File _service:obs_scm:pkcs11-helper-rfc7512.patch of Package pkcs11-helper

From 14e09211c3d50eb06825090c9765e4382cf52f19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 19:42:18 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Stop _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary() checking for trailing
 NUL

We are going to want to use this for parsing %XX hex escapes in RFC7512
PKCS#11 URIs, where we cannot expect a trailing NUL. Since there's only
one existing caller at the moment, it's simple just to let the caller
have responsibility for that check.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
 lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c | 8 +++++++-
 lib/pkcs11h-util.c          | 7 +------
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
index 74b4ca7..a45a6c5 100644
--- a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
 	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 	char *p = NULL;
 	char *_sz = NULL;
+	size_t id_hex_len;
 
 	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_certificate_id!=NULL);
 	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
@@ -413,7 +414,12 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-	certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size = strlen (p)/2;
+	id_hex_len = strlen (p);
+	if (id_hex_len & 1) {
+		rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size = id_hex_len/2;
 
 	if (
 		(rv = _pkcs11h_mem_malloc (
diff --git a/lib/pkcs11h-util.c b/lib/pkcs11h-util.c
index 7325db4..7dfe9a3 100644
--- a/lib/pkcs11h-util.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs11h-util.c
@@ -109,12 +109,7 @@ _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary (
 		p++;
 	}
 
-	if (*p != '\x0') {
-		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-	}
-	else {
-		return CKR_OK;
-	}
+	return CKR_OK;
 }
 
 CK_RV

From 4d5280da8df591aab701dff4493d13a835a9b29c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 14:00:21 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] Accept RFC7512-compliant PKCS#11 URIs as serialized
 token/certificate IDs

The old format is still accepted for compatibility.

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
 lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c | 305 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 256 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
index a45a6c5..390ac0e 100644
--- a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
@@ -60,6 +60,26 @@
 
 #if defined(ENABLE_PKCS11H_TOKEN) || defined(ENABLE_PKCS11H_CERTIFICATE)
 
+#define URI_SCHEME "pkcs11:"
+
+#define token_field_ofs(field) ((unsigned long)&(((struct pkcs11h_token_id_s *)0)->field))
+#define token_field_size(field) sizeof((((struct pkcs11h_token_id_s *)0)->field))
+#define token_field(name, field) { name "=", sizeof(name), \
+				   token_field_ofs(field), token_field_size(field) }
+
+static struct {
+	const char const *name;
+	size_t namelen;
+	unsigned long field_ofs;
+	size_t field_size;
+} __token_fields[] = {
+	token_field ("model", model),
+	token_field ("token", label),
+	token_field ("manufacturer", manufacturerID ),
+	token_field ("serial", serialNumber ),
+	{ NULL },
+};
+
 CK_RV
 pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
 	OUT char * const sz,
@@ -149,9 +169,147 @@ pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
 	return rv;
 }
 
+static
 CK_RV
-pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
-	OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t *p_token_id,
+__parse_token_uri_attr (
+	const char *uri,
+	size_t urilen,
+	char *tokstr,
+	size_t toklen,
+	size_t *parsed_len
+) {
+	size_t orig_toklen = toklen;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+
+	while (urilen && toklen > 1) {
+		if (*uri == '%') {
+			size_t size = 1;
+
+			if (urilen < 3) {
+				rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+				goto done;
+			}
+
+			rv = _pkcs11h_util_hexToBinary ((unsigned char *)tokstr,
+							uri + 1, &size);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+				goto done;
+			}
+
+			uri += 2;
+			urilen -= 2;
+		} else {
+			*tokstr = *uri;
+		}
+		tokstr++;
+		uri++;
+		toklen--;
+		urilen--;
+		tokstr[0] = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (urilen) {
+		rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	} else if (parsed_len) {
+		*parsed_len = orig_toklen - toklen;
+	}
+
+ done:
+	return rv;
+}
+
+static
+CK_RV
+__parse_pkcs11_uri (
+	OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id,
+	OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id,
+	IN const char * const sz
+) {
+	const char *end, *p;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
+
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (token_id!=NULL);
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
+
+	if (strncmp (sz, URI_SCHEME, strlen (URI_SCHEME)))
+		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+	end = sz + strlen (URI_SCHEME) - 1;
+	while (rv == CKR_OK && end[0] && end[1]) {
+		int i;
+
+		p = end + 1;
+	        end = strchr (p, ';');
+		if (!end)
+			end = p + strlen(p);
+
+		for (i = 0; __token_fields[i].name; i++) {
+			/* Parse the token=, label=, manufacturer= and serial= fields */
+			if (!strncmp(p, __token_fields[i].name, __token_fields[i].namelen)) {
+				char *field = ((char *)token_id) + __token_fields[i].field_ofs;
+
+				p += __token_fields[i].namelen;
+				rv = __parse_token_uri_attr (p, end - p, field,
+							     __token_fields[i].field_size,
+							     NULL);
+				if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+					goto cleanup;
+				}
+
+				goto matched;
+			}
+		}
+		if (certificate_id && !strncmp(p, "id=", 3)) {
+			p += 3;
+
+			rv = _pkcs11h_mem_malloc ((void *)&certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
+						  end - p + 1);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			rv = __parse_token_uri_attr (p, end - p,
+						     (char *)certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
+						     end - p + 1,
+						     &certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+				goto cleanup;
+			}
+
+			goto matched;
+		}
+
+		/* We don't parse object= because the match code doesn't support
+		   matching by label. */
+
+		/* Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI element. */
+		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+		matched:
+		    ;
+	}
+cleanup:
+	/* The matching code doesn't support support partial matches; it needs
+	 * *all* of manufacturer, model, serial and label attributes to be
+	 * defined. So reject partial URIs early instead of letting it do the
+	 * wrong thing. We can maybe improve this later. */
+	if (!token_id->model[0] || !token_id->label[0] ||
+	    !token_id->manufacturerID[0] || !token_id->serialNumber[0]) {
+		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	/* For a certificate ID we need CKA_ID */
+	if (certificate_id && !certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size) {
+		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+	}
+
+	return rv;
+}
+
+static
+CK_RV
+__pkcs11h_token_legacy_deserializeTokenId (
+	OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id,
 	IN const char * const sz
 ) {
 #define __PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER 4
@@ -160,24 +318,11 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
 		size_t s;
 	} targets[__PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER];
 
