
 					 banki.algo_name, j, j);
@@ -1811,8 +1999,10 @@
 	fp = fopen(pcrs, "r");
 	if (!fp)
 		fp = fopen(misc_pcrs, "r");
-	if (!fp)
+	if (!fp) {
+		log_errno_reset(LOG_DEBUG, "Failed to read TPM 1.2 PCRs");
 		return -1;
+	}
 
 	result = read_one_bank(&tpm_banks0, fp);
 	fclose(fp);
@@ -1822,7 +2012,63 @@
 	for (i = 1; i < num_banks; i++)
 		tpm_banksi.supported = 0;
 	return 0;
+}
+
+static int read_tpm2_one_bank(struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_bank)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	char digestMAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 1;
+	char file_nameNAME_MAX;
+	char *p;
+	int i;
 
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_PCRS; i++) {
+		sprintf(file_name, "/sys/class/tpm/tpm0/pcr-%s/%d",
+			tpm_bank->algo_name, i);
+		fp = fopen(file_name, "r");
+		if (!fp) {
+			log_errno_reset(LOG_DEBUG,
+					"Failed to read TPM 2.0 PCRs via sysfs");
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		p = fgets(digest, tpm_bank->digest_size * 2 + 1, fp);
+		if (!p) {
+			fclose(fp);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		hex2bin(tpm_bank->pcri, digest, tpm_bank->digest_size);
+		fclose(fp);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int read_sysfs_tpm2_pcrs(int num_banks, struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_banks)
+{
+	int tpm_enabled = 0;
+	int rt, j;
+
+	if (imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO)
+		log_info("Trying to read TPM 2.0 PCRs via sysfs\n");
+
+	for (j = 0; j < num_banks; j++) {
+		rt = read_tpm2_one_bank(&tpm_banksj);
+		if (rt < 0) {
+			tpm_banksj.supported = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+		tpm_enabled = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* On failure to read any TPM bank PCRs, re-initialize the TPM banks*/
+	if (tpm_enabled == 0) {
+		for (j = 0; j < num_banks; j++)
+			tpm_banksj.supported = 1;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Read PCRs from per-bank file(s) specified via --pcrs */
@@ -1895,7 +2141,8 @@
 {
 	int tpm_enabled = 0;
 	char *errmsg = NULL;
-	int i, j;
+	int i;
+	uint32_t pcr_handle;
 	int err;
 
 	/* If --pcrs was specified, read only from the specified file(s) */
@@ -1906,6 +2153,9 @@
 	if (read_sysfs_pcrs(num_banks, bank) == 0)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (hwtpm && read_sysfs_tpm2_pcrs(num_banks, bank) == 0)
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Any userspace applications available for reading TPM 2.0 PCRs? */
 	if (!tpm2_pcr_supported()) {
 		log_debug("Failed to read TPM 2.0 PCRs\n");
@@ -1915,14 +2165,18 @@
 	/* Read PCRs from multiple TPM 2.0 banks */
 	for (i = 0; i < num_banks; i++) {
 		err = 0;
-		for (j = 0; j < NUM_PCRS && !err; j++) {
-			err = tpm2_pcr_read(banki.algo_name, j,
-					    banki.pcrj, banki.digest_size,
+		for (pcr_handle = 0;
+		     pcr_handle < NUM_PCRS && !err;
+		     pcr_handle++) {
+			err = tpm2_pcr_read(banki.algo_name, pcr_handle,
+					    banki.pcrpcr_handle,
+					    banki.digest_size,
 					    &errmsg);
 			if (err) {
 				log_debug("Failed to read %s PCRs: (%s)\n",
 					  banki.algo_name, errmsg);
 				free(errmsg);
+				errmsg = NULL;
 				banki.supported = 0;
 			}
 		}
@@ -1935,36 +2189,49 @@
 static int ima_measurement(const char *file)
 {
 	struct tpm_bank_info *pseudo_padded_banks;
-	struct tpm_bank_info *pseudo_banks;
-	struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_banks;
+	struct tpm_bank_info *pseudo_banks = NULL;
+	struct tpm_bank_info *tpm_banks = NULL;
 	int is_ima_template, cur_template_fmt;
 	int num_banks = 0;
 	int tpmbanks = 1;
 	int first_record = 1;
+	unsigned int pseudo_padded_banks_mask, pseudo_banks_mask;
+	unsigned long entry_num = 0;
+	int c;
 
-	struct template_entry entry = { .template = 0 };
+	struct template_entry entry = { .template = NULL };
 	FILE *fp;
 	int invalid_template_digest = 0;
 	int err_padded = -1;
 	int err = -1;
 
-	errno = 0;
 	memset(zero, 0, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	pseudo_padded_banks = init_tpm_banks(&num_banks);
+	if (!pseudo_padded_banks)
+		return -1;
+
 	pseudo_banks = init_tpm_banks(&num_banks);
+	if (!pseudo_banks)
+		goto out_free;
+
 	tpm_banks = init_tpm_banks(&num_banks);
+	if (!tpm_banks)
+		goto out_free;
 
 	fp = fopen(file, "rb");
 	if (!fp) {
 		log_err("Failed to open measurement file: %s\n", file);
-		return -1;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	if (imaevm_params.keyfile)	/* Support multiple public keys */
 		init_public_keys(imaevm_params.keyfile);
 	else				/* assume read pubkey from x509 cert */
 		init_public_keys("/etc/keys/x509_evm.der");
+	if (errno)
+		log_errno_reset(LOG_DEBUG,
+				"Failure in initializing public keys");
 
 	/*
 	 * Reading the PCRs before walking the IMA measurement list
@@ -1974,7 +2241,27 @@
 	if (read_tpm_banks(num_banks, tpm_banks) != 0)
 		tpmbanks = 0;
 
-	while (fread(&entry.header, sizeof(entry.header), 1, fp)) {
+	/* A mask where each bit represents the banks to check against */
+	pseudo_banks_mask = (1 << num_banks) - 1;
+	pseudo_padded_banks_mask = pseudo_banks_mask;
+
+	/* Instead of verifying all the banks, only verify a single bank */
+	for (c = 0; c < num_banks; c++) {
+		if (verify_bank
+		    && strcmp(pseudo_padded_banksc.algo_name, verify_bank)) {
+			pseudo_banks_mask ^= (1 << c);
+			pseudo_padded_banks_mask ^= (1 << c);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	while (fread(&entry.header, sizeof(entry.header), 1, fp) == 1) {
+		entry_num++;
+		if (entry.header.pcr >= NUM_PCRS) {
+			log_err("Invalid PCR %d.\n", entry.header.pcr);
+			fclose(fp);
+			exit(1);
+		}
 		if (entry.header.name_len > TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) {
 			log_err("%d ERROR: event name too long!\n",
 				entry.header.name_len);
@@ -1983,7 +2270,7 @@
 		}
 
 		memset(entry.name, 0x00, sizeof(entry.name));
-		if (!fread(entry.name, entry.header.name_len, 1, fp)) {
+		if (fread(entry.name, entry.header.name_len, 1, fp) != 1) {
 			log_err("Unable to read template name\n");
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -2006,11 +2293,16 @@
 
 		/* The "ima" template data is not length prefixed.  Skip it. */
 		if (!is_ima_template) {
-			if (!fread(&entry.template_len,
-				   sizeof(entry.template_len), 1, fp)) {
+			if (fread(&entry.template_len,
+				  sizeof(entry.template_len), 1, fp) != 1) {
 				log_err("Unable to read template length\n");
 				goto out;
 			}
+			if (entry.template_len == 0 ||
+			    entry.template_len > MAX_TEMPLATE_SIZE) {
+				log_err("Invalid template data len\n");
+				goto out;
+			}
 		} else {
 			entry.template_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH +
 					     TCG_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
@@ -2020,10 +2312,15 @@
 			free(entry.template);
 			entry.template_buf_len = entry.template_len;
 			entry.template = malloc(entry.template_len);
+			if (!entry.template) {
+				log_err("Out of memory\n");
+				goto out;
+			}
 		}
 
 		if (!is_ima_template) {
-			if (!fread(entry.template, entry.template_len, 1, fp)) {
+			if (fread(entry.template, entry.template_len,
+				  1, fp) != 1) {
 				log_errno("Unable to read template\n");
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -2035,7 +2332,8 @@
 			 * The "ima" template data format is digest,
 			 * filename length, filename.
 			 */
-			if (!fread(entry.template, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1, fp)) {
+			if (fread(entry.template, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+				  1, fp) != 1) {
 				log_errno("Unable to read file data hash\n");
 				goto out;
 			}
@@ -2086,18 +2384,33 @@
 		if (!tpmbanks)
 			continue;
 
-		/* The measurement list might contain too many entries,
-		 * compare the re-calculated TPM PCR values after each
-		 * extend.
-		 */
-		err = compare_tpm_banks(num_banks, pseudo_banks, tpm_banks);
-		if (!err)
+		for (c = 0; c < num_banks; c++) {
+			if ((pseudo_banks_mask & (1 << c)) == 0)
+				continue;
+			/* The measurement list might contain too many entries,
+			 * compare the re-calculated TPM PCR values after each
+			 * extend.
+			 */
+			err = compare_tpm_banks(num_banks, pseudo_banks,
+						tpm_banks, 1 << c, entry_num);
+			if (!err)
+				pseudo_banks_mask ^= (1 << c);
+		}
+		if (pseudo_banks_mask == 0)
 			break;
 
-		/* Compare against original SHA1 zero padded TPM PCR values */
-		err_padded = compare_tpm_banks(num_banks, pseudo_padded_banks,
-					       tpm_banks);
-		if (!err_padded)
+		for (c = 0; c < num_banks; c++) {
+			if ((pseudo_padded_banks_mask & (1 << c)) == 0)
+				continue;
+			/* Compare against original SHA1 zero padded TPM PCR values */
+			err_padded = compare_tpm_banks(num_banks,
+						       pseudo_padded_banks,
+						       tpm_banks,
+						       1 << c, entry_num);
+			if (!err_padded)
+				pseudo_padded_banks_mask ^= (1 << c);
+		}
+		if (pseudo_padded_banks_mask == 0)
 			break;
 	}
 
@@ -2120,6 +2433,12 @@
 
 out:
 	fclose(fp);
+out_free:
+	free(tpm_banks);
+	free(pseudo_banks);
+	free(pseudo_padded_banks);
+	free(entry.template);
+
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -2136,6 +2455,11 @@
 	return ima_measurement(file);
 }
 
+/*
+ * read_binary_bios_measurements - read the TPM 1.2 event log
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, 1 on failure.
+ */
 #define MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE 200000
 static int read_binary_bios_measurements(char *file, struct tpm_bank_info *bank)
 {
@@ -2148,17 +2472,22 @@
 		} header;
 		unsigned char dataMAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE;
 	} event;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+	const EVP_MD *md;
+	unsigned int mdlen;
+	int evp_err = 1;	/* success */
 	struct stat s;
 	FILE *fp;
-	SHA_CTX c;
 	int err = 0;
 	int len;
 	int i;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+	mdctx = &ctx;
+#endif
 
-	if (stat(file, &s) == -1) {
-		errno = 0;
+	if (stat(file, &s) == -1)
 		return 1;
-	}
 
 	if (!S_ISREG(s.st_mode)) {
 		log_info("Bios event log: not a regular file or link to regular file\n");
@@ -2166,29 +2495,60 @@
 	}
 
 	fp = fopen(file, "r");
-	if (!fp) {
-		log_errno("Failed to open TPM 1.2 event log.\n");
+	if (!fp)
 		return 1;
-	}
 
 	if (imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO)
-		log_info("Reading the TPM 1.2 event log %s.\n", file);
+		log_info("Reading the TPM 1.2 event log (%s)\n", file);
+
+	md = EVP_get_digestbyname(bank->algo_name);
+	if (!md) {
+		log_err("Unknown message digest %s\n", bank->algo_name);
+		fclose(fp);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
+	mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (!mdctx) {
+		log_err("EVP_MD_CTX_new failed\n");
+		fclose(fp);
+		return 1;
+	}
+#endif
 
 	/* Extend the pseudo TPM PCRs with the event digest */
-	while (fread(&event, sizeof(event.header), 1, fp)) {
+	while (fread(&event, sizeof(event.header), 1, fp) == 1) {
 		if (imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO) {
 			log_info("%02u ", event.header.pcr);
 			log_dump(event.header.digest, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 		}
-		if (event.header.pcr > NUM_PCRS) {
+		if (event.header.pcr >= NUM_PCRS) {
 			log_err("Invalid PCR %d.\n", event.header.pcr);
-			err = 1;
 			break;
 		}
-		SHA1_Init(&c);
-		SHA1_Update(&c, bank->pcrevent.header.pcr, 20);
-		SHA1_Update(&c, event.header.digest, 20);
-		SHA1_Final(bank->pcrevent.header.pcr, &c);
+
+		evp_err = EVP_DigestInit(mdctx, md);
+		if (evp_err == 0) {
+			log_err("EVP_DigestInit() failed\n");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		evp_err = EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, bank->pcrevent.header.pcr, 20);
+		if (evp_err == 0) {
+			log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+			break;
+		}
+		evp_err = EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, event.header.digest, 20);
+		if (evp_err == 0) {
+			log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+			break;
+		}
+		evp_err = EVP_DigestFinal(mdctx, bank->pcrevent.header.pcr, &mdlen);
+		if (evp_err == 0) {
+			log_err("EVP_DigestFinal() failed\n");
+			break;
+		}
 		if (event.header.len > MAX_EVENT_DATA_SIZE) {
 			log_err("Event data event too long.\n");
 			err = 1;
@@ -2197,10 +2557,17 @@
 		len = fread(event.data, event.header.len, 1, fp);
 		if (len != 1) {
 			log_errno("Failed reading event data (short read)\n");
+			err = 1;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
+
+	if (evp_err == 0) /* EVP_ functions return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
+		err = 1;
 	fclose(fp);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
+#endif
 
 	if (imaevm_params.verbose <= LOG_INFO)
 		return err;
@@ -2317,6 +2684,8 @@
 	 */
 	if (file) {
 		tpm_banks = init_tpm_banks(&num_banks);
+		if (!tpm_banks)
+			return -1;
 
 		/* TPM 1.2 only supports SHA1.*/
 		for (i = 1; i < num_banks; i++)
@@ -2324,14 +2693,21 @@
 
 		err = read_binary_bios_measurements(file, tpm_banks);
 		if (err) {
-			log_info("Failed reading the TPM 1.2 event log %s.\n",
-				 file);
+			log_err("Failed reading the TPM 1.2 event log (%s)\n",
+				file);
+			free(tpm_banks);
+
 			return -1;
 		}
 	} else {
 		tpm_banks = init_tpm_banks(&num_banks);
+		if (!tpm_banks)
+			return -1;
+
 		if (read_tpm_banks(num_banks, tpm_banks) != 0) {
 			log_info("Failed to read any TPM PCRs\n");
+			free(tpm_banks);
+
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
@@ -2365,7 +2741,10 @@
 	}
 	bootaggrbootaggr_len = '\0';
 	printf("%s", bootaggr);
+
 	free(bootaggr);
+	free(tpm_banks);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2439,17 +2818,24 @@
 
 	printf(
 		"\n"
-		"  -a, --hashalgo     sha1 (default), sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, streebog256, streebog512\n"
+		"  -a, --hashalgo     sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, streebog256, streebog512 (default: %s)\n"
 		"  -s, --imasig       make IMA signature\n"
+		"      --veritysig    sign an fs-verity file digest hash\n"
 		"  -d, --imahash      make IMA hash\n"
 		"  -f, --sigfile      store IMA signature in .sig file instead of xattr\n"
 		"      --xattr-user   store xattrs in user namespace (for testing purposes)\n"
-		"      --rsa          use RSA key type and signing scheme v1\n"
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
+		"      --rsa          use RSA key type and signing scheme v1 (deprecated)\n"
+#endif
 		"  -k, --key          path to signing key (default: /etc/keys/{privkey,pubkey}_evm.pem)\n"
+		"                     or a pkcs11 URI\n"
+		"      --keyid n      overwrite signature keyid with a 32-bit value in hex (for signing)\n"
+		"      --keyid-from-cert file\n"
+		"                     read keyid value from SKID of a x509 cert file\n"
 		"  -o, --portable     generate portable EVM signatures\n"
 		"  -p, --pass         password for encrypted signing key\n"
 		"  -r, --recursive    recurse into directories (sign)\n"
-		"  -t, --type         file types to fix 'fdsxm' (f: file, d: directory, s: block/char/symlink)\n"
+		"  -t, --type         file types to fix 'fxm' (f: file)\n"
 		"                     x - skip fixing if both ima and evm xattrs exist (use with caution)\n"
 		"                     m - stay on the same filesystem (like 'find -xdev')\n"
 		"  -n                 print result to stdout instead of setting xattr\n"
@@ -2466,29 +2852,38 @@
 		"      --selinux      use custom Selinux label for EVM\n"
 		"      --caps         use custom Capabilities for EVM(unspecified: from FS, empty: do not use)\n"
 		"      --verify-sig   verify measurement list signatures\n"
-		"      --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost)\n"
+#if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+		"      --engine e     preload OpenSSL engine e (such as: gost) is deprecated\n"
+#endif
 		"      --ignore-violations ignore ToMToU measurement violations\n"
 		"  -v                 increase verbosity level\n"
 		"  -h, --help         display this help and exit\n"
-		"\n");
+		"\n"
+		"Environment variables:\n\n"
+		"EVMCTL_KEY_PASSWORD  : Private key password to use; do not use --pass option\n"
+		"\n", DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO);
 }
 