-	pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id = NULL;
 	char *p1 = NULL;
 	char *_sz = NULL;
 	int e;
 	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 
-	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_token_id!=NULL);
-	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
-
-	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
-		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
-		"PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId entry p_token_id=%p, sz='%s'",
-		(void *)p_token_id,
-		sz
-	);
-
-	*p_token_id = NULL;
-
 	if (
 		(rv = _pkcs11h_mem_strdup (
 			(void *)&_sz,
@@ -189,10 +334,6 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
 
 	p1 = _sz;
 
-	if ((rv = _pkcs11h_token_newTokenId (&token_id)) != CKR_OK) {
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
 	targets[0].p = token_id->manufacturerID;
 	targets[0].s = sizeof (token_id->manufacturerID);
 	targets[1].p = token_id->model;
@@ -251,6 +392,51 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
 		p1 = p2+1;
 	}
 
+	rv = CKR_OK;
+
+cleanup:
+
+	if (_sz != NULL) {
+		_pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
+	}
+
+	return rv;
+#undef __PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER
+}
+
+CK_RV
+pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
+	OUT pkcs11h_token_id_t *p_token_id,
+	IN const char * const sz
+) {
+	pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id = NULL;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_token_id!=NULL);
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
+
+	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+		"PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId entry p_token_id=%p, sz='%s'",
+		(void *)p_token_id,
+		sz
+	);
+
+	*p_token_id = NULL;
+
+	if ((rv = _pkcs11h_token_newTokenId (&token_id)) != CKR_OK) {
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (!strncmp (sz, URI_SCHEME, strlen (URI_SCHEME))) {
+		rv = __parse_pkcs11_uri(token_id, NULL, sz);
+	} else {
+		rv = __pkcs11h_token_legacy_deserializeTokenId(token_id, sz);
+	}
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
 	strncpy (
 		token_id->display,
 		token_id->label,
@@ -263,11 +449,6 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
 	rv = CKR_OK;
 
 cleanup:
-
-	if (_sz != NULL) {
-		_pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
-	}
-
 	if (token_id != NULL) {
 		pkcs11h_token_freeTokenId (token_id);
 	}
@@ -280,7 +461,6 @@ pkcs11h_token_deserializeTokenId (
 	);
 
 	return rv;
-#undef __PKCS11H_TARGETS_NUMBER
 }
 
 #endif				/* ENABLE_PKCS11H_TOKEN || ENABLE_PKCS11H_CERTIFICATE */
@@ -359,29 +539,17 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId (
 	return rv;
 }
 
+static
 CK_RV
-pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
-	OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t * const p_certificate_id,
+__pkcs11h_certificate_legacy_deserializeCertificateId (
+	OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id,
 	IN const char * const sz
 ) {
-	pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id = NULL;
 	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 	char *p = NULL;
 	char *_sz = NULL;
 	size_t id_hex_len;
 
-	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_certificate_id!=NULL);
-	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
-
-	*p_certificate_id = NULL;
-
-	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
-		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
-		"PKCS#11: pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId entry p_certificate_id=%p, sz='%s'",
-		(void *)p_certificate_id,
-		sz
-	);
-
 	if (
 		(rv = _pkcs11h_mem_strdup (
 			(void *)&_sz,
@@ -393,10 +561,6 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
 
 	p = _sz;
 