 struct command cmds = {
 	{"--version", NULL, 0, ""},
 	{"help", cmd_help, 0, "<command>"},
-	{"import", cmd_import, 0, "--rsa pubkey keyring", "Import public key into the keyring.\n"},
-	{"convert", cmd_convert, 0, "key", "convert public key into the keyring.\n"},
-	{"sign", cmd_sign_evm, 0, "-r --imahash | --imasig  --key key --pass password file", "Sign file metadata.\n"},
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
+	{"import", cmd_import, 0, "--rsa (deprecated) pubkey keyring", "Import public key into the keyring.\n"},
+	{"convert", cmd_convert, 0, "key", "convert public key into the keyring. (deprecated)\n"},
+#else
+	{"import", cmd_import, 0, "pubkey keyring", "Import public key into the keyring.\n"},
+#endif
+	{"sign", cmd_sign_evm, 0, "-r --imahash | --imasig  --key key --pass=<password> file", "Sign file metadata.\n"},
 	{"verify", cmd_verify_evm, 0, "file", "Verify EVM signature (for debugging).\n"},
-	{"ima_sign", cmd_sign_ima, 0, "--sigfile --key key --pass password file", "Make file content signature.\n"},
+	{"ima_sign", cmd_sign_ima, 0, "--sigfile --key key --pass=<password> file", "Make file content signature.\n"},
 	{"ima_verify", cmd_verify_ima, 0, "file", "Verify IMA signature (for debugging).\n"},
 	{"ima_setxattr", cmd_setxattr_ima, 0, "--sigfile file", "Set IMA signature from sigfile\n"},
 	{"ima_hash", cmd_hash_ima, 0, "file", "Make file content hash.\n"},
-	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "--ignore-violations --verify-sig --key key1, key2, ... --pcrs hash-algorithm,file --pcrs hash-algorithm,file ... file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
-	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "--pcrs hash-algorithm,file TPM 1.2 BIOS event log", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
+	{"ima_measurement", cmd_ima_measurement, 0, "--ignore-violations --verify-sig --key key1, key2, ... --pcrs hash-algorithm,file --pcrs hash-algorithm,file ... --verify-bank hash-algorithm file", "Verify measurement list (experimental).\n"},
+	{"ima_boot_aggregate", cmd_ima_bootaggr, 0, "--pcrs hash-algorithm,file TPM 1.2 BIOS event log --hwtpm", "Calculate per TPM bank boot_aggregate digests\n"},
 	{"ima_fix", cmd_ima_fix, 0, "-t fdsxm path", "Recursively fix IMA/EVM xattrs in fix mode.\n"},
 	{"ima_clear", cmd_ima_clear, 0, "-t fdsxm path", "Recursively remove IMA/EVM xattrs.\n"},
-	{"sign_hash", cmd_sign_hash, 0, "--key key --pass password", "Sign hashes from shaXsum output.\n"},
+	{"sign_hash", cmd_sign_hash, 0, "--veritysig --key key --pass=<password>", "Sign hashes from either shaXsum or \"fsverity digest\" output.\n"},
 #ifdef DEBUG
 	{"hmac", cmd_hmac_evm, 0, "--imahash | --imasig  file", "Sign file metadata with HMAC using symmetric key (for testing purpose).\n"},
 #endif
@@ -2521,10 +2916,17 @@
 	{"selinux", 1, 0, 136},
 	{"caps", 2, 0, 137},
 	{"verify-sig", 0, 0, 138},
+#if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
 	{"engine", 1, 0, 139},
+#endif
 	{"xattr-user", 0, 0, 140},
 	{"ignore-violations", 0, 0, 141},
 	{"pcrs", 1, 0, 142},
+	{"verify-bank", 2, 0, 143},
+	{"keyid", 1, 0, 144},
+	{"keyid-from-cert", 1, 0, 145},
+	{"veritysig", 0, 0, 146},
+	{"hwtpm", 0, 0, 147},
 	{}
 
 };
@@ -2562,13 +2964,41 @@
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
-	return pwd;
+	if (pwd == NULL) {
+		free(password);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return password;
 }
 
+#if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+static ENGINE *setup_engine(const char *engine_id)
+{
+	ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id);
+
+	if (!eng) {
+		log_err("engine %s isn't available\n", optarg);
+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+	} else if (!ENGINE_init(eng)) {
+		log_err("engine %s init failed\n", optarg);
+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+		ENGINE_free(eng);
+		eng = NULL;
+	}
+	if (eng)
+		ENGINE_set_default(eng, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL);
+	return eng;
+}
+#endif
+
 int main(int argc, char *argv)
 {
 	int err = 0, c, lind;
-	ENGINE *eng = NULL;
+	unsigned long keyid;
+	char *eptr;
+
+	errno = 0;	/* initialize global errno */
 
 #if !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000)
 	OPENSSL_init_crypto(
@@ -2686,19 +3116,15 @@
 		case 138:
 			verify_list_sig = 1;
 			break;
+#if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
 		case 139: /* --engine e */
-			eng = ENGINE_by_id(optarg);
-			if (!eng) {
-				log_err("engine %s isn't available\n", optarg);
-				ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-			} else if (!ENGINE_init(eng)) {
-				log_err("engine %s init failed\n", optarg);
-				ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-				ENGINE_free(eng);
-				eng = NULL;
+			imaevm_params.eng = setup_engine(optarg);
+			if (!imaevm_params.eng) {
+				log_info("setup_engine failed\n");
+				goto error;
 			}
-			ENGINE_set_default(eng, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL);
 			break;
+#endif
 		case 140: /* --xattr-user */
 			xattr_ima = "user.ima";
 			xattr_evm = "user.evm";
@@ -2713,6 +3139,39 @@
 			}
 			pcrfilenpcrfile++ = optarg;
 			break;
+		case 143:
+			verify_bank = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 144:
+			errno = 0;
+			keyid = strtoul(optarg, &eptr, 16);
+			/*
+			 * ULONG_MAX is error from strtoul(3),
+			 * UINT_MAX is `imaevm_params.keyid' maximum value,
+			 * 0 is reserved for keyid being unset.
+			 */
+			if (errno || eptr - optarg != strlen(optarg) ||
+			    keyid == ULONG_MAX || keyid > UINT_MAX ||
+			    keyid == 0) {
+				log_err("Invalid keyid value.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			imaevm_params.keyid = keyid;
+			break;
+		case 145:
+			keyid = imaevm_read_keyid(optarg);
+			if (keyid == 0) {
+				log_err("Error reading keyid.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			imaevm_params.keyid = keyid;
+			break;
+		case 146:
+			veritysig = 1;
+			break;
+		case 147:
+			hwtpm = 1;
+			break;
 		case '?':
 			exit(1);
 			break;
@@ -2721,6 +3180,19 @@
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (!imaevm_params.keypass)
+		imaevm_params.keypass = getenv("EVMCTL_KEY_PASSWORD");
+
+	if (imaevm_params.keyfile != NULL &&
+	    imaevm_params.eng == NULL &&
+	    !strncmp(imaevm_params.keyfile, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+#if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+		imaevm_params.eng = setup_engine("pkcs11");
+#endif
+		if (!imaevm_params.eng)
+			goto error;
+	}
+
 	if (argvoptind == NULL)
 		usage();
 	else
@@ -2741,13 +3213,16 @@
 			err = 125;
 	}
 
-	if (eng) {
-		ENGINE_finish(eng);
-		ENGINE_free(eng);
+error:
+#if CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+	if (imaevm_params.eng) {
+		ENGINE_finish(imaevm_params.eng);
+		ENGINE_free(imaevm_params.eng);
 #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
 		ENGINE_cleanup();
 #endif
 	}
+#endif
 	ERR_free_strings();
 	EVP_cleanup();
 	BIO_free(NULL);

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/hash_info.gen -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/hash_info.gen Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/imaevm.h -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/imaevm.h Changed

@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE)
+#undef CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+#endif
 
 #ifdef USE_FPRINTF
 #define do_log(level, fmt, args...)	\
@@ -74,12 +81,26 @@
 #define log_err(fmt, args...)		do_log(LOG_ERR, fmt, ##args)
 #define log_errno(fmt, args...)		do_log(LOG_ERR, fmt ": errno: %s (%d)\n", ##args, strerror(errno), errno)
 
+#ifndef DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO
+#define DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO "sha256"
+#endif
+
 #define	DATA_SIZE	4096
 #define SHA1_HASH_LEN   20
 
 #define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE		64
 #define MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE	1024
 
+/*
+ * The maximum template data size is dependent on the template format. For
+ * example the 'ima-modsig' template includes two signatures - one for the
+ * entire file, the other without the appended signature - and other fields
+ * (e.g. file digest, file name, file digest without the appended signature).
+ *
+ * Other template formats are much smaller.
+ */
+#define MAX_TEMPLATE_SIZE	(MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE * 4)
+
 #define __packed __attribute__((packed))
 
 enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
@@ -88,6 +109,7 @@
 	EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
 	IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
 	EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
+	IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG,
 };
 
 struct h_misc {
@@ -133,7 +155,8 @@
 
 enum digsig_version {
 	DIGSIG_VERSION_1 = 1,
-	DIGSIG_VERSION_2
+	DIGSIG_VERSION_2,
+	DIGSIG_VERSION_3	/* hash of ima_file_id struct (portion used) */
 };
 
 struct pubkey_hdr {
@@ -196,6 +219,8 @@
 	const char *hash_algo;
 	const char *keyfile;
 	const char *keypass;
+	uint32_t keyid;		/* keyid overriding value, unless 0. (Host order.) */
+	ENGINE *eng;
 };
 
 struct RSA_ASN1_template {
@@ -218,6 +243,7 @@
 void calc_keyid_v1(uint8_t *keyid, char *str, const unsigned char *pkey, int len);
 void calc_keyid_v2(uint32_t *keyid, char *str, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
 int key2bin(RSA *key, unsigned char *pub);
+uint32_t imaevm_read_keyid(const char *certfile);
 
 int sign_hash(const char *algo, const unsigned char *hash, int size, const char *keyfile, const char *keypass, unsigned char *sig);
 int verify_hash(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash, int size, unsigned char *sig, int siglen);
@@ -225,5 +251,6 @@
 void init_public_keys(const char *keyfiles);
 int imaevm_hash_algo_from_sig(unsigned char *sig);
 const char *imaevm_hash_algo_by_id(int algo);
+int calc_hash_sigv3(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type, const char *algo, const unsigned char *in_hash, unsigned char *out_hash);
 
 #endif

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/libimaevm.c -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/libimaevm.c Changed

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -52,11 +53,14 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
 
 #include "imaevm.h"
 #include "hash_info.h"
@@ -85,19 +89,19 @@
 struct libimaevm_params imaevm_params = {
 	.verbose = LOG_INFO,
 	.x509 = 1,
-	.hash_algo = "sha1",
+	.hash_algo = DEFAULT_HASH_ALGO,
 };
 
 static void __attribute__ ((constructor)) libinit(void);
 
-void imaevm_do_hexdump(FILE *fp, const void *ptr, int len, bool cr)
+void imaevm_do_hexdump(FILE *fp, const void *ptr, int len, bool newline)
 {
 	int i;
 	uint8_t *data = (uint8_t *) ptr;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
 		fprintf(fp, "%02x", datai);
-	if (cr)
+	if (newline)
 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
 }
 
@@ -156,7 +160,7 @@
 
 	for (size = stats.st_size; size; size -= len) {
 		len = MIN(size, bs);
-		if (!fread(data, len, 1, fp)) {
+		if (fread(data, len, 1, fp) != 1) {
 			if (ferror(fp)) {
 				log_err("fread() failed\n\n");
 				goto out;
@@ -177,67 +181,6 @@
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int add_dir_hash(const char *file, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	int err;
-	struct dirent *de;
-	DIR *dir;
-	unsigned long long ino, off;
-	unsigned int type;
-	int result = 0;
-
-	dir = opendir(file);
-	if (!dir) {
-		log_err("Failed to open: %s\n", file);
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	while ((de = readdir(dir))) {
-		ino = de->d_ino;
-		off = de->d_off;
-		type = de->d_type;
-		log_debug("entry: %s, ino: %llu, type: %u, off: %llu, reclen: %hu\n",
-			  de->d_name, ino, type, off, de->d_reclen);
-		err = EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, de->d_name, strlen(de->d_name));
-		/*err |= EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &off, sizeof(off));*/
-		err |= EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &ino, sizeof(ino));
-		err |= EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &type, sizeof(type));
-		if (!err) {
-			log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
-			output_openssl_errors();
-			result = 1;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-
-	closedir(dir);
-
-	return result;
-}
-
-static int add_link_hash(const char *path, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	int err;
-	char buf1024;
-
-	err = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	if (err <= 0)
-		return -1;
-
-	log_info("link: %s -> %.*s\n", path, err, buf);
-	return !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, buf, err);
-}
-
-static int add_dev_hash(struct stat *st, EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	uint32_t dev = st->st_rdev;
-	unsigned major = (dev & 0xfff00) >> 8;
-	unsigned minor = (dev & 0xff) | ((dev >> 12) & 0xfff00);
-
-	log_info("device: %u:%u\n", major, minor);
-	return !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &dev, sizeof(dev));
-}
-
 int ima_calc_hash(const char *file, uint8_t *hash)
 {
 	const EVP_MD *md;
@@ -278,18 +221,8 @@
 	case S_IFREG:
 		err = add_file_hash(file, pctx);
 		break;
-	case S_IFDIR:
-		err = add_dir_hash(file, pctx);
-		break;
-	case S_IFLNK:
-		err = add_link_hash(file, pctx);
-		break;
-	case S_IFIFO: case S_IFSOCK:
-	case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
-		err = add_dev_hash(&st, pctx);
-		break;
 	default:
-		log_errno("Unsupported file type");
+		log_err("Unsupported file type (0x%x)", st.st_mode & S_IFMT);
 		err = -1;
 		goto err;
 	}
@@ -317,6 +250,7 @@
 {
 	FILE *fp;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
 
 	if (!keyfile)
 		return NULL;
@@ -328,6 +262,17 @@
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
+	if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) == -1) {
+		log_err("Failed to fstat key file: %s\n", keyfile);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((st.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) {
+		if (imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO)
+			log_err("Key file is not regular file: %s\n", keyfile);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	if (x509) {
 		X509 *crt = d2i_X509_fp(fp, NULL);
 
@@ -357,6 +302,7 @@
 	return pkey;
 }
 
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
 RSA *read_pub_key(const char *keyfile, int x509)
 {
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
@@ -416,6 +362,7 @@
 
 	return 0;
 }
+#endif  /* CONFIG_SIGV1 */
 
 struct public_key_entry {
 	struct public_key_entry *next;
@@ -463,8 +410,6 @@
 	keyfiles_free = tmp_keyfiles;
 
 	while ((keyfile = strsep(&tmp_keyfiles, ", \t")) != NULL) {
-		if (!keyfile)
-			break;
 		if ((*keyfile == '\0') || (*keyfile == ' ') ||
 		    (*keyfile == '\t'))
 			continue;
@@ -491,10 +436,21 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * Verify a signature, prefixed with the signature_v2_hdr, either based
+ * directly or indirectly on the file data hash.
+ *
+ * version 2: directly based on the file data hash (e.g. sha*sum)
+ * version 3: indirectly based on the hash of the struct ima_file_id, which
+ *	      contains the xattr type (enum evm_ima_xattr_type), the hash
+ *	      algorithm (enum hash_algo), and the file data hash
+ *	      (e.g. fsverity digest).
+ *
  * Return: 0 verification good, 1 verification bad, -1 error.
+ *
+ * (Note: signature_v2_hdr struct does not contain the 'type'.)
  */
-static int verify_hash_v2(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash, int size,
-			  unsigned char *sig, int siglen)
+static int verify_hash_common(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash,
+			      int size, unsigned char *sig, int siglen)
 {
 	int ret = -1;
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey, *pkey_free = NULL;
@@ -518,6 +474,16 @@
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+#if defined(EVP_PKEY_SM2) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000
+	/* If EC key are used, check whether it is SM2 key */
+	if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+		EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+		int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+		if (curve == NID_sm2)
+			EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	st = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_new";
 	if (!(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL)))
 		goto err;
@@ -554,6 +520,128 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Verify a signature, prefixed with the signature_v2_hdr, directly based
+ * on the file data hash.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 verification good, 1 verification bad, -1 error.
+ */
+static int verify_hash_v2(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash,
+			  int size, unsigned char *sig, int siglen)
+{
+	/* note: signature_v2_hdr does not contain 'type', use sig + 1 */
+	return verify_hash_common(file, hash, size, sig + 1, siglen - 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature, prefixed with the signature_v2_hdr, indirectly based
+ * on the file data hash.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 verification good, 1 verification bad, -1 error.
+ */
+static int verify_hash_v3(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash,
+			  int size, unsigned char *sig, int siglen)
+{
+	unsigned char sigv3_hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = calc_hash_sigv3(sig0, NULL, hash, sigv3_hash);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* note: signature_v2_hdr does not contain 'type', use sig + 1 */
+	return verify_hash_common(file, sigv3_hash, size, sig + 1, siglen - 1);
+}
+
+#define HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE 64	/* kernel HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE is 64 bytes */
+
+struct ima_file_id {
+	__u8 hash_type;		/* xattr type enum evm_ima_xattr_type */
+	__u8 hash_algorithm;	/* Digest algorithm enum hash_algo */
+	__u8 hashHASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE;
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the signature format version 3 hash based on the portion
+ * of the ima_file_id structure used, not the entire structure.
+ *
+ * On success, return the hash length, otherwise for openssl errors
+ * return 1, other errors return -EINVAL.
+ */
+int calc_hash_sigv3(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type, const char *algo,
+		    const unsigned char *in_hash, unsigned char *out_hash)
+{
+	struct ima_file_id file_id = { .hash_type = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG };
+	uint8_t *data = (uint8_t *) &file_id;
+
+	const EVP_MD *md;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *pctx;
+	unsigned int mdlen;
+	int err;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
+	EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+	pctx = &ctx;
+#else
+	pctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+#endif
+	int hash_algo;
+	int hash_size;
+	unsigned int unused;
+
+	if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG) {
+		log_err("Only fsverity supports signature format v3 (sigv3)\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!algo)
+		algo = imaevm_params.hash_algo;
+
+	if ((hash_algo = imaevm_get_hash_algo(algo)) < 0) {
+		log_err("Hash algorithm %s not supported\n", algo);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	file_id.hash_algorithm = hash_algo;
+
+	md = EVP_get_digestbyname(algo);
+	if (!md) {
+		log_err("EVP_get_digestbyname(%s) failed\n", algo);
+		err = 1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
+	memcpy(file_id.hash, in_hash, hash_size);
+
+	err = EVP_DigestInit(pctx, md);
+	if (!err) {
+		log_err("EVP_DigestInit() failed\n");
+		err = 1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	unused = HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - hash_size;
+	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(pctx, data, sizeof(file_id) - unused)) {
+		log_err("EVP_DigestUpdate() failed\n");
+		err = 1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	err = EVP_DigestFinal(pctx, out_hash, &mdlen);
+	if (!err) {
+		log_err("EVP_DigestFinal() failed\n");
+		err = 1;
+		goto err;
+	}
+	err = mdlen;
+err:
+	if (err == 1)
+		output_openssl_errors();
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(pctx);
+#endif
+	return err;
+}
+
 int imaevm_get_hash_algo(const char *algo)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -596,7 +684,7 @@
 		default:
 			return -1;
 		}
-	} else if (sig0 == DIGSIG_VERSION_2) {
+	} else if (sig0 == DIGSIG_VERSION_2 || sig0 == DIGSIG_VERSION_3) {
 		hashalgo = ((struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig)->hash_algo;
 		if (hashalgo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST)
 			return -1;
@@ -605,11 +693,12 @@
 		return -1;
 }
 
-int verify_hash(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash, int size, unsigned char *sig,
-		int siglen)
+int verify_hash(const char *file, const unsigned char *hash, int size,
+		unsigned char *sig, int siglen)
 {
 	/* Get signature type from sig header */
-	if (sig0 == DIGSIG_VERSION_1) {
+	if (sig1 == DIGSIG_VERSION_1) {
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
 		const char *key = NULL;
 
 		/* Read pubkey from RSA key */
@@ -617,9 +706,16 @@
 			key = "/etc/keys/pubkey_evm.pem";
 		else
 			key = imaevm_params.keyfile;
-		return verify_hash_v1(file, hash, size, sig, siglen, key);
-	} else if (sig0 == DIGSIG_VERSION_2) {
+		return verify_hash_v1(file, hash, size, sig + 1, siglen - 1,
+					 key);
+#else
+		log_info("Signature version 1 deprecated.");
+		return -1;
+#endif
+	} else if (sig1 == DIGSIG_VERSION_2) {
 		return verify_hash_v2(file, hash, size, sig, siglen);
+	} else if (sig1 == DIGSIG_VERSION_3) {
+		return verify_hash_v3(file, hash, size, sig, siglen);
 	} else
 		return -1;
 }
@@ -630,11 +726,16 @@
 	unsigned char hashMAX_DIGEST_SIZE;
 	int hashlen, sig_hash_algo;
 
-	if (sig0 != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) {
+	if (sig0 != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && sig0 != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG) {
 		log_err("%s: xattr ima has no signature\n", file);
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	if (!digest && sig0 == IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG) {
+		log_err("%s: calculating the fs-verity digest is not supported\n", file);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
 	sig_hash_algo = imaevm_hash_algo_from_sig(sig + 1);
 	if (sig_hash_algo < 0) {
 		log_err("%s: Invalid signature\n", file);
@@ -647,17 +748,18 @@
 	 * Validate the signature based on the digest included in the
 	 * measurement list, not by calculating the local file digest.
 	 */
-	if (digestlen > 0)
-	    return verify_hash(file, digest, digestlen, sig + 1, siglen - 1);
+	if (digest && digestlen > 0)
+		return verify_hash(file, digest, digestlen, sig, siglen);
 
 	hashlen = ima_calc_hash(file, hash);
 	if (hashlen <= 1)
 		return hashlen;
 	assert(hashlen <= sizeof(hash));
 
-	return verify_hash(file, hash, hashlen, sig + 1, siglen - 1);
+	return verify_hash(file, hash, hashlen, sig, siglen);
 }
 
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
 /*
  * Create binary key representation suitable for kernel
  */
@@ -716,6 +818,7 @@
 	if (imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO)
 		log_info("keyid-v1: %s\n", str);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SIGV1 */
 
 /*
  * Calculate keyid of the public_key part of EVP_PKEY
@@ -747,27 +850,170 @@
 	X509_PUBKEY_free(pk);
 }
 
-static EVP_PKEY *read_priv_pkey(const char *keyfile, const char *keypass)
+/*
+ * Extract SKID from x509 in openssl portable way.
+ */
+static const unsigned char *x509_get_skid(X509 *x, int *len)
 {
-	FILE *fp;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
+	ASN1_STRING *skid;
 
-	fp = fopen(keyfile, "r");
-	if (!fp) {
-		log_err("Failed to open keyfile: %s\n", keyfile);
+	/*
+	 * This will cache extensions.
+	 * OpenSSL uses this method itself.
+	 */
+	if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1) != 1)
 		return NULL;
+	skid = x->skid;
+#else
+	const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(x);
+#endif
+	if (len)
+		*len = ASN1_STRING_length(skid);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000
+	return ASN1_STRING_data(x->skid);
+#else
+	return ASN1_STRING_get0_data(skid);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * read_keyid_from_cert() - Read keyid from SKID from x509 certificate file
+ * @keyid_be:	Output 32-bit keyid in network order (BE);
+ * @certfile:	Input filename.
+ * @try_der:	true:  try to read in DER from if there is no PEM,
+ *		       cert is considered mandatory and error will be issued
+ *		       if there is no cert;
+ *		false: only try to read in PEM form, cert is considered
+ *		       optional.
+ * Return:	0 on success, -1 on error.
+ */
+static int read_keyid_from_cert(uint32_t *keyid_be, const char *certfile, int try_der)
+{
+	X509 *x = NULL;
+	FILE *fp;
+	const unsigned char *skid;
+	int skid_len;
+
+	if (!(fp = fopen(certfile, "r"))) {
+		log_err("Cannot open %s: %s\n", certfile, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
 	}
-	pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, (void *)keypass);
-	if (!pkey) {
-		log_err("Failed to PEM_read_PrivateKey key file: %s\n",
-			keyfile);
-		output_openssl_errors();
+	if (!PEM_read_X509(fp, &x, NULL, NULL)) {
+		if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_last_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
+			ERR_clear_error();
+			if (try_der) {
+				rewind(fp);
+				d2i_X509_fp(fp, &x);
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * Cert is optional and there is just no PEM
+				 * header, then issue debug message and stop
+				 * trying.
+				 */
+				log_debug("%s: x509 certificate not found\n",
+					  certfile);
+				fclose(fp);
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-
 	fclose(fp);
+	if (!x) {
+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+		log_err("read keyid: %s: Error reading x509 certificate\n",
+			certfile);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (!(skid = x509_get_skid(x, &skid_len))) {
+		log_err("read keyid: %s: SKID not found\n", certfile);
+		goto err_free;
+	}
+	if (skid_len < sizeof(*keyid_be)) {
+		log_err("read keyid: %s: SKID too short (len %d)\n", certfile,
+			skid_len);
+		goto err_free;
+	}
+	memcpy(keyid_be, skid + skid_len - sizeof(*keyid_be), sizeof(*keyid_be));
+	log_info("keyid %04x (from %s)\n", ntohl(*keyid_be), certfile);
+	X509_free(x);
+	return 0;
+
+err_free:
+	X509_free(x);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * imaevm_read_keyid() - Read 32-bit keyid from the cert file
+ * @certfile:	File with certificate in PEM or DER form.
+ *
+ * Try to read keyid from Subject Key Identifier (SKID) of x509 certificate.
+ * Autodetect if cert is in PEM (tried first) or DER encoding.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on error or 32-bit keyid in host order otherwise.
+ */
+uint32_t imaevm_read_keyid(const char *certfile)
+{
+	uint32_t keyid_be = 0;
+
+	read_keyid_from_cert(&keyid_be, certfile, true);
+	/* On error keyid_be will not be set, returning 0. */
+	return ntohl(keyid_be);
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *read_priv_pkey(const char *keyfile, const char *keypass)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+	if (!strncmp(keyfile, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_EVM_ENGINE
+		if (!imaevm_params.keyid) {
+			log_err("When using a pkcs11 URI you must provide the keyid with an option\n");
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (keypass) {
+			if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(imaevm_params.eng, "PIN", keypass, 0)) {
+				log_err("Failed to set the PIN for the private key\n");
+				goto err_engine;
+			}
+		}
+		pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(imaevm_params.eng, keyfile, NULL, NULL);
+		if (!pkey) {
+			log_err("Failed to load private key %s\n", keyfile);
+			goto err_engine;
+		}
+#else
+		log_err("OpenSSL \"engine\" support is disabled\n");
+		goto err_engine;
+#endif
+	} else {
+		fp = fopen(keyfile, "r");
+		if (!fp) {
+			log_err("Failed to open keyfile: %s\n", keyfile);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, (void *)keypass);
+		if (!pkey) {
+			log_err("Failed to PEM_read_PrivateKey key file: %s\n",
+				keyfile);
+			output_openssl_errors();
+		}
+
+		fclose(fp);
+	}
+
 	return pkey;
+
+err_engine:
+	output_openssl_errors();
+	return NULL;
 }
 
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
 static RSA *read_priv_key(const char *keyfile, const char *keypass)
 {
 	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
@@ -878,6 +1124,7 @@
 	RSA_free(key);
 	return len;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SIGV1 */
 
 /*
  * @sig is assumed to be of (MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE - 1) size
@@ -916,7 +1163,7 @@
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	log_info("hash(%s): ", imaevm_params.hash_algo);
+	log_info("hash(%s): ", algo);
 	log_dump(hash, size);
 
 	pkey = read_priv_pkey(keyfile, imaevm_params.keypass);
@@ -932,7 +1179,24 @@
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	calc_keyid_v2(&keyid, name, pkey);
+#if defined(EVP_PKEY_SM2) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x30000000
+	/* If EC key are used, check whether it is SM2 key */
+	if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+		EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+		int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+		if (curve == NID_sm2)
+			EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (imaevm_params.keyid)
+		keyid = htonl(imaevm_params.keyid);
+	else {
+		int keyid_read_failed = read_keyid_from_cert(&keyid, keyfile, false);
+
+		if (keyid_read_failed)
+			calc_keyid_v2(&keyid, name, pkey);
+	}
 	hdr->keyid = keyid;
 
 	st = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_new";
@@ -942,7 +1206,7 @@
 	if (!EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx))
 		goto err;
 	st = "EVP_get_digestbyname";
-	if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(imaevm_params.hash_algo)))
+	if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(algo)))
 		goto err;
 	st = "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md";
 	if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, md))
@@ -975,9 +1239,14 @@
 	if (keypass)
 		imaevm_params.keypass = keypass;
 
-	return imaevm_params.x509 ?
-		sign_hash_v2(hashalgo, hash, size, keyfile, sig) :
-		sign_hash_v1(hashalgo, hash, size, keyfile, sig);
+	if (imaevm_params.x509)
+		return sign_hash_v2(hashalgo, hash, size, keyfile, sig);
+#if CONFIG_SIGV1
+	else
+		return sign_hash_v1(hashalgo, hash, size, keyfile, sig);
+#endif
+	log_info("Signature version 1 deprecated.");
+	return -1;
 }
 
 static void libinit()

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/pcr.h -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/pcr.h Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/pcr_ibmtss.c Added

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Support PCR reading implementation based on IBM TSS2
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 IBM Ken Goldman <kgoldman@us.ibm.com>
+ */
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#define USE_FPRINTF
+#include "utils.h"
+#include "imaevm.h"
+
+#define TPM_POSIX	/* use Posix, not Windows constructs in TSS */
+#undef MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	/* imaevm uses a different value than the TSS */
+#include <ibmtss/tss.h>
+
+int tpm2_pcr_supported(void)
+{
+	if (imaevm_params.verbose > LOG_INFO)
+		log_info("Using ibmtss to read PCRs\n");
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Table mapping C strings to TCG algorithm identifiers */
+typedef struct tdAlgorithm_Map {
+	const char *algorithm_string;
+	TPMI_ALG_HASH algid;
+} Algorithm_Map;
+
+Algorithm_Map algorithm_map = {
+				 { "sha1", TPM_ALG_SHA1},
+				 { "sha256", TPM_ALG_SHA256},
+#if 0	/* uncomment as these digest algorithms are supported */
+				 { "", TPM_ALG_SHA384},
+				 { "", TPM_ALG_SHA512},
+				 { "", TPM_ALG_SM3_256},
+				 { "", TPM_ALG_SHA3_256},
+				 { "", TPM_ALG_SHA3_384},
+				 { "", TPM_ALG_SHA3_512},
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * algorithm_string_to_algid() converts a digest algorithm from a C string to a
+ * TCG algorithm identifier as defined in the TCG Algorithm Regisrty..
+ *
+ *  Returns TPM_ALG_ERROR if the string has an unsupported value.
+ */
+static TPMI_ALG_HASH algorithm_string_to_algid(const char *algorithm_string)
+{
+	size_t 	i;
+
+	for (i=0 ; i < sizeof(algorithm_map)/sizeof(Algorithm_Map) ; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(algorithm_string, algorithm_mapi.algorithm_string)
+		    == 0) {
+			return algorithm_mapi.algid; 		/* if match */
+		}
+	}
+	return TPM_ALG_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * tpm2_pcr_read - read the PCR
+ *
+ * algo_name: PCR digest algorithm (the PCR bank) as a C string
+ * pcr_handle: PCR number to read
+ * hwpcr: buffer for the PCR output in binary
+ * len: allocated size of hwpcr and should match the digest algorithm
+ */
+int tpm2_pcr_read(const char *algo_name, uint32_t pcr_handle, uint8_t *hwpcr,
+		  int len, char **errmsg)
+{
+        int 			ret = 0;	/* function return code */
+	TPM_RC			rc = 0;		/* TCG return code */
+	TPM_RC 			rc1 = 0;	/* secondary return code */
+	PCR_Read_In 		pcr_read_in;	/* command input */
+	PCR_Read_Out 		pcr_read_out;	/* response output */
+	TSS_CONTEXT		*tss_context = NULL;
+	TPMI_ALG_HASH 		alg_id;		/* PCR algorithm */
+
+	alg_id = algorithm_string_to_algid(algo_name);
+	if (alg_id == TPM_ALG_ERROR) {
+		ret = asprintf(errmsg, "tpm2_pcr_read: unknown algorithm %s",
+			       algo_name);
+		if (ret == -1) 	/* the contents of errmsg is undefined */
+			*errmsg = NULL;
+		rc = 1;
+		goto end;
+	}
+
+	rc = TSS_Create(&tss_context);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto end;
+
+	/* call TSS to execute the command */
+	pcr_read_in.pcrSelectionIn.count = 1;
+	pcr_read_in.pcrSelectionIn.pcrSelections0.hash = alg_id;
+	pcr_read_in.pcrSelectionIn.pcrSelections0.sizeofSelect = 3;
+	pcr_read_in.pcrSelectionIn.pcrSelections0.pcrSelect0 = 0;
+	pcr_read_in.pcrSelectionIn.pcrSelections0.pcrSelect1 = 0;
+	pcr_read_in.pcrSelectionIn.pcrSelections0.pcrSelect2 = 0;
+	pcr_read_in.pcrSelectionIn.pcrSelections0.pcrSelectpcr_handle / 8 =
+		1 << (pcr_handle % 8);
+	rc = TSS_Execute(tss_context,
+			 (RESPONSE_PARAMETERS *)&pcr_read_out,
+			 (COMMAND_PARAMETERS *)&pcr_read_in,
+			 NULL,
+			 TPM_CC_PCR_Read,
+			 TPM_RH_NULL, NULL, 0);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto end;
+
+	/* nothing read, bank missing */
+	if (pcr_read_out.pcrValues.count == 0) {
+		ret = asprintf(errmsg, "tpm2_pcr_read: returned count 0 for %s",
+			       algo_name);
+		if (ret == -1) /* the contents of errmsg is undefined */
+			*errmsg = NULL;
+		rc = 1;
+		goto end;
+	}
+	/* len parameter did not match the digest algorithm */
+	else if (pcr_read_out.pcrValues.digests0.t.size != len) {
+		ret = asprintf(errmsg,
+			       "tpm2_pcr_read: "
+			       "expected length %d actual %u for %s",
+			       len, pcr_read_out.pcrValues.digests0.t.size,
+			       algo_name);
+		if (ret == -1)	/* the contents of errmsg is undefined */
+			*errmsg = NULL;
+		rc = 1;
+		goto end;
+	} else {
+		memcpy(hwpcr,
+		       pcr_read_out.pcrValues.digests0.t.buffer,
+		       pcr_read_out.pcrValues.digests0.t.size);
+	}
+end:
+	/* Call delete even on errors to free context resources */
+	rc1 = TSS_Delete(tss_context);
+
+	/* map TCG return code to function return code */
+	if ((rc == 0) && (rc1 == 0))
+		return 0;
+	else
+		return -1;
+}

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/pcr_tss.c -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/pcr_tss.c Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/pcr_tsspcrread.c -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/pcr_tsspcrread.c Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/src/utils.c -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/src/utils.c Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/tests/Makefile.am -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/Makefile.am Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/tests/boot_aggregate.test -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/boot_aggregate.test Changed

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 # for verifying the calculated boot_aggregate is included in this
 # directory as well.
 
-trap cleanup SIGINT SIGTERM EXIT
+trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM EXIT
 
 # Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
 VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
@@ -126,8 +126,10 @@
 # Verify that the last "boot_aggregate" record in the IMA measurement
 # list matches.
 check() {
+	local options=$1
+
 	echo "INFO: Calculating the boot_aggregate (PCRs 0 - 9) for multiple banks"
-	bootaggr=$(evmctl ima_boot_aggregate)
+	bootaggr=$(evmctl ima_boot_aggregate ${options})
 	if  $? -ne 0 ; then
 		echo "${CYAN}SKIP: evmctl ima_boot_aggregate: $bootaggr${NORM}"
 		exit "$SKIP"
@@ -151,6 +153,7 @@
 }
 
 if  "$(id -u)" = 0  &&  -c "/dev/tpm0" ; then
+	BOOTAGGR_OPTIONS="--hwtpm"
 	ASCII_RUNTIME_MEASUREMENTS="/sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements"
 	if  ! -d "/sys/kernel/security/ima" ; then
 		echo "${CYAN}SKIP: CONFIG_IMA not enabled${NORM}"
@@ -194,4 +197,4 @@
 	fi
 fi
 
-expect_pass check
+expect_pass check $BOOTAGGR_OPTIONS

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/fsverity.test Added

@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Test IMA support for including fs-verity enabled files measurements
+# in the IMA measurement list.
+#
+# Define policy rules showing the different types of IMA and fs-verity
+# records in the IMA measurement list.  Include examples of files that
+# are suppose to be fs-verity enabled, but aren't.
+#
+# test 1: IMA policy rule using the new ima-ngv2 template
+# - Hash prefixed with "ima:"
+#
+# test 2: fs-verity IMA policy rule using the new ima-ngv2 template
+# - fs-verity hash prefixed with "verity:"
+# - Non fs-verity enabled file, zeros prefixed with "verity:"
+#
+# test 3: IMA policy rule using the new ima-sigv2 template
+# - Hash prefixed with "ima:"
+# - Appended signature, when available.
+#
+# test 4: fs-verity IMA policy rule using the new ima-sigv2 template
+# - fs-verity hash prefixed with "verity:"
+# - Non fs-verity enabled file, zeros prefixed with "verity:"
+# - Appended IMA signature of fs-verity file hash, when available.
+
+# To avoid affecting the system's IMA custom policy or requiring a
+# reboot between tests, define policy rules based on UUID.  However,
+# since the policy rules are walked sequentially, the system's IMA
+# custom policy rules might take precedence.
+
+cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
+PATH=../src:../fsverity-utils:$PATH
+source ./functions.sh
+
+# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
+VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
+
+IMA_POLICY_FILE="/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/policy"
+IMA_MEASUREMENT_LIST="/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements"
+TST_MNT="/tmp/fsverity-test"
+TST_IMG="/tmp/test.img"
+
+LOOPBACK_MOUNTED=0
+FSVERITY="$(which fsverity)"
+
+_require dd mkfs blkid e2fsck tune2fs evmctl setfattr
+./gen-keys.sh >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup _cleanup_env cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM EXIT
+
+cleanup() {
+        if  -e $TST_MNT ; then
+		if  $LOOPBACK_MOUNTED -eq 1 ; then
+			umount $TST_MNT
+		fi
+		if  -f "$TST_IMG" ; then
+			rm "$TST_IMG"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# Loopback mount a file
+mount_loopback_file() {
+	local ret
+
+	if  ! -d $TST_MNT ; then
+		mkdir $TST_MNT
+	fi
+
+#	if modprobe loop; then
+#		echo "${CYAN}INFO: modprobe loop failed${NORM}"
+#	fi
+
+	if ! losetup -f &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: losetup${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	mount -v -o loop ${TST_IMG} $TST_MNT
+	ret=$?
+
+	if  "${ret}" -eq 0 ; then
+		LOOPBACK_MOUNTED=1
+	fi
+
+	return "$ret"
+}
+
+# Change the loopback mounted filesystem's UUID in between tests
+change_loopback_file_uuid() {
+	echo " "
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 1  && echo "INFO: Changing loopback file uuid"
+
+	umount $TST_MNT
+	if ! e2fsck -y -f ${TST_IMG} &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: e2fsck${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! tune2fs -f ${TST_IMG} -U random &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: change UUID${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 1  && echo "INFO: Remounting loopback filesystem"
+	if ! mount_loopback_file; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: re-mounting loopback filesystem${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+# Create a file to be loopback mounted
+create_loopback_file() {
+	local fs_type=$1
+	local options=""
+
+	echo "INFO: Creating loopback filesystem"
+	case $fs_type in
+	ext4|f2fs)
+		options="-O verity"
+		;;
+	btrfs)
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: unsupported fs-verity filesystem${NORM}"
+		exit "${FAIL}"
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 2  && echo "INFO: Creating a file to be loopback mounted with options: $options"
+	if ! dd if=/dev/zero of="${TST_IMG}" bs=100M count=6 &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: creating ${TST_IMG}${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	echo "INFO: Building an $fs_type filesystem"
+	if ! mkfs -t "$fs_type" -q "${TST_IMG}" "$options"; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: Creating $fs_type filesystem${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	echo "INFO: Mounting loopback filesystem"
+	if ! mount_loopback_file; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: mounting loopback filesystem${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+get_current_uuid() {
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 2  && echo "INFO: Getting loopback file uuid"
+	if ! UUID=$(blkid -s UUID -o value ${TST_IMG}); then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: to get UUID${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+unqualified_bprm_rule() {
+	local test=$1
+	local rule=$2
+	local rule_match="measure func=BPRM_CHECK"
+	local rule_dontmatch="fsuuid"
+
+	if  -z "${rule##*$digest_type=verity*}" ; then
+		if grep "$rule_match" $IMA_POLICY_FILE | grep -v "$rule_dontmatch"  &> /dev/null; then
+			return "$SKIP"
+		fi
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+load_policy_rule() {
+	local test=$1
+	local rule=$2
+
+	if ! get_current_uuid; then
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE:FAILED getting uuid${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	unqualified_bprm_rule "${test}" "${rule}"
+	if  $? -eq "${SKIP}" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}SKIP: fsuuid unqualified \"BPRM_CHECK\" rule exists${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	echo "$test: rule: $rule fsuuid=$UUID"
+	if ! echo "$rule fsuuid=$UUID" > $IMA_POLICY_FILE; then
+		echo "${CYAN}SKIP: Loading policy rule failed, skipping test${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+create_file() {
+	local test=$1
+	local type=$2
+
+	TST_FILE=$(mktemp -p $TST_MNT -t "${type}".XXXXXX)
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 1  && echo "INFO: creating $TST_FILE"
+
+	# heredoc to create a script
+	cat <<-EOF > "$TST_FILE"
+	#!/bin/bash
+	echo "Hello" &> /dev/null
+	EOF
+
+	chmod a+x "$TST_FILE"
+}
+
+measure-verity() {
+	local test=$1
+	local verity="${2:-disabled}"
+	local digest_filename
+	local error="$OK"
+	local KEY=$PWD/test-rsa2048.key
+
+	create_file "$test" verity-hash
+	if  "$verity" = "enabled" ; then
+		msg="Measuring fs-verity enabled file $TST_FILE"
+		if ! "$FSVERITY" enable "$TST_FILE" &> /dev/null; then
+			echo "${CYAN}SKIP: Failed enabling fs-verity on $TST_FILE${NORM}"
+			return "$SKIP"
+		fi
+	else
+		msg="Measuring non fs-verity enabled file $TST_FILE"
+	fi
+
+	# Sign the fsverity digest and write it as security.ima xattr.
+	# "evmctl sign_hash" input: <digest> <filename>
+	# "evmctl sign_hash" output: <digest> <filename> <signature>
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 2  && echo "INFO: Signing the fsverity digest"
+	xattr=$("$FSVERITY" digest "$TST_FILE" | evmctl sign_hash --veritysig --key "$KEY" 2> /dev/null)
+	sig=$(echo "$xattr" | cut -d' ' -f3)
+
+	# On failure to write security.ima xattr, the signature will simply
+	# not be appended to the measurement list record.
+	if ! setfattr -n security.ima -v "0x$sig" "$TST_FILE"; then
+		echo "${CYAN}INFO: Failed to write security.ima xattr${NORM}"
+	fi
+	"$TST_FILE"
+
+	# "fsverity digest" calculates the fsverity hash, even for
+	# non fs-verity enabled files.
+	digest_filename=$("$FSVERITY" digest "$TST_FILE")
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 2  && echo "INFO: verity:$digest_filename"
+
+	grep "verity:$digest_filename" $IMA_MEASUREMENT_LIST &> /dev/null
+	ret=$?
+
+	# Not finding the "fsverity digest" result in the IMA measurement
+	# list is expected for non fs-verity enabled files.  The measurement
+	# list will contain zeros for the file hash.
+	if  $ret -eq 1 ; then
+		error="$FAIL"
+		if  "$verity" = "enabled" ; then
+			echo "${RED}FAILURE: ${msg} ${NORM}"
+		else
+			echo "${GREEN}SUCCESS: ${msg}, fsverity digest not found${NORM}"
+		fi
+	else
+		if  "$verity" = "enabled" ; then
+			echo "${GREEN}SUCCESS: ${msg} ${NORM}"
+		else
+			error="$FAIL"
+			echo "${RED}FAILURE: ${msg} ${NORM}"
+		fi
+	fi
+	return "$error"
+}
+
+measure-ima() {
+	local test=$1
+	local digest_filename
+	local error="$OK"
+	local hashalg
+	local digestsum
+
+	create_file "$test" ima-hash
+	"$TST_FILE"
+
+	hashalg=$(grep "${TST_FILE}" $IMA_MEASUREMENT_LIST | cut -d':' -f2)
+	if  -z "${hashalg}" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}SKIP: Measurement record with algorithm not found${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	digestsum=$(which "${hashalg}"sum)
+	if  -z "${digestsum}" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}SKIP: ${hashalg}sum is not installed${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	# sha1sum,sha256sum return: <digest> <2 spaces> <filename>
+	# Remove the extra space before the filename
+	digest_filename=$(${digestsum} "$TST_FILE" | sed "s/\ \ /\ /")
+	 "$VERBOSE" -ge 2  && echo "$test: $digest_filename"
+	if grep "$digest_filename" $IMA_MEASUREMENT_LIST &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${GREEN}SUCCESS: Measuring $TST_FILE ${NORM}"
+	else
+		error="$FAIL"
+		echo "${RED}FAILURE: Measuring $TST_FILE ${NORM}"
+	fi
+
+	return "$error"
+}
+
+# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set.
+_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE"
+
+# Exit from the creator of the new environment.
+_exit_env "$TST_KERNEL"
+
+# Mount filesystems in the new environment.
+_init_env
+
+# Dependency on being able to read and write the IMA policy file.
+# Requires both CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY, CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY be
+# enabled.
+if  -e "$IMA_POLICY_FILE" ; then
+	mode=$(stat -c "%a" $IMA_POLICY_FILE)
+	if  "$mode" != "600" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}SKIP: IMA policy file must be read-write${NORM}"
+		exit "$SKIP"
+	fi
+else
+	echo "${CYAN}SKIP: $IMA_POLICY_FILE does not exist${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+# Skip the test if fsverity is not found; using _require fails the test.
+if  -z "$FSVERITY" ; then
+	echo "${CYAN}SKIP: fsverity is not installed${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+if  "x$(id -u)" != "x0" ; then
+	echo "${CYAN}SKIP: Must be root to execute this test${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+create_loopback_file ext4
+
+# Commit 989dc72511f7 ("ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and
+# templates") introduced ima-ngv2 and ima-sigv2 in linux-5.19.
+__skip() { return "$SKIP"; }
+
+# IMA policy rule using the ima-ngv2 template
+if load_policy_rule test1 "measure func=BPRM_CHECK template=ima-ngv2"; then
+	expect_pass measure-ima test1
+else
+	expect_pass __skip
+fi
+
+# fsverity IMA policy rule using the ima-ngv2 template
+change_loopback_file_uuid
+if load_policy_rule test2 "measure func=BPRM_CHECK template=ima-ngv2 digest_type=verity"; then
+	expect_fail measure-verity test2
+	expect_pass measure-verity test2 enabled
+else
+	expect_pass __skip
+	expect_pass __skip
+fi
+
+# IMA policy rule using the ima-sigv2 template
+change_loopback_file_uuid
+if load_policy_rule test3 "measure func=BPRM_CHECK template=ima-sigv2"; then
+	expect_pass measure-ima test3
+else
+	expect_pass __skip
+fi
+
+# fsverity IMA policy rule using the ima-sigv2 template
+change_loopback_file_uuid
+if load_policy_rule test4 "measure func=BPRM_CHECK template=ima-sigv2 digest_type=verity"; then
+	expect_fail measure-verity test4
+	expect_pass measure-verity test4 enabled
+else
+	expect_pass __skip
+	expect_pass __skip
+fi
+exit

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/tests/functions.sh -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/functions.sh Changed

@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@
 expect_pass() {
   local -i ret
 
+  if  -n "$TST_LIST"  &&  "${TST_LIST/$1/}" = "$TST_LIST" ; then
+     "$VERBOSE" -gt 1  && echo "____ SKIP test: $*"
+    testsskip+=1
+    return "$SKIP"
+  fi
+
   if  $TNESTED -gt 0 ; then
     echo $RED"expect_pass should not be run nested"$NORM
     testsfail+=1
@@ -94,10 +100,35 @@
   return $ret
 }
 
+expect_pass_if() {
+  local indexes="$1"
+  local ret idx
+
+  shift
+
+  expect_pass "$@"
+  ret=$?
+
+  if  $ret -ne 0  &&  $ret -ne 77  &&  -n "$PATCHES" ; then
+    echo $YELLOW"Possibly missing patches:"$NORM
+    for idx in $indexes; do
+      echo $YELLOW" - ${PATCHES$((idx))}"$NORM
+    done
+  fi
+
+  return $ret
+}
+
 # Eval negative test (one that should fail) and account its result
 expect_fail() {
   local ret
 
+  if  -n "$TST_LIST"  &&  "${TST_LIST/$1/}" = "$TST_LIST" ; then
+     "$VERBOSE" -gt 1  && echo "____ SKIP test: $*"
+    testsskip+=1
+    return "$SKIP"
+  fi
+
   if  $TNESTED -gt 0 ; then
     echo $RED"expect_fail should not be run nested"$NORM
     testsfail+=1
@@ -125,6 +156,25 @@
   return $ret
 }
 
+expect_fail_if() {
+  local indexes="$1"
+  local ret idx
+
+  shift
+
+  expect_fail "$@"
+  ret=$?
+
+  if {  $ret -eq 0  ||  $ret -eq 99 ; } &&  -n "$PATCHES" ; then
+    echo $YELLOW"Possibly missing patches:"$NORM
+    for idx in $indexes; do
+      echo $YELLOW" - ${PATCHES$((idx))}"$NORM
+    done
+  fi
+
+  return $ret
+}
+
 # return true if current test is positive
 _test_expected_to_pass() {
    ! $TFAIL 
@@ -248,8 +298,16 @@
 }
 
 # Show test stats and exit into automake test system
-# with proper exit code (same as ours).
-_report_exit() {
+# with proper exit code (same as ours). Do cleanups.
+_report_exit_and_cleanup() {
+  local exit_code=$?
+
+  if  -n "${WORKDIR}" ; then
+    rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
+  fi
+
+  "$@"
+
   if  $testsfail -gt 0 ; then
     echo "================================="
     echo " Run with FAILEARLY=1 $0 $*"
@@ -263,12 +321,142 @@
    $testsfail -gt 0  && echo -n "$RED" || echo -n "$NORM"
   echo " FAIL: $testsfail"
   echo "$NORM"
+  # Signal failure to the testing environment creator with an unclean shutdown.
+  if  -n "$TST_ENV"  &&  $$ -eq 1 ; then
+    if  -z "$(command -v poweroff)" ; then
+      echo "Warning: cannot properly shutdown system"
+    fi
+
+    # If no test was executed and the script was successful,
+    # do a clean shutdown.
+    if  $testsfail -eq 0  &&  $testspass -eq 0  &&  $testsskip -eq 0  &&
+        $exit_code -ne "$FAIL"  &&  $exit_code -ne "$HARDFAIL" ; then
+      poweroff -f
+    fi
+
+    # If tests were executed and no test failed, do a clean shutdown.
+    if {  $testspass -gt 0  ||  $testsskip -gt 0 ; } &&
+        $testsfail -eq 0 ; then
+      poweroff -f
+    fi
+  fi
   if  $testsfail -gt 0 ; then
     exit "$FAIL"
   elif  $testspass -gt 0 ; then
     exit "$OK"
-  else
+  elif  $testsskip -gt 0 ; then
     exit "$SKIP"
+  else
+    exit "$exit_code"
+  fi
+}
+
+# Setup SoftHSM for local testing by calling the softhsm_setup script.
+# Use the provided workdir as the directory where SoftHSM will store its state
+# into.
+# Upon successfully setting up SoftHSM, this function sets the global variables
+# OPENSSL_ENGINE and OPENSSL_KEYFORM so that the openssl command line tool can
+# use SoftHSM. Also the PKCS11_KEYURI global variable is set to the test key's
+# pkcs11 URI.
+_softhsm_setup() {
+  local workdir="$1"
+
+  local msg
+
+  export SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR="${workdir}/softhsm"
+  export SOFTHSM2_CONF="${workdir}/softhsm/softhsm2.conf"
+
+  mkdir -p "${SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR}"
+
+  msg=$(./softhsm_setup setup 2>&1)
+  if  $? -eq 0 ; then
+    echo "softhsm_setup setup succeeded: $msg"
+    PKCS11_KEYURI=$(echo $msg | sed -n 's|^keyuri: $.*$|\1|p')
+
+    export EVMCTL_ENGINE="--engine pkcs11"
+    export OPENSSL_ENGINE="-engine pkcs11"
+    export OPENSSL_KEYFORM="-keyform engine"
+  else
+    echo "softhsm_setup setup failed: ${msg}"
+  fi
+}
+
+# Tear down the SoftHSM setup and clean up the environment
+_softhsm_teardown() {
+  ./softhsm_setup teardown &>/dev/null
+  rm -rf "${SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR}"
+  unset SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR SOFTHSM2_CONF PKCS11_KEYURI \
+    EVMCTL_ENGINE OPENSSL_ENGINE OPENSSL_KEYFORM
+}
+
+# Syntax: _run_env <kernel> <init> <additional kernel parameters>
+_run_env() {
+  if  -z "$TST_ENV" ; then
+    return
+  fi
+
+  if  $$ -eq 1 ; then
+    return
+  fi
+
+  if  "$TST_ENV" = "um" ; then
+    expect_pass "$1" rootfstype=hostfs rw init="$2" quiet mem=2048M "$3"
+  else
+    echo $RED"Testing environment $TST_ENV not supported"$NORM
+    exit "$FAIL"
+  fi
+}
+
+# Syntax: _exit_env <kernel>
+_exit_env() {
+  if  -z "$TST_ENV" ; then
+    return
+  fi
+
+  if  $$ -eq 1 ; then
+    return
   fi
+
+  exit "$OK"
 }
 
+# Syntax: _init_env
+_init_env() {
+  if  -z "$TST_ENV" ; then
+    return
+  fi
+
+  if  $$ -ne 1 ; then
+    return
+  fi
+
+  mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /tmp
+  mount -t proc proc /proc
+  mount -t sysfs sysfs /sys
+  mount -t securityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security
+
+  if  -n "$(command -v haveged 2> /dev/null)" ; then
+    $(command -v haveged) -w 1024 &> /dev/null
+  fi
+
+  pushd "$PWD" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
+}
+
+# Syntax: _cleanup_env <cleanup function>
+_cleanup_env() {
+  if  -z "$TST_ENV" ; then
+    $1
+    return
+  fi
+
+  if  $$ -ne 1 ; then
+    return
+  fi
+
+  $1
+
+  umount /sys/kernel/security
+  umount /sys
+  umount /proc
+  umount /tmp
+}

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/tests/gen-keys.sh -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/gen-keys.sh Changed

@@ -20,13 +20,14 @@
 type openssl
 
 log() {
-  echo - "$*"
+  echo >&2 - "$*"
   eval "$@"
 }
 
 if  "$1" = clean ; then
   rm -f test-ca.conf
-elif  "$1" = force  ||  ! -e test-ca.conf ; then
+elif  "$1" = force  ||  ! -e test-ca.conf  \
+	||  gen-keys.sh -nt test-ca.conf ; then
 cat > test-ca.conf <<- EOF
 	 req 
 	distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name
@@ -43,26 +44,64 @@
 	basicConstraints=CA:TRUE
 	subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
 	authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer
+
+	 skid 
+	basicConstraints=CA:TRUE
+	subjectKeyIdentifier=12345678
+	authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid:always,issuer
 EOF
 fi
 
 # RSA
 # Second key will be used for wrong key tests.
-for m in 1024 2048; do
-  if  "$1" = clean  ||  "$1" = force ; then
+for m in 1024 1024_skid 2048; do
+  if  "$1" = clean  ||  "$1" = force  \
+	  ||  gen-keys.sh -nt test-rsa$m.key ; then
     rm -f test-rsa$m.cer test-rsa$m.key test-rsa$m.pub
   fi
   if  "$1" = clean ; then
     continue
   fi
+  if  -z "${m%%*_*}" ; then
+    # Add named extension.
+    bits=${m%_*}
+    ext="-extensions ${m#*_}"
+  else
+    bits=$m
+    ext=
+  fi
   if  ! -e test-rsa$m.key ; then
-    log openssl req -verbose -new -nodes -utf8 -sha1 -days 10000 -batch -x509 \
+    log openssl req -verbose -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 10000 -batch -x509 $ext \
       -config test-ca.conf \
-      -newkey rsa:$m \
+      -newkey rsa:$bits \
       -out test-rsa$m.cer -outform DER \
       -keyout test-rsa$m.key
     # for v1 signatures
     log openssl pkey -in test-rsa$m.key -out test-rsa$m.pub -pubout
+    if  $m = 1024_skid ; then
+      # Create combined key+cert.
+      log openssl x509 -inform DER -in test-rsa$m.cer >> test-rsa$m.key
+    fi
+  fi
+done
+
+for curve in prime192v1 prime256v1; do
+  if  "$1" = clean  ||  "$1" = force ; then
+    rm -f test-$curve.cer test-$curve.key test-$curve.pub
+  fi
+  if  "$1" = clean ; then
+    continue
+  fi
+  if  ! -e test-$curve.key ; then
+    log openssl req -verbose -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 10000 -batch -x509 \
+      -config test-ca.conf \
+      -newkey ec \
+      -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:$curve \
+      -out test-$curve.cer -outform DER \
+      -keyout test-$curve.key
+    if  -s test-$curve.key ; then
+      log openssl pkey -in test-$curve.key -out test-$curve.pub -pubout
+    fi
   fi
 done
 
@@ -92,6 +131,31 @@
     fi
 done
 
+# SM2, If openssl 3.0 is installed, gen SM2 keys using
+if  -x /opt/openssl3/bin/openssl ; then
+  (PATH=/opt/openssl3/bin:$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/openssl3/lib
+  for curve in sm2; do
+    if  "$1" = clean  ||  "$1" = force ; then
+      rm -f test-$curve.cer test-$curve.key test-$curve.pub
+    fi
+    if  "$1" = clean ; then
+      continue
+    fi
+    if  ! -e test-$curve.key ; then
+      log openssl req -verbose -new -nodes -utf8 -days 10000 -batch -x509 \
+        -sm3 -sigopt "distid:1234567812345678" \
+        -config test-ca.conf \
+        -copy_extensions copyall \
+        -newkey $curve \
+        -out test-$curve.cer -outform DER \
+        -keyout test-$curve.key
+      if  -s test-$curve.key ; then
+        log openssl pkey -in test-$curve.key -out test-$curve.pub -pubout
+      fi
+    fi
+  done)
+fi
+
 # This script leaves test-ca.conf, *.cer, *.pub, *.key files for sing/verify tests.
 # They are never deleted except by `make distclean'.

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/tests/ima_hash.test -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/ima_hash.test Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/ima_policy_check.awk Added

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+#! /usr/bin/gawk -f
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+#
+# Check a new rule against the loaded IMA policy.
+#
+# Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy (Linux kernel)
+# base:	func= mask= fsmagic= fsuuid= fsname=
+#	uid= euid= gid= egid=
+#	fowner= fgroup=
+# lsm:	subj_user= subj_role= subj_type=
+#	obj_user= obj_role= obj_type=
+# option:	digest_type= template= permit_directio
+#		appraise_type= appraise_flag=
+#		appraise_algos= keyrings=
+#
+# Rules don't overlap if their actions are unrelated (cannot be matched without
+# dont_) and there is no combination of appraise with another do action (e.g.
+# measure, audit, hash). The second condition is due to the fact that appraise
+# might still forbid other actions expected to be performed by a test that did
+# not setup appraisal. Checking appraise for new rules is not sufficient,
+# because that rule could be added anyway. By checking existing rules as well,
+# a warning will be displayed when tests inserting rules with other do actions
+# are reexecuted.
+#
+# Also, rules don't overlap if both include the same policy keyword(s) (in base
+# or lsm, except func), at least one, with a different value. Different func
+# values don't imply non-overlap, due to the fact that a test command might
+# cause the execution of multiple hooks (e.g. FILE_CHECK in addition to
+# MMAP_CHECK). Despite one test is willing to test a particular hook, this could
+# have side effects on other tests (e.g. one test sets: appraise func=MMAP_CHECK
+# and another: measure func=FILE_CHECK; the second test might see an unexpected
+# measurement due to the first test being executed; or the second test cannot
+# unexpectedly do mmap).
+#
+# Currently, the < > operators are not supported and overlapping is asserted
+# even if intervals are disjoint. If supported, non-overlapping conditions could
+# be found. With the ^ modifier, no disjoint intervals can be found. Overlapping
+# is always reported.
+#
+# Rule equivalence is determined by checking each key/value pair, regardless of
+# their order. However, the action must always be at the beginning of the rules.
+# Rules with aliases are considered equivalent to those with their source (e.g.
+# rules with PATH_CHECK and FILE_MMAP are considered as equivalent to rules with
+# FILE_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK).
+#
+# Return a bit mask with the following values:
+# - 1: invalid new rule;
+# - 2: overlap of the new rule with an existing rule in the IMA policy;
+# - 4: new rule exists in the IMA policy.
+
+BEGIN {
+	# Policy definitions.
+	actions_str="measure dont_measure appraise dont_appraise audit hash dont_hash"
+	split(actions_str, actions_array);
+	keywords_str="func mask fsmagic fsuuid fsname uid euid gid egid fowner fgroup subj_user subj_role subj_type obj_user obj_role obj_type";
+	split(keywords_str, keywords_array);
+	options_str="digest_type template permit_directio appraise_type appraise_flag appraise_algos keyrings";
+	split(options_str, options_array);
+
+	# Key types.
+	key_type_unknown=0;
+	key_type_action=1;
+	key_type_keyword=2;
+	key_type_option=3;
+
+	# Result values.
+	ret_invalid_rule=1;
+	ret_rule_overlap=2;
+	ret_same_rule_exists=4;
+
+	for (action_idx in actions_array)
+		key_typesactions_arrayaction_idx=key_type_action;
+	for (keyword_idx in keywords_array)
+		key_typeskeywords_arraykeyword_idx=key_type_keyword;
+	for (option_idx in options_array)
+		key_typesoptions_arrayoption_idx=key_type_option;
+
+	new_rule=1;
+	result=0;
+}
+{
+	# Delete arrays from previous rule.
+	if (!new_rule) {
+		delete current_rule_array;
+		delete current_rule_operator_array;
+	}
+
+	# Check empty rules.
+	if (!length($0)) {
+		if (new_rule) {
+			result=or(result, ret_invalid_rule);
+			exit;
+		}
+		next;
+	}
+
+	for (i=1; i<=NF; i++) {
+		# Parse key/value pair.
+		split($i, key_value_array, /=,>,</, separator_array);
+		key=key_value_array1;
+		value=key_value_array2;
+
+		if (key == "func") {
+			# Normalize values of IMA hooks to what IMA will print.
+			if (value == "FILE_MMAP")
+				value="MMAP_CHECK";
+			else if (value == "PATH_CHECK")
+				value="FILE_CHECK";
+		}
+
+		# Basic validity check (not necessary in general for the IMA policy, but useful to find typos in the tests).
+		if (key_typeskey == key_type_unknown ||
+		    (i == 1 && key_typeskey != key_type_action)) {
+			result=or(result, ret_invalid_rule);
+			exit;
+		}
+
+		# Store key/value pair and operator into an array.
+		if (new_rule) {
+			new_rule_arraykey=value;
+			new_rule_operator_arraykey=separator_array1;
+		} else {
+			current_rule_arraykey=value;
+			current_rule_operator_arraykey=separator_array1;
+		}
+
+		# Store original action and action without dont_.
+		if (i == 1) {
+			if (new_rule) {
+				new_rule_action=key;
+				new_rule_action_sub=key;
+				gsub(/dont_/, "", new_rule_action_sub);
+			} else {
+				current_rule_action=key;
+				current_rule_action_sub=key;
+				gsub(/dont_/, "", current_rule_action_sub);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	# Go to the next line, to compare the new rule with rules in the IMA policy.
+	if (new_rule) {
+		new_rule=0;
+		next;
+	}
+
+	# No overlap by action (unrelated rules and no combination appraise - <do action>), new rule safe to add to the IMA policy.
+	if (current_rule_action_sub != new_rule_action_sub &&
+	    (current_rule_action != "appraise" || new_rule_action ~ /^dont_/) &&
+	    (new_rule_action != "appraise" || current_rule_action ~ /^dont_/))
+		next;
+
+	same_rule=1;
+	overlap_rule=1;
+
+	for (key in key_types) {
+		if (!(key in new_rule_array)) {
+			# Key in current rule but not in new rule.
+			if (key in current_rule_array)
+				same_rule=0;
+			# Key not in new rule and not in current rule.
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (!(key in current_rule_array)) {
+			# Key in new rule but not in current rule.
+			if (key in new_rule_array)
+				same_rule=0;
+			# Key not in current rule and not in new rule.
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		# Same value and operator.
+		if (new_rule_arraykey == current_rule_arraykey &&
+		    new_rule_operator_arraykey == current_rule_operator_arraykey)
+			continue;
+
+		# Different value and/or operator.
+		same_rule=0;
+
+		# Not a policy keyword, not useful to determine overlap.
+		if (key_typeskey != key_type_keyword)
+			continue;
+
+		# > < operators are not supported, cannot determine overlap.
+		if (new_rule_operator_arraykey != "=" || current_rule_operator_arraykey != "=")
+			continue;
+
+		# ^ modifier does not make disjoint sets, cannot determine overlap.
+		if (new_rule_arraykey ~ /^\^/ || current_rule_arraykey ~ /^\^/)
+			continue;
+
+		# One test command can invoke multiple hooks, cannot determine overlap from func.
+		if (key == "func")
+			continue;
+
+		# No overlap by policy keyword, new rule safe to add to the IMA policy.
+		overlap_rule=0;
+		next;
+	}
+
+	if (same_rule)
+		result=or(result, ret_same_rule_exists);
+	else if (overlap_rule)
+		result=or(result, ret_rule_overlap);
+}
+END {
+	exit result;
+}

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/ima_policy_check.test Added

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+#
+# Test for ima_policy_check.awk
+
+trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM EXIT
+
+cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
+. ./functions.sh
+
+export PATH=$PWD:$PATH
+
+check_result() {
+	local result
+
+	echo -e "\nTest: $1"
+	echo "New rule: $2"
+	echo "IMA policy: $3"
+
+	echo -n "Result (expect $4): "
+
+	echo -e "$2\n$3" | ima_policy_check.awk
+	result=$?
+
+	if  "$result" -ne "$4" ; then
+		echo "${RED}$result${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	echo "${GREEN}$result${NORM}"
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+# ima_policy_check.awk returns a bit mask with the following values:
+# - 1: invalid new rule;
+# - 2: overlap of the new rule with an existing rule in the IMA policy;
+# - 4: new rule exists in the IMA policy.
+
+# Basic checks.
+desc="empty IMA policy"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy=""
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Empty new rule"
+rule=""
+ima_policy=""
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 1
+
+desc="Unknown policy keyword fun"
+rule="measure fun=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy=""
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 1
+
+desc="Missing action"
+rule="func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy=""
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 1
+
+# Non-overlapping rules.
+desc="Non-overlapping by action measure/dont_appraise, same func"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="dont_appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Non-overlapping by action audit/dont_appraise, same func"
+rule="audit func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="dont_appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Non-overlapping by action appraise/dont_measure, same func"
+rule="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="dont_measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Non-overlapping by action dont_measure/hash, same func"
+rule="dont_measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="hash func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Non-overlapping by uid, func is equal"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0"
+ima_policy="measure uid=1 func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Non-overlapping by uid, func is equal, same policy options"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0 permit_directio"
+ima_policy="measure uid=1 func=FILE_CHECK permit_directio"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Non-overlapping by mask, func and uid are equal, same policy options"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0 permit_directio mask=MAY_READ"
+ima_policy="measure uid=0 mask=MAY_EXEC func=FILE_CHECK permit_directio"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="Non-overlapping by mask, func and uid are equal, different policy options"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid=0 permit_directio mask=MAY_READ"
+ima_policy="measure uid=0 mask=MAY_EXEC func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+# Overlapping and different rules.
+desc="same actions, different keywords"
+rule="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="appraise uid=0"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="unrelated actions with appraise and a do action, same func"
+rule="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="unrelated actions with appraise and a do action, different func"
+rule="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=MMAP_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="related actions, same func"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="dont_measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="related actions, same func, different policy options"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="dont_measure func=FILE_CHECK permit_directio"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="related actions, same func, different policy options"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK permit_directio"
+ima_policy="dont_measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="same actions, same func, same mask with different modifier (no disjoint sets with the ^ modifier)"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_EXEC"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="same actions, same func, different mask with same modifier (no disjoint sets with the ^ modifier)"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_EXEC"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="same actions, same func, different policy options"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK permit_directio"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="same actions, same func, different policy options"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK permit_directio"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="same actions, MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks"
+rule="measure func=MMAP_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="related actions, same func, same mask with same modifier"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_EXEC"
+ima_policy="dont_measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_EXEC"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="same actions, same func, different uid with same operator (overlap because operators are not supported)"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid>0"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid>1"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+desc="same actions, same func, same uid with different operator (overlap because operators are not supported)"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid>1"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK uid<1"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 2
+
+# Overlapping and same rules.
+desc="same actions, same func"
+rule="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+desc="same actions, same func, same mask"
+rule="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="appraise func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+desc="same actions, same func, same mask, same policy options"
+rule="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK permit_directio appraise_type=imasig"
+ima_policy="appraise func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ permit_directio appraise_type=imasig"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+desc="same actions, same func"
+rule="measure func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT"
+ima_policy="measure func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+desc="same actions, same func with alias (PATH_CHECK = FILE_CHECK)"
+rule="measure func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=PATH_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+desc="same actions, same func with alias (PATH_CHECK = FILE_CHECK), same mask with same modifiers"
+rule="measure mask=^MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+desc="same actions, same func with alias (PATH_CHECK = FILE_CHECK) and same mask with same modifiers, same uid with same operators"
+rule="measure mask=^MAY_READ uid>0 func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ uid>0"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+desc="same actions, same func with alias (PATH_CHECK = FILE_CHECK) and same mask with same modifiers, same uid with same operators"
+rule="measure mask=^MAY_READ uid<1 func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=PATH_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ uid<1"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4
+
+# Overlapping and two rules (one same, one different).
+desc="first: same actions, same func, second: unrelated actions with appraise and a do action"
+rule="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="appraise func=FILE_CHECK\nmeasure func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 6
+
+desc="first: unrelated actions with appraise and a do action, same func, second: same actions"
+rule="appraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="measure func=FILE_CHECK\nappraise func=FILE_CHECK"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 6
+
+desc="first: same actions, same func, same mask, second: different policy options"
+rule="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="appraise func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ\nappraise func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ permit_directio"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 6
+
+desc="first: same actions, same func with alias (PATH_CHECK = FILE_CHECK), same mask, second: different policy options"
+rule="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK"
+ima_policy="appraise func=PATH_CHECK mask=MAY_READ\nappraise func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ permit_directio"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 6
+
+# Non-overlapping and three rules.
+desc="same actions, same func and mask, different uid"
+rule="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=0"
+ima_policy="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=1\nappraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=2\nappraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=3"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 0
+
+desc="same actions, same func and mask, different uid, except one that is the same"
+rule="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=0"
+ima_policy="appraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=1\nappraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=0\nappraise mask=MAY_READ func=FILE_CHECK uid=3"
+expect_pass check_result "$desc" "$rule" "$ima_policy" 4

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/install-fsverity.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/install-mount-idmapped.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/install-openssl3.sh Added

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/tests/install-swtpm.sh -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/install-swtpm.sh Changed

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/mmap_check.test Added

@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+#
+# Check the behavior of MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT
+
+trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup _cleanup_env cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT
+
+PATCHES=(
+'ima: Align ima_file_mmap() parameters with mmap_file LSM hook'
+'ima: Introduce MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook'
+)
+
+RET_INVALID_RULE=$((0x0001))
+RET_RULE_OVERLAP=$((0x0002))
+RET_SAME_RULE_EXISTS=$((0x0004))
+
+EVM_INIT_HMAC=$((0x0001))
+EVM_INIT_X509=$((0x0002))
+
+# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
+VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
+
+# Errors defined in test_mmap
+ERR_SETUP=1
+ERR_TEST=2
+
+cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
+export PATH=$PWD/../src:$PWD:$PATH
+export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
+. ./functions.sh
+_require evmctl
+
+cleanup() {
+	if  "$g_loop_mounted" = "1" ; then
+		popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
+		umount "$g_mountpoint"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_dev" ; then
+		losetup -d "$g_dev"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_image" ; then
+		rm -f "$g_image"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_mountpoint" ; then
+		rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_key_path_der" ; then
+		rm -f "$g_key_path_der"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Use the fsuuid= IMA policy keyword to select only files created/used by the
+# tests below. Also use fowner= to differentiate between files created/used by
+# individual tests.
+IMA_UUID="28b23254-9467-44c0-b6ba-34b12e85a26e"
+MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER=2000
+MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER=2001
+MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
+MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="measure func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
+APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER=2002
+APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER=2003
+APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
+APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE="appraise func=MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT fsmagic=0xef53 fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
+
+check_load_ima_rule() {
+	local result new_policy color
+
+	echo -e "$1\n$(cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy)" | ima_policy_check.awk
+	result=$?
+
+	if  $((result & RET_INVALID_RULE)) -eq $RET_INVALID_RULE ; then
+		echo "${RED}Invalid rule${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  $((result & RET_RULE_OVERLAP)) -eq $RET_RULE_OVERLAP ; then
+		color=${YELLOW}
+		if  -n "$TST_ENV" ; then
+			color=${RED}
+		fi
+
+		echo "${color}Possible interference with existing IMA policy rule${NORM}"
+		if  -n "$TST_ENV" ; then
+			return "$HARDFAIL"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if  $((result & RET_SAME_RULE_EXISTS)) -eq $RET_SAME_RULE_EXISTS ; then
+		return "$OK"
+	fi
+
+	new_policy=$(mktemp -p "$g_mountpoint")
+	echo "$1" > "$new_policy"
+	echo "$new_policy" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
+	result=$?
+	rm -f "$new_policy"
+
+	if  "$result" -ne 0 ; then
+		echo "${RED}Failed to set IMA policy${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+check_mmap() {
+	local hook="$1"
+	local arg="$2"
+	local test_file fowner rule result test_file_entry
+
+	echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME0} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
+
+	if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	fowner="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
+	rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
+
+	if  "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ; then
+		fowner="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
+		rule="$MEASURE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
+	result=$?
+	if  $result -ne "$OK" ; then
+		return $result
+	fi
+
+	test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
+	result=$?
+
+	if  $result -ne 0  &&  $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ; then
+		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  "$TFAIL" != "yes" ; then
+		echo -n "Result (expect found): "
+	else
+		echo -n "Result (expect not found): "
+	fi
+
+	test_file_entry=$(awk '$5 == "'"$test_file"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
+	if  -z "$test_file_entry" ; then
+		if  "$TFAIL" != "yes" ; then
+			echo "${RED}not found${NORM}"
+		else
+			echo "${GREEN}not found${NORM}"
+		fi
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  "$TFAIL" != "yes" ; then
+		echo "${GREEN}found${NORM}"
+	else
+		echo "${RED}found${NORM}"
+	fi
+
+	if  "$VERBOSE" -gt 0 ; then
+		echo "$test_file_entry"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+check_deny() {
+	local hook="$1"
+	local arg="$2"
+	local test_file fowner rule result
+
+	echo -e "\nTest: ${FUNCNAME0} (hook=\"$hook\", test_mmap arg: \"$arg\")"
+
+	if ! test_file=$(mktemp -p "$PWD"); then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot create $test_file${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > "$test_file"; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write $test_file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --key "$g_key_path" "$test_file" &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign $test_file${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	fowner="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_FOWNER"
+	rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_RULE"
+
+	if  "$hook" = "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ; then
+		fowner="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_FOWNER"
+		rule="$APPRAISE_MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT_RULE"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$fowner" "$test_file"; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of $test_file${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	check_load_ima_rule "$rule"
+	result=$?
+	if  $result -ne "$OK" ; then
+		return $result
+	fi
+
+	test_mmap "$test_file" exec
+	result=$?
+
+	if  $result -ne 0  &&  $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ; then
+		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	test_mmap "$test_file" "$arg"
+	result=$?
+
+	if  $result -ne 0  &&  $result -ne "$ERR_TEST" ; then
+		echo "${RED}Unexpected exit status $result from test_mmap${NORM}"
+		return "$HARDFAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  "$TFAIL" != "yes" ; then
+		echo -n "Result (expect denied): "
+	else
+		echo -n "Result (expect allowed): "
+	fi
+
+	if  $result -eq 0 ; then
+		if  "$TFAIL" != "yes" ; then
+			echo "${RED}allowed${NORM}"
+		else
+			echo "${GREEN}allowed${NORM}"
+		fi
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  "$TFAIL" != "yes" ; then
+		echo "${GREEN}denied${NORM}"
+	else
+		echo "${RED}denied${NORM}"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set.
+_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH"
+
+# Exit from the creator of the new environment.
+_exit_env "$TST_KERNEL"
+
+# Mount filesystems in the new environment.
+_init_env
+
+if  "$(whoami)" != "root" ; then
+	echo "${CYAN}This script must be executed as root${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+if  ! -f /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy ; then
+	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file not found${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+if ! cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy &> /dev/null; then
+	echo "${CYAN}IMA policy file is not readable${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+if  -n "$TST_KEY_PATH" ; then
+	if  "${TST_KEY_PATH:0:1}" != "/" ; then
+		echo "${RED}Absolute path required for the signing key${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  ! -f "$TST_KEY_PATH" ; then
+		echo "${RED}Kernel signing key not found in $TST_KEY_PATH${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	g_key_path="$TST_KEY_PATH"
+elif  -f "$PWD/../signing_key.pem" ; then
+	g_key_path="$PWD/../signing_key.pem"
+elif  -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem" ; then
+	g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem"
+elif  -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem" ; then
+	g_key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem"
+else
+	echo "${CYAN}Kernel signing key not found${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm)
+if  $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -eq "$EVM_INIT_X509" ; then
+	if  $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_HMAC" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}Incompatible EVM mode $evm_value${NORM}"
+		exit "$SKIP"
+	fi
+fi
+
+g_key_path_der=$(mktemp)
+
+openssl x509 -in "$g_key_path" -out "$g_key_path_der" -outform der
+if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.ima < "$g_key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
+	echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the IMA keyring${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+g_mountpoint=$(mktemp -d)
+g_image=$(mktemp)
+
+if  -z "$g_mountpoint" ; then
+	echo "${RED}Mountpoint directory not created${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if ! dd if=/dev/zero of="$g_image" bs=1M count=20 &> /dev/null; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot create test image${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+g_dev=$(losetup -f "$g_image" --show)
+if  -z "$g_dev" ; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot create loop device${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if ! mkfs.ext4 -U "$IMA_UUID" -b 4096 "$g_dev" &> /dev/null; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot format $g_dev${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if ! mount -o iversion "$g_dev" "$g_mountpoint"; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot mount loop device${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+g_loop_mounted=1
+pushd "$g_mountpoint" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
+
+# Ensure that IMA does not add a new measurement entry if an application calls
+# mmap() with PROT_READ, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
+# In this case, both the protections requested by the application and the final
+# protections applied by the kernel contain only PROT_READ, so there is no
+# match with the IMA rule, which expects PROT_EXEC to be set.
+expect_fail check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" ""
+
+# Ensure that IMA adds a new measurement entry if an application calls mmap()
+# with PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, and a policy rule contains the MMAP_CHECK hook.
+expect_pass check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "exec"
+
+# Same as in the first test, but in this case the application calls the
+# personality() system call with READ_IMPLIES_EXEC, which causes the kernel to
+# add PROT_EXEC in the final protections passed to the MMAP_CHECK hook.
+#
+# Ensure that the bug introduced by 98de59bfe4b2 ("take calculation of final
+# protections in security_mmap_file() into a helper") is fixed, by passing the
+# final protections again to the MMAP_CHECK hook. Due to the bug, the hook
+# received the protections requested by the application. Since those protections
+# don't have PROT_EXEC, IMA was not creating a measurement entry.
+expect_pass_if '0' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK" "read_implies_exec"
+
+# Repeat the previous three tests, but with the new MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook,
+# which behaves like the buggy MMAP_CHECK hook. In the third test, expect that
+# no new measurement entry is created, since the MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hook sees
+# the protections requested by the application (PROT_READ).
+expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" ""
+expect_pass_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec"
+expect_fail_if '1' check_mmap "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "read_implies_exec"
+
+# Ensure that IMA refuses an mprotect() with PROT_EXEC on a memory area
+# obtained with an mmap() with PROT_READ. This is due to the inability of IMA
+# to measure/appraise the file for which mmap() was called (locking issue).
+expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "mprotect"
+
+# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
+# previous test.
+expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "mprotect"
+
+# Ensure that there cannot be an mmap() with PROT_EXEC on a file with writable
+# mappings, due to the inability of IMA to make a reliable measurement of that
+# file.
+expect_pass check_deny "MMAP_CHECK" "exec_on_writable"
+
+# Ensure that MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT has the same behavior of MMAP_CHECK for the
+# previous test.
+expect_pass_if '1' check_deny "MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT" "exec_on_writable"

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/portable_signatures.test Added

@@ -0,0 +1,1122 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright (C) 2022-2023 Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+#
+# Check if operations on files with EVM portable signatures succeed.
+
+trap '_report_exit_and_cleanup _cleanup_env cleanup' SIGINT SIGTERM SIGSEGV EXIT
+
+# Base VERBOSE on the environment variable, if set.
+VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-0}"
+TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE="${TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE:-0}"
+
+# From security/integrity/evm/evm.h in kernel source directory.
+(( EVM_INIT_HMAC=0x0001 ))
+(( EVM_INIT_X509=0x0002 ))
+(( EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES=0x0004 ))
+(( EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE=0x80000000 ))
+
+cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit "$FAIL"
+export PATH=$PWD/../src:$PWD/../mount-idmapped:$PATH
+export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH
+. ./functions.sh
+_require evmctl
+
+cleanup() {
+	if  "$g_loop_mounted" = "1" ; then
+		popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
+
+		if  -n "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" ; then
+			umount "$g_mountpoint_idmapped"
+		fi
+
+		umount "$g_mountpoint"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_dev" ; then
+		losetup -d "$g_dev"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_image" ; then
+		rm -f "$g_image"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$key_path_der" ; then
+		rm -f "$key_path_der"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_mountpoint" ; then
+		rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" ; then
+		rm -Rf "$g_mountpoint_idmapped"
+	fi
+}
+
+get_xattr() {
+	local format="hex"
+
+	if  "$1" = "security.selinux" ; then
+		format="text"
+	fi
+
+	getfattr -n "$1" -e $format -d "$2" 2> /dev/null | awk -F "=" '$1 == "'"$1"'" {if ("'$format'" == "hex") v=substr($2, 3); else { split($2, temp, "\""); v=temp2 }; print v}'
+}
+
+# Use the fsuuid= IMA policy keyword to select only files created/used by the
+# tests below. Also use fowner= to differentiate between files created/used by
+# individual tests.
+IMA_UUID="28b23254-9467-44c0-b6ba-34b12e85a26d"
+APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER=2000
+APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE="appraise fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER appraise_type=imasig"
+MEASURE_FOWNER=2001
+MEASURE_RULE="measure fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$MEASURE_FOWNER template=ima-sig"
+APPRAISE_FOWNER=2002
+APPRAISE_RULE="appraise fsuuid=$IMA_UUID fowner=$APPRAISE_FOWNER"
+METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER=3001
+METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER_2=3002
+
+check_load_ima_rule() {
+	local rule_loaded
+	local result
+	local new_policy
+
+	rule_loaded=$(grep "$1" /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy)
+	if  -z "$rule_loaded" ; then
+		new_policy=$(mktemp -p "$g_mountpoint")
+		echo "$1" > "$new_policy"
+		evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imasig --key "$key_path" "$new_policy" &> /dev/null
+		echo "$new_policy" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
+		result=$?
+		rm -f "$new_policy"
+
+		if  "$result" -ne 0 ; then
+			echo "${RED}Failed to set IMA policy${NORM}"
+			return "$FAIL"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+# The purpose of this test is to verify that the patch 'ima: Allow imasig
+# requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures' didn't break the
+# current behavior (IMA signatures still satisfy the imasig requirement).
+check_ima_sig_appraisal() {
+	local result
+
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if  $((evm_value & (EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_INIT_HMAC))) -ne 0 ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode 0 required${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE"
+	result=$?
+	if  $result -ne "$OK" ; then
+		return $result
+	fi
+
+	# Check if appraisal works.
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Ensure that files with IMA signature cannot be updated (immutable).
+	if echo "test" 2> /dev/null >> test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Write to test-file should not succeed (immutable file)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_ima_sig_appraisal() {
+	rm -f test-file
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
+#
+# The purpose of this test is to verify that the patch 'ima: Introduce template
+# field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback' still allows IMA signatures
+# to be displayed in the measurement list.
+check_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
+	local result
+	local ima_sig_fs
+	local ima_sig_list
+
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl ima_sign -a sha256 --imasig --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$MEASURE_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	check_load_ima_rule "$MEASURE_RULE"
+	result=$?
+	if  $result -ne "$OK" ; then
+		return $result
+	fi
+
+	# Read the file to add it to the measurement list.
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	ima_sig_fs=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
+	if  -z "$ima_sig_fs" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Search security.ima in the measurement list.
+	ima_sig_list=$(awk '$6 == "'"$ima_sig_fs"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
+	if  -z "$ima_sig_list" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.ima mismatch (xattr != measurement list)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
+	rm -f test-file
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+#
+# The purpose of this test is to verify that new files can be created when EVM
+# is initialized only with a public key.
+check_create_file() {
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	# To trigger the bug we need to enable public key verification without HMAC key loaded.
+	if  $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if  $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) -eq "$EVM_INIT_HMAC" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_HMAC must be disabled${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_create_file() {
+	rm -f test-file
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
+# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+#
+# The purpose of this test is to verify that EVM with the patches above allows
+# metadata to copied one by one, even if the portable signature verification
+# temporarily fails until the copy is completed.
+check_cp_preserve_xattrs() {
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if  "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Check if cp is allowed to set metadata for the new file.
+	if ! cp -a test-file test-file.copy; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot copy test-file with attrs/xattrs preserved${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_cp_preserve_xattrs() {
+	rm -f test-file test-file.copy
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
+# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
+#
+# The purpose of this test is similar to that of the previous test, with the
+# difference that tar is used instead of cp. One remark is that the owner is
+# intentionally different (or it should be) from the current owner, to
+# incrementally test the patches without 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr()
+# for unmodified metadata'.
+check_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner() {
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if  "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! mkdir in out; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot create directories${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > in/test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown 3000 in/test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chmod 600 in/test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" in/test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar in/test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Check if tar is allowed to set metadata for the extracted file.
+	# Ensure that the owner from the archive is different from the
+	# owner of the extracted file to avoid that portable signature
+	# verification succeeds before restoring original metadata
+	# (a patch allows modification of immutable metadata if portable
+	# signature verification fails).
+	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner() {
+	rm -Rf in out test-archive.tar
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
+# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
+# - evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks
+# - evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
+#
+# The purpose of this test is similar to that of the previous two tests. The
+# difference is that tar is used instead of cp, and the extracted files have
+# the same owner as the current one. Thus, this test requires 'evm: Allow
+# setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata'.
+check_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner() {
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if  "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! mkdir in out; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot create directories${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > in/test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" in/test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar in/test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Check if tar is allowed to set metadata for the extracted file.
+	# This test is different from the previous one, as the owner
+	# from the archive is the same of the owner of the extracted
+	# file. tar will attempt anyway to restore the original owner but
+	# unlike the previous test, portable signature verification already
+	# succeeds at the time the owner is set (another patch allows
+	# metadata operations if those operations don't modify current
+	# values).
+	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner() {
+	rm -Rf in out test-archive.tar
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
+# - evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures
+# - evm: Pass user namespace to set/remove xattr hooks
+# - evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified metadata
+# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+#
+# The purpose of this test is to further verify the patches above, by executing
+# commands to set the same or different metadata. Setting the same metadata
+# should be allowed, setting different metadata should be denied.
+check_metadata_change() {
+	local ima_xattr
+	local label
+	local last_char
+	local msg
+
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if  "$evm_value" -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chgrp "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change group of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chmod 2644 test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# If metadata modification is not allowed, EVM should deny any
+	# operation that modifies metadata. Check if setting the same
+	# value is allowed.
+	if ! chown "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot set same owner for test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Setting a different value should not be allowed.
+	if chown "$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER_2" test-file 2> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Owner change for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Repeat the test for the file mode.
+	if ! chmod 2644 test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot set same mode for test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if chmod 2666 test-file 2> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Mode change for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$(command -v chcon 2> /dev/null)"  &&  -n "$(command -v getenforce 2> /dev/null)"  &&  "$(getenforce 2> /dev/null)" != "Disabled" ; then
+		# Repeat the test for the SELinux label.
+		label=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file)
+
+		if  -n "$label" ; then
+			if ! chcon "$label" test-file; then
+				echo "${RED}Cannot set same security.selinux for test-file${NORM}"
+				return "$FAIL"
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if chcon unconfined_u:object_r:null_device_t:s0 test-file 2> /dev/null; then
+			echo "${RED}security.selinux change for test file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
+			return "$FAIL"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# Repeat the test for the IMA signature.
+	ima_xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
+	if  -z "$ima_xattr" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot set same security.ima for test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	last_char=${ima_xattr: -1}
+	((last_char += 1))
+	((last_char %= 10))
+	ima_xattr=${ima_xattr:0:-1}$last_char
+
+	if setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr" test-file 2> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Change of security.ima for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Repeat the test for ACLs.
+	if ! msg=$(exec 2>&1 && setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:r test-file); then
+		if  "${msg%not supported}" != "$msg" ; then
+			return "$OK"
+		fi
+
+		echo "${RED}Cannot preserve system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r,m:rw test-file 2> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Change of system.posix_acl_access for test-file should not be allowed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" ; then
+		pushd "$g_mountpoint_idmapped" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
+
+		# Repeat the test for ACLs on an idmapped mount.
+		#
+		# This test relies on the fact that the caller of this script (root) is in
+		# the same owning group of test-file (in the idmapped mount the group is
+		# root, not $METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER and, for this reason, the S_ISGID bit
+		# is not cleared. If EVM was not aware of the mapping, it would have
+		# determined that root is not in the owning group of test-file and given
+		# that also CAP_FSETID is cleared, the S_ISGID bit would have been cleared
+		# and thus the operation would fail (file metadata changed).
+		if ! capsh --drop='cap_fsetid' -- -c 'setfacl --set u::rw,g::r,o::r test-file'; then
+			echo "${RED}Cannot preserve system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}"
+			popd || exit "$FAIL"
+			return "$FAIL"
+		fi
+
+		popd > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_metadata_change() {
+	rm -f test-file
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status()
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+#
+# Note:
+# This test can be run if EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set in advance
+# before running this script. If it is not set before, this script sets
+# EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE, disabling further EVM mode modifications until reboot.
+#
+# Without EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES, EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is necessary to ignore
+# the INTEGRITY_NOLABEL and INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS errors.
+#
+# The purpose of this test is to verify that IMA detected a metadata change
+# when EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set (metadata operations are always
+# allowed). After the first successful appraisal, the test intentionally changes
+# metadata and verifies that IMA revoked access to the file. The test also
+# verifies that IMA grants access again to the file after restoring the correct
+# metadata.
+check_evm_revalidate() {
+	local result
+	local ima_xattr
+	local ima_xattr_new
+	local evm_xattr
+	local evm_xattr_new
+	local label
+	local last_char
+	local msg
+
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if  "$evm_value" -ne $((EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM mode $((EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) required, execute echo 4 > /sys/kernel/security/evm before running this test${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chmod 600 test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# We need to defer setting the correct owner, as there could be
+	# already an IMA policy rule preventing evmctl from reading the
+	# file to calculate the digest.
+	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --uid "$APPRAISE_FOWNER" --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$APPRAISE_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_RULE"
+	result=$?
+	if  $result -ne "$OK" ; then
+		return $result
+	fi
+
+	# Read the file so that IMA would not re-appraise it next time.
+	if ! cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# After enabling metadata modification, operations should succeed even
+	# if the file has a portable signature. However, the previously cached
+	# appraisal status should be invalidated.
+	if ! chmod 644 test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Here check if IMA re-appraised the file. The read should fail
+	# since now file metadata is invalid.
+	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid mode)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Restore metadata back to the original value.
+	if ! chmod 600 test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original mode of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Ensure that now IMA appraisal succeeds.
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct mode${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  -n "$(command -v chcon 2> /dev/null)"  &&  -n "$(command -v getenforce 2> /dev/null)"  &&  "$(getenforce 2> /dev/null)" != "Disabled" ; then
+		# Repeat the test for the SELinux label.
+		label=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file)
+
+		if ! chcon unconfined_u:object_r:null_device_t:s0 test-file; then
+			echo "${RED}Cannot change security.selinux of test-file${NORM}"
+			return "$FAIL"
+		fi
+
+		if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
+			echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.selinux)${NORM}"
+			return "$FAIL"
+		fi
+
+		if  -n "$label" ; then
+			if ! chcon "$label" test-file; then
+				echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.selinux of test-file${NORM}"
+				return "$FAIL"
+			fi
+		else
+			attr -S -r selinux test-file
+		fi
+
+		if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+			echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.selinux${NORM}"
+			return "$FAIL"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# Repeat the test for the IMA signature.
+	ima_xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
+	if  -z "$ima_xattr" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.ima not found${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	last_char=${ima_xattr: -1}
+	((last_char += 1))
+	((last_char %= 10))
+	ima_xattr_new=${ima_xattr:0:-1}$last_char
+
+	if ! setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr_new" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot set security.ima of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.ima)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! setfattr -n security.ima -v 0x"$ima_xattr" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.ima of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.ima${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Repeat the test for the EVM signature.
+	evm_xattr=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file)
+	if  -z "$evm_xattr" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.evm not found${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	last_char=${evm_xattr: -1}
+	((last_char += 1))
+	((last_char %= 10))
+	evm_xattr_new=${evm_xattr:0:-1}$last_char
+
+	if ! setfattr -n security.evm -v 0x"$evm_xattr_new" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot set security.evm of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid security.evm)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! setfattr -n security.evm -v 0x"$evm_xattr" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original security.evm of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct security.evm${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Repeat the test for ACLs.
+	if ! setfacl -m u::rwx test-file 2> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change system.posix_acl_access${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if cat test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Read of test-file should not succeed (invalid system.posix_acl_access)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! setfacl -m u::rw test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot restore original system.posix_acl_access for test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file after restoring correct system.posix_acl_access${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_evm_revalidate() {
+	rm -f test-file
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - evm: Introduce evm_hmac_disabled() to safely ignore verification errors
+# - evm: Introduce evm_revalidate_status()
+# - ima: Allow imasig requirement to be satisfied by EVM portable signatures
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+#
+# The purpose of this test is to verify that IMA manages files with an EVM
+# portable signature similarly to those with an IMA signature: content can be
+# written to new files after adding the signature and files can be accessed
+# when the imasig requirement is specified in the IMA policy.
+check_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal() {
+	local result
+	local xattr_orig
+	local xattr
+	local mode
+	local owner
+
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if  $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509" ; then
+		echo "${CYAN}EVM flag $EVM_INIT_X509 required${NORM}"
+		return "$SKIP"
+	fi
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chmod 600 test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change mode of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# We need to defer setting the correct owner, as there could be
+	# already an IMA policy rule preventing evmctl from reading the
+	# file to calculate the digest.
+	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --uid "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	check_load_ima_rule "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_RULE"
+	result=$?
+	if  "$result" -ne "$OK" ; then
+		return "$result"
+	fi
+
+	# Ensure that a file with a portable signature satisfies the
+	# appraise_type=imasig requirement specified in the IMA policy.
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Even files with a portable signature should be considered as
+	# immutable by IMA. Write should fail.
+	if echo "test" 2> /dev/null >> test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Write to test-file should not succeed (immutable metadata)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -cf test-archive.tar test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot create archive with xattrs${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	mkdir out
+
+	# Appraisal of the new file, extracted by tar, should succeed
+	# not only if the new file has an IMA signature but also if
+	# it has a portable signature.
+	if ! tar --xattrs-include=* -xf test-archive.tar -C out; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot extract archive with xattrs${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Check if xattrs have been correctly set.
+	xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.selinux test-file)
+	xattr=$(get_xattr security.selinux out/test-file)
+	if  "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.selinux mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.ima test-file)
+	xattr=$(get_xattr security.ima out/test-file)
+	if  "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.ima mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	xattr_orig=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file)
+	xattr=$(get_xattr security.evm out/test-file)
+	if  "$xattr" != "$xattr_orig" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.evm mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Check if attrs have been correctly set.
+	owner=$(stat -c "%u" out/test-file)
+	if  "$owner" != "$APPRAISE_DIGSIG_FOWNER" ; then
+		echo "${RED}owner mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	mode=$(stat -c "%a" out/test-file)
+	if  "$mode" != "600" ; then
+		echo "${RED}mode mismatch between original and extracted file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal() {
+	rm -f test-file test-archive.tar
+	rm -Rf out
+}
+
+# Requires:
+# - ima: Introduce template field evmsig and write to field sig as fallback
+# - evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loaded
+# - ima: Don't remove security.ima if file must not be appraised
+#
+# The purpose of this test is to verify that the EVM portable signature is
+# displayed in the measurement list.
+check_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
+	local result
+	local evm_sig_fs
+	local evm_sig_list
+
+	echo "Test: ${FUNCNAME0} (evm_value: $evm_value)"
+
+	if ! echo "test" > test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot write test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! chown "$MEASURE_FOWNER" test-file; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot change owner of test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if ! evmctl sign -o -a sha256 --imahash --key "$key_path" test-file &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot sign test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	check_load_ima_rule "$MEASURE_RULE"
+	result=$?
+	if  "$result" -ne "$OK" ; then
+		return "$result"
+	fi
+
+	# Invalidate previous measurement to add new entry
+	touch test-file
+
+	# Read the file to add it to the measurement list.
+	if ! cat test-file > /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Cannot read test-file${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	evm_sig_fs=$(get_xattr security.evm test-file)
+	if  -z "$evm_sig_fs" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.evm not found${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	# Search security.evm in the measurement list.
+	evm_sig_list=$(awk '$6 == "'"$evm_sig_fs"'"' < /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements)
+	if  -z "$evm_sig_list" ; then
+		echo "${RED}security.evm mismatch (xattr != measurement list)${NORM}"
+		return "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	return "$OK"
+}
+
+cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list() {
+	rm -f test-file
+}
+
+# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set.
+_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH"
+
+# Run in the new environment if TST_ENV is set (skipped test).
+_run_env "$TST_KERNEL" "$PWD/$(basename "$0")" "TST_ENV=$TST_ENV TST_KERNEL=$TST_KERNEL PATH=$PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH VERBOSE=$VERBOSE TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE TST_KEY_PATH=$TST_KEY_PATH TST_LIST=check_evm_revalidate"
+
+# Exit from the creator of the new environment.
+_exit_env "$TST_KERNEL"
+
+# Mount filesystems in the new environment.
+_init_env
+
+g_mountpoint=$(mktemp -d)
+g_image=$(mktemp)
+
+if  -z "$g_mountpoint" ; then
+	echo "${RED}Mountpoint directory not created${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if  "$(whoami)" != "root" ; then
+	echo "${CYAN}This script must be executed as root${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+if  -n "$TST_KEY_PATH" ; then
+	if  "${TST_KEY_PATH:0:1}" != "/" ; then
+		echo "${RED}Absolute path required for the signing key${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	if  ! -f "$TST_KEY_PATH" ; then
+		echo "${RED}Kernel signing key not found in $TST_KEY_PATH${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	key_path="$TST_KEY_PATH"
+elif  -f "$PWD/../signing_key.pem" ; then
+	key_path="$PWD/../signing_key.pem"
+elif  -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem" ; then
+	key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/source/certs/signing_key.pem"
+elif  -f "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem" ; then
+	key_path="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/build/certs/signing_key.pem"
+else
+	echo "${CYAN}Kernel signing key not found${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+key_path_der=$(mktemp)
+
+if  ! -f "/sys/kernel/security/evm" ; then
+	echo "${CYAN}EVM support in the kernel disabled${NORM}"
+	exit "$SKIP"
+fi
+
+# Assume that the EVM mode can be changed in a new environment.
+if  -n "$TST_ENV" ; then
+	TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE=1
+fi
+
+evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm)
+
+openssl x509 -in "$key_path" -out "$key_path_der" -outform der
+if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.ima < "$key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
+	echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the IMA keyring${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if ! dd if=/dev/zero of="$g_image" bs=1M count=20 &> /dev/null; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot create test image${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+g_dev=$(losetup -f "$g_image" --show)
+if  -z "$g_dev" ; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot create loop device${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if ! mkfs.ext4 -U "$IMA_UUID" -b 4096 "$g_dev" &> /dev/null; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot format $g_dev${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if ! mount -o i_version "$g_dev" "$g_mountpoint"; then
+	echo "${RED}Cannot mount loop device${NORM}"
+	exit "$FAIL"
+fi
+
+if  -n "$(command -v mount-idmapped 2> /dev/null)" ; then
+	echo "Found mount-idmapped at $(command -v mount-idmapped), testing idmapped mounts"
+	g_mountpoint_idmapped=$(mktemp -d)
+	if ! mount-idmapped --map-mount b:"$METADATA_CHANGE_FOWNER":0:1 "$g_mountpoint" "$g_mountpoint_idmapped"; then
+		echo "${RED}mount-idmapped failed${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+fi
+
+g_loop_mounted=1
+pushd "$g_mountpoint" > /dev/null || exit "$FAIL"
+
+expect_pass check_ima_sig_appraisal
+cleanup_ima_sig_appraisal
+expect_pass check_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list
+cleanup_ima_sig_ima_measurement_list
+
+if  "$(echo -e "$(uname -r)\n5.12" | sort -V | head -n 1)" != "5.12" ; then
+	exit "$OK"
+fi
+
+if  $((evm_value & EVM_INIT_X509)) -ne "$EVM_INIT_X509"  &&  "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ; then
+	if ! keyctl padd asymmetric pubkey %keyring:.evm < "$key_path_der" &> /dev/null; then
+		echo "${RED}Public key cannot be added to the EVM keyring${NORM}"
+		exit "$FAIL"
+	fi
+
+	echo "$EVM_INIT_X509" > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null
+fi
+
+if  "$(expr index "$TST_LIST" "check_evm_revalidate")" -gt 0  &&  "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ; then
+	echo "$EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES" > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null
+fi
+
+# We cannot determine from securityfs if EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is set, so we set it unless EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is set.
+if  $((evm_value & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) -ne "$EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES"  &&  "$TST_EVM_CHANGE_MODE" -eq 1 ; then
+	echo "$EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE" > /sys/kernel/security/evm 2> /dev/null
+fi
+
+evm_value=$(cat /sys/kernel/security/evm)
+
+expect_pass check_create_file
+cleanup_create_file
+expect_pass check_cp_preserve_xattrs
+cleanup_cp_preserve_xattrs
+expect_pass check_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner
+cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_different_owner
+expect_pass check_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner
+cleanup_tar_extract_xattrs_same_owner
+expect_pass check_metadata_change
+cleanup_metadata_change
+expect_pass check_evm_revalidate
+cleanup_evm_revalidate
+expect_pass check_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal
+cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_appraisal
+expect_pass check_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list
+cleanup_evm_portable_sig_ima_measurement_list

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.3.2.tar.gz/tests/sign_verify.test -> _service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/sign_verify.test Changed

@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
 
 cd "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
 PATH=../src:$PATH
+
+# set the env SIGV1=1 to execute the signature v1 tests
+SIGV1=${SIGV1:-0}
+
 source ./functions.sh
 
 _require cmp evmctl getfattr openssl xxd
@@ -28,7 +32,8 @@
 
 ./gen-keys.sh >/dev/null 2>&1
 
-trap _report_exit EXIT
+trap _report_exit_and_cleanup EXIT
+WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
 set -f # disable globbing
 
 # Determine keyid from a cert
@@ -43,6 +48,7 @@
   id=$($cmd 2>/dev/null \
     | openssl asn1parse \
     | grep BIT.STRING \
+    | tail -n1 \
     | cut -d: -f1)
   if  -z "$id" ; then
     echo - "$cmd" >&2
@@ -131,11 +137,16 @@
   # OPTS (additional options for evmctl),
   # FILE (working file to sign).
   local "$@"
-  local KEY=${KEY%.*}.key
+  local key verifykey
   local FILE=${FILE:-$ALG.txt}
 
-  # Normalize key filename
-  KEY=test-${KEY#test-}
+  # Normalize key filename if it's not a pkcs11 URI
+  if  ${KEY:0:7} != pkcs11: ; then
+    key=${KEY%.*}.key
+    key=test-${key#test-}
+  else
+    key=${KEY}
+  fi
 
   # Append suffix to files for negative tests, because we may
   # leave only good files for verify tests.
@@ -151,33 +162,33 @@
 
   if _test_expected_to_pass; then
     # Can openssl work with this digest?
-    cmd="openssl dgst $OPENSSL_ENGINE -$ALG $FILE"
+    cmd="openssl dgst $OPENSSL_ENGINE $OPENSSL_KEYFORM -$ALG $FILE"
     echo - "$cmd"
     if ! $cmd >/dev/null; then
-      echo "${CYAN}$ALG ($KEY) test is skipped (openssl is unable to digest)$NORM"
+      echo "${CYAN}$ALG ($key) test is skipped (openssl is unable to digest)$NORM"
       return "$SKIP"
     fi
 
-    if  ! -e "$KEY" ; then
-      echo "${CYAN}$ALG ($KEY) test is skipped (key file not found)$NORM"
+    if  "${key:0:7}" != pkcs11:  &&  ! -e "$key" ; then
+      echo "${CYAN}$ALG ($key) test is skipped (key file not found)$NORM"
       return "$SKIP"
     fi
 
     # Can openssl sign with this digest and key?
-    cmd="openssl dgst $OPENSSL_ENGINE -$ALG -sign $KEY -hex $FILE"
+    cmd="openssl dgst $OPENSSL_ENGINE $OPENSSL_KEYFORM -$ALG -sign $key -hex $FILE"
     echo - "$cmd"
     if ! $cmd >/dev/null; then
-      echo "${CYAN}$ALG ($KEY) test is skipped (openssl is unable to sign)$NORM"
+      echo "${CYAN}$ALG ($key) test is skipped (openssl is unable to sign)$NORM"
       return "$SKIP"
     fi
   fi
 
   # Insert keyid from cert into PREFIX in-place of marker `:K:'
   if  $PREFIX =~ :K: ; then
-    keyid=$(_keyid_from_cert "$KEY")
+    keyid=$(_keyid_from_cert "$key")
     if  $? -ne 0 ; then
       color_red
-      echo "Unable to determine keyid for $KEY"
+      echo "Unable to determine keyid for $key"
       color_restore
       return "$HARDFAIL"
     fi
@@ -186,7 +197,7 @@
   fi
 
   # Perform signing by evmctl
-  _evmctl_sign "$TYPE" "$KEY" "$ALG" "$FILE" "$OPTS" || return
+  _evmctl_sign "$TYPE" "$key" "$ALG" "$FILE" "$OPTS" || return
 
   # First simple pattern match the signature.
   ADD_TEXT_FOR=$ALG \
@@ -198,11 +209,21 @@
   # This is all we can do for evm.
    "$TYPE" =~ evm  && return "$OK"
 
+  # When using the SM2/3 algorithm, the openssl tool uses USERID for verify,
+  # which is incompatible with calling API directly, so skip it.
+   "$ALG" == sm3  && return "$OK"
+
   # Extract signature to a file
   _extract_xattr "$FILE" "$(_xattr "$TYPE")" "$FILE.sig2" "$PREFIX"
 
   # Verify extracted signature with openssl
-  cmd="openssl dgst $OPENSSL_ENGINE -$ALG -verify ${KEY%.*}.pub \
+  if  "${key:0:7}" != pkcs11: ; then
+      verifykey=${key%.*}.pub
+  else
+      verifykey=${key}
+  fi
+
+  cmd="openssl dgst $OPENSSL_ENGINE $OPENSSL_KEYFORM -$ALG -verify ${verifykey} \
 	-signature $FILE.sig2 $FILE"
   echo - "$cmd"
   if ! $cmd; then
@@ -328,9 +349,14 @@
     expect_fail check_verify TYPE=ima
   fi
 
-  # Test --portable
-  expect_pass check_sign OPTS="$OPTS --portable" PREFIX=0x05
-  # Cannot be verified for now, until that support is added to evmctl
+  # Test --portable (only supported for V2 signatures)
+  if expect_pass check_sign OPTS="$OPTS --portable --imahash" PREFIX=0x05; then
+     if  "$OPTS" =~ --rsa ; then
+        expect_fail check_verify
+     else
+        expect_pass check_verify
+     fi
+  fi
 
   # Test -i (immutable)
   expect_pass check_sign OPTS="$OPTS -i" PREFIX=0x0303
@@ -346,19 +372,27 @@
 
 ## Test v1 signatures
 # Signature v1 only supports sha1 and sha256 so any other should fail
-expect_fail \
-  check_sign TYPE=ima KEY=rsa1024 ALG=md5 PREFIX=0x0301 OPTS=--rsa
-
-sign_verify  rsa1024  sha1    0x0301 --rsa
-sign_verify  rsa1024  sha256  0x0301 --rsa
-  try_different_keys
-  try_different_sigs
+if  $SIGV1 -eq 0 ; then
+  __skip() { echo "IMA signature v1 tests are skipped: not supported"; return $SKIP; }
+  expect_pass __skip
+else
+   expect_fail \
+      check_sign TYPE=ima KEY=rsa1024 ALG=md5 PREFIX=0x0301 OPTS=--rsa
+
+   sign_verify  rsa1024  sha1    0x0301 --rsa
+   sign_verify  rsa1024  sha256  0x0301 --rsa
+      try_different_keys
+      try_different_sigs
+fi
 
 ## Test v2 signatures with RSA PKCS#1
 # List of allowed hashes much greater but not all are supported.
 sign_verify  rsa1024  md5     0x030201:K:0080
 sign_verify  rsa1024  sha1    0x030202:K:0080
 sign_verify  rsa1024  sha224  0x030207:K:0080
+expect_pass check_sign TYPE=ima KEY=rsa1024 ALG=sha256 PREFIX=0x030204aabbccdd0080 OPTS=--keyid=aabbccdd
+expect_pass check_sign TYPE=ima KEY=rsa1024 ALG=sha256 PREFIX=0x030204:K:0080 OPTS=--keyid-from-cert=test-rsa1024.cer
+expect_pass check_sign TYPE=ima KEY=rsa1024_skid ALG=sha256 PREFIX=0x030204123456780080
 sign_verify  rsa1024  sha256  0x030204:K:0080
   try_different_keys
   try_different_sigs
@@ -366,6 +400,30 @@
 sign_verify  rsa1024  sha512  0x030206:K:0080
 sign_verify  rsa1024  rmd160  0x030203:K:0080
 
+# Test v2 signatures with ECDSA
+# Signature length is typically 0x34-0x38 bytes long, very rarely 0x33
+sign_verify  prime192v1 sha1   0x030202:K:003345678
+sign_verify  prime192v1 sha224 0x030207:K:003345678
+sign_verify  prime192v1 sha256 0x030204:K:003345678
+sign_verify  prime192v1 sha384 0x030205:K:003345678
+sign_verify  prime192v1 sha512 0x030206:K:003345678
+
+# Signature length is typically 0x44-0x48 bytes long, very rarely 0x43
+sign_verify  prime256v1 sha1   0x030202:K:004345678
+sign_verify  prime256v1 sha224 0x030207:K:004345678
+sign_verify  prime256v1 sha256 0x030204:K:004345678
+sign_verify  prime256v1 sha384 0x030205:K:004345678
+sign_verify  prime256v1 sha512 0x030206:K:004345678
+
+# If openssl 3.0 is installed, test the SM2/3 algorithm combination
+ssl_major_version=$(openssl version | sed -n 's/^OpenSSL $^\.$.*/\1/p')
+if  "${ssl_major_version}" = 3 ; then
+   sign_verify  sm2    sm3    0x030211:K:004345678
+else
+	__skip() { echo "sm2/sm3 tests are skipped (ssl version)"; return $SKIP; }
+  expect_pass __skip
+fi
+
 # Test v2 signatures with EC-RDSA
 _enable_gost_engine
 sign_verify  gost2012_256-A md_gost12_256 0x030212:K:0040
@@ -379,3 +437,15 @@
 expect_fail \
   check_sign TYPE=ima KEY=gost2012_256-B ALG=md_gost12_512 PREFIX=0x0302 OPTS=
 
+# Test signing with key described by pkcs11 URI
+_softhsm_setup "${WORKDIR}"
+if  -n "${PKCS11_KEYURI}" ; then
+  expect_pass check_sign FILE=pkcs11test TYPE=ima KEY=${PKCS11_KEYURI} ALG=sha256 PREFIX=0x030204aabbccdd0100 OPTS=--keyid=aabbccdd
+  expect_pass check_sign FILE=pkcs11test TYPE=ima KEY=${PKCS11_KEYURI} ALG=sha1   PREFIX=0x030202aabbccdd0100 OPTS=--keyid=aabbccdd
+else
+  # to have a constant number of tests, skip these two tests
+  __skip() { echo "pkcs11 test is skipped: could not setup softhsm"; return $SKIP; }
+  expect_pass __skip
+  expect_pass __skip
+fi
+_softhsm_teardown "${WORKDIR}"

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/softhsm_setup Added

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 and BSD-3-clause
+# This program originates from 'swtpm' project (https://github.com/stefanberger/swtpm/)
+
+if  -z "$(type -P p11tool)" ; then
+	echo "Need p11tool from gnutls"
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+if  -z "$(type -P softhsm2-util)" ; then
+	echo "Need softhsm2-util from softhsm2 package"
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+MAJOR=$(softhsm2-util -v | cut -d '.' -f1)
+MINOR=$(softhsm2-util -v | cut -d '.' -f2)
+if  ${MAJOR} -lt 2  ||  ${MAJOR} -eq 2 -a ${MINOR} -lt 2 ; then
+	echo "Need softhsm v2.2.0 or later"
+	exit 77
+fi
+
+NAME=swtpm-test
+PIN=${PIN:-1234}
+SO_PIN=${SO_PIN:-1234}
+SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR=${SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR:-~/.config/softhsm2}
+export SOFTHSM2_CONF=${SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR}/softhsm2.conf
+
+UNAME_S="$(uname -s)"
+
+case "${UNAME_S}" in
+Darwin)
+	msg=$(sudo -v -n)
+	if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+		echo "Need password-less sudo rights on OS X to change /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf"
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	;;
+esac
+
+teardown_softhsm() {
+	local configdir=${SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR}
+	local configfile=${SOFTHSM2_CONF}
+	local bakconfigfile=${configfile}.bak
+	local tokendir=${configdir}/tokens
+
+	softhsm2-util --token "${NAME}" --delete-token &>/dev/null
+
+	case "${UNAME_S}" in
+	Darwin*)
+		if  -f /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf.bak ; then
+			sudo rm -f /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf
+			sudo mv /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf.bak \
+			   /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf &>/dev/null
+		fi
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	if  -f "$bakconfigfile" ; then
+		mv "$bakconfigfile" "$configfile"
+	else
+		rm -f "$configfile"
+	fi
+	if  -d "$tokendir" ; then
+		rm -rf "${tokendir}"
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+setup_softhsm() {
+	local msg tokenuri keyuri
+	local configdir=${SOFTHSM_SETUP_CONFIGDIR}
+	local configfile=${SOFTHSM2_CONF}
+	local bakconfigfile=${configfile}.bak
+	local tokendir=${configdir}/tokens
+	local rc
+
+	case "${UNAME_S}" in
+	Darwin*)
+		if  -f /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf.bak ; then
+			echo "/etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf.bak already exists; need to 'teardown' first"
+			return 1
+		fi
+		sudo mv /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf \
+			/etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf.bak &>/dev/null
+		if  $(id -u) -eq 0 ; then
+			SONAME="$(sudo -u nobody brew ls --verbose softhsm | \
+				  grep -E "\.so$")"
+		else
+			SONAME="$(brew ls --verbose softhsm | \
+				  grep -E "\.so$")"
+		fi
+		sudo mkdir -p /etc/gnutls &>/dev/null
+		sudo bash -c "echo "load=${SONAME}" > /etc/gnutls/pkcs11.conf"
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	if !  -d $configdir ; then
+		mkdir -p $configdir
+	fi
+	mkdir -p ${tokendir}
+
+	if  -f $configfile ; then
+		mv "$configfile" "$bakconfigfile"
+	fi
+
+	if !  -f $configfile ; then
+		cat <<_EOF_ > $configfile
+directories.tokendir = ${tokendir}
+objectstore.backend = file
+log.level = DEBUG
+slots.removable = false
+_EOF_
+	fi
+
+	msg=$(p11tool --list-tokens 2>&1 | grep "token=${NAME}" | tail -n1)
+	if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+		echo "Could not list existing tokens"
+		echo "$msg"
+	fi
+	tokenuri=$(echo "$msg" | sed -n 's/.*URL: $:print:*$/\1/p')
+
+	if  -z "$tokenuri" ; then
+		msg=$(softhsm2-util \
+			--init-token --pin ${PIN} --so-pin ${SO_PIN} \
+			--free --label ${NAME} 2>&1)
+		if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+			echo "Could not initialize token"
+			echo "$msg"
+			return 2
+		fi
+
+		slot=$(echo "$msg" | \
+		       sed -n 's/.* reassigned to slot $0-9*$$/\1/p')
+		if  -z "$slot" ; then
+			slot=$(softhsm2-util --show-slots | \
+			       grep -E "^Slot " | head -n1 |
+			       sed -n 's/Slot $0-9*$/\1/p')
+			if  -z "$slot" ; then
+				echo "Could not parse slot number from output."
+				echo "$msg"
+				return 3
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		msg=$(p11tool --list-tokens 2>&1 | \
+			grep "token=${NAME}" | tail -n1)
+		if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+			echo "Could not list existing tokens"
+			echo "$msg"
+		fi
+		tokenuri=$(echo "$msg" | sed -n 's/.*URL: $:print:*$/\1/p')
+		if  -z "${tokenuri}" ; then
+			echo "Could not get tokenuri!"
+			return 4
+		fi
+
+		# more recent versions of p11tool have --generate-privkey ...
+		msg=$(GNUTLS_PIN=$PIN p11tool \
+			--generate-privkey=rsa --bits 2048 --label mykey --login \
+			"${tokenuri}" 2>&1)
+		if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+			# ... older versions have --generate-rsa
+			msg=$(GNUTLS_PIN=$PIN p11tool \
+				--generate-rsa --bits 2048 --label mykey --login \
+				"${tokenuri}" 2>&1)
+			if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+				echo "Could not create RSA key!"
+				echo "$msg"
+				return 5
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	getkeyuri_softhsm $slot
+	rc=$?
+	if  $rc -ne 0 ; then
+		teardown_softhsm
+	fi
+
+	return $rc
+}
+
+_getkeyuri_softhsm() {
+	local msg tokenuri keyuri
+
+	msg=$(p11tool --list-tokens 2>&1 | grep "token=${NAME}")
+	if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+		echo "Could not list existing tokens"
+		echo "$msg"
+		return 5
+	fi
+	tokenuri=$(echo "$msg" | sed -n 's/.*URL: $:print:*$/\1/p')
+	if  -z "$tokenuri" ; then
+		echo "Could not get token URL"
+		echo "$msg"
+		return 6
+	fi
+	msg=$(p11tool --list-all ${tokenuri} 2>&1)
+	if  $? -ne 0 ; then
+		echo "Could not list object under token $tokenuri"
+		echo "$msg"
+		softhsm2-util --show-slots
+		return 7
+	fi
+
+	keyuri=$(echo "$msg" | sed -n 's/.*URL: $:print:*$/\1/p')
+	if  -z "$keyuri" ; then
+		echo "Could not get key URL"
+		echo "$msg"
+		return 8
+	fi
+	echo "$keyuri"
+	return 0
+}
+
+getkeyuri_softhsm() {
+	local keyuri rc
+
+	keyuri=$(_getkeyuri_softhsm)
+	rc=$?
+	if  $rc -ne 0 ; then
+		return $rc
+	fi
+	echo "keyuri: $keyuri?pin-value=${PIN}" #&module-name=softhsm2"
+	return 0
+}
+
+getpubkey_softhsm() {
+	local keyuri rc
+
+	keyuri=$(_getkeyuri_softhsm)
+	rc=$?
+	if  $rc -ne 0 ; then
+		return $rc
+	fi
+	GNUTLS_PIN=${PIN} p11tool --export-pubkey "${keyuri}" --login 2>/dev/null
+	return $?
+}
+
+usage() {
+	cat <<_EOF_
+Usage: $0 command
+
+Supported commands are:
+
+setup      : Setup the user's account for softhsm and create a
+             token and key with a test configuration
+
+getkeyuri  : Get the key's URI; may only be called after setup
+
+getpubkey  : Get the public key in PEM format; may only be called after setup
+
+teardown   : Remove the temporary softhsm test configuration
+
+_EOF_
+}
+
+main() {
+	local ret
+
+	if  $# -lt 1 ; then
+		usage $0
+		echo -e "Missing command.\n\n"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	case "$1" in
+	setup)
+		setup_softhsm
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	getkeyuri)
+		getkeyuri_softhsm
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	getpubkey)
+		getpubkey_softhsm
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	teardown)
+		teardown_softhsm
+		ret=$?
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo -e "Unsupported command: $1\n\n"
+		usage $0
+		ret=1
+	esac
+	return $ret
+}
+
+main "$@"
+exit $?

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils-1.5.tar.gz/tests/test_mmap.c Added

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH
+ *
+ * Tool to test IMA MMAP_CHECK and MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT hooks.
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/personality.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convention: return 1 for errors that should not occur, as they are
+ * setup-related, return 2 for errors that might occur due to testing
+ * conditions.
+ */
+#define ERR_SETUP 1
+#define ERR_TEST 2
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	void *ptr, *ptr_write = NULL;
+	int ret, fd, fd_write, prot = PROT_READ;
+
+	if (!argv1) {
+		printf("Missing file parameter\n");
+		return ERR_SETUP;
+	}
+
+	if (argv2 && !strcmp(argv2, "read_implies_exec")) {
+		ret = personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);
+		if (ret == -1) {
+			printf("Failed to set personality, err: %d (%s)\n",
+			       -errno, strerror(errno));
+			return ERR_SETUP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (stat(argv1, &st) == -1) {
+		printf("Failed to access %s, err: %d (%s)\n", argv1, -errno,
+		       strerror(errno));
+		return ERR_SETUP;
+	}
+
+	if (argv2 && !strcmp(argv2, "exec_on_writable")) {
+		fd_write = open(argv1, O_RDWR);
+		if (fd_write == -1) {
+			printf("Failed to open %s in r/w, err: %d (%s)\n",
+			       argv1, -errno, strerror(errno));
+			return ERR_SETUP;
+		}
+
+		ptr_write = mmap(0, st.st_size, PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED,
+				 fd_write, 0);
+		close(fd_write);
+
+		if (ptr_write == MAP_FAILED) {
+			printf("Failed mmap() with PROT_WRITE on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
+			       argv1, -errno, strerror(errno));
+			return ERR_SETUP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fd = open(argv1, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		printf("Failed to open %s in ro, err: %d (%s)\n", argv1,
+		       -errno, strerror(errno));
+
+		if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1)
+			printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
+			       argv1, -errno, strerror(errno));
+
+		return ERR_SETUP;
+	}
+
+	if (argv2 && !strncmp(argv2, "exec", 4))
+		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+
+	ptr = mmap(0, st.st_size, prot, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
+
+	close(fd);
+
+	if (ptr_write && munmap(ptr_write, st.st_size) == -1) {
+		printf("Failed munmap() of writable mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
+		       argv1, -errno, strerror(errno));
+		return ERR_SETUP;
+	}
+
+	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
+		ret = ERR_SETUP;
+		if (argv2 && !strcmp(argv2, "exec_on_writable") &&
+		    errno == EACCES)
+			ret = ERR_TEST;
+		else
+			printf("Failed mmap() with PROT_READ%s on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
+			       (prot & PROT_EXEC) ? " | PROT_EXEC" : "",
+			       argv1, -errno, strerror(errno));
+
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+	if (argv2 && !strcmp(argv2, "mprotect")) {
+		ret = mprotect(ptr, st.st_size, PROT_EXEC);
+		if (ret == -1) {
+			ret = ERR_SETUP;
+			if (errno == EPERM)
+				ret = ERR_TEST;
+			else
+				printf("Unexpected mprotect() error on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
+				       argv1, -errno, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (munmap(ptr, st.st_size) == -1) {
+		printf("Failed munmap() of mapping on %s, err: %d (%s)\n",
+		       argv1, -errno, strerror(errno));
+		return ERR_SETUP;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}

_service:tar_scm:ima-evm-utils.yaml Changed