-	if ((rv = _pkcs11h_certificate_newCertificateId (&certificate_id)) != CKR_OK) {
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
 	if ((p = strrchr (_sz, '/')) == NULL) {
 		rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
 		goto cleanup;
@@ -435,21 +599,64 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
+	rv = CKR_OK;
+
+cleanup:
+
+	if (_sz != NULL) {
+		_pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
+	}
+
+	return rv;
+
+}
+
+CK_RV
+pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId (
+	OUT pkcs11h_certificate_id_t * const p_certificate_id,
+	IN const char * const sz
+) {
+	pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id = NULL;
+	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (p_certificate_id!=NULL);
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL);
+
+	*p_certificate_id = NULL;
+
+	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
+		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
+		"PKCS#11: pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId entry p_certificate_id=%p, sz='%s'",
+		(void *)p_certificate_id,
+		sz
+	);
+
+	if ((rv = _pkcs11h_certificate_newCertificateId (&certificate_id)) != CKR_OK) {
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+	if ((rv = _pkcs11h_token_newTokenId (&certificate_id->token_id)) != CKR_OK) {
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	if (!strncmp(sz, URI_SCHEME, strlen (URI_SCHEME))) {
+		rv = __parse_pkcs11_uri (certificate_id->token_id, certificate_id, sz);
+	} else {
+		rv = __pkcs11h_certificate_legacy_deserializeCertificateId (certificate_id, sz);
+	}
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
 	*p_certificate_id = certificate_id;
 	certificate_id = NULL;
 	rv = CKR_OK;
 
 cleanup:
-
 	if (certificate_id != NULL) {
 		pkcs11h_certificate_freeCertificateId (certificate_id);
 		certificate_id = NULL;
 	}
 
-	if (_sz != NULL) {
-		_pkcs11h_mem_free ((void *)&_sz);
-	}
-
 	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
 		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
 		"PKCS#11: pkcs11h_certificate_deserializeCertificateId return rv=%lu-'%s'",

From 90590b02085edc3830bdfe0942a46c4e7bf3f1ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2015 14:58:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Serialize to RFC7512-compliant PKCS#11 URIs

Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
 lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c | 186 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
index 390ac0e..0ea1861 100644
--- a/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
+++ b/lib/pkcs11h-serialization.c
@@ -80,29 +80,107 @@ static struct {
 	{ NULL },
 };
 
+#define               P11_URL_VERBATIM      "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" \
+                                            "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" \
+                                            "0123456789_-."
+
+static
+int
+__token_attr_escape(char *uri, char *attr, size_t attrlen)
+{
+	int len = 0, i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
+		if ((attr[i] != '\x0') && strchr(P11_URL_VERBATIM, attr[i])) {
+			if (uri) {
+				*(uri++) = attr[i];
+			}
+			len++;
+		} else {
+			if (uri) {
+				sprintf(uri, "%%%02x", (unsigned char)attr[i]);
+				uri += 3;
+			}
+			len += 3;
+		}
+	}
+	return len;
+}
+
+static
+CK_RV
+__generate_pkcs11_uri (
+	OUT char * const sz,
+	IN OUT size_t *max,
+	IN const pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id,
+	IN const pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id
+) {
+	size_t _max;
+	char *p = sz;
+	int i;
+
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (max!=NULL);
+	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (token_id!=NULL);
+
+	_max = strlen(URI_SCHEME);
+	for (i = 0; __token_fields[i].name; i++) {
+		char *field = ((char *)token_id) + __token_fields[i].field_ofs;
+
+		_max += __token_fields[i].namelen;
+		_max += __token_attr_escape (NULL, field, strlen(field));
+		_max++; /* For a semicolon or trailing NUL */
+	}
+	if (certificate_id) {
+		_max += strlen (";id=");
+		_max += __token_attr_escape (NULL,
+					     (char *)certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
+					     certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size);
+	}
+
+	if (!sz) {
+		*max = _max;
+		return CKR_OK;
+	}
+
+	if (sz && *max < _max)
+		return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
+
+	p += sprintf(p, URI_SCHEME);
+	for (i = 0; __token_fields[i].name; i++) {
+		char *field = ((char *)token_id) + __token_fields[i].field_ofs;
+
+		p += sprintf (p, "%s", __token_fields[i].name);
+		p += __token_attr_escape (p, field, strlen(field));
+		*(p++) = ';';
+	}
+	if (certificate_id) {
+		p += sprintf (p, "id=");
+		p += __token_attr_escape (p,
+					  (char *)certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
+					  certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size);
+	} else {
+		/* Remove the unneeded trailing semicolon */
+		p--;
+	}
+	*(p++) = 0;
+
+	*max = _max;
+
+	return CKR_OK;
+}
+
 CK_RV
 pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
 	OUT char * const sz,
 	IN OUT size_t *max,
 	IN const pkcs11h_token_id_t token_id
 ) {
-	const char *sources[5];
 	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
-	size_t n;
-	int e;
 
 	/*_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL); Not required*/
 	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (max!=NULL);
 	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (token_id!=NULL);
 
-	{ /* Must be after assert */
-		sources[0] = token_id->manufacturerID;
-		sources[1] = token_id->model;
-		sources[2] = token_id->serialNumber;
-		sources[3] = token_id->label;
-		sources[4] = NULL;
-	}
-
 	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
 		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
 		"PKCS#11: pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId entry sz=%p, *max="P_Z", token_id=%p",
@@ -111,51 +189,7 @@ pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
 		(void *)token_id
 	);
 
-	n = 0;
-	for (e=0;sources[e] != NULL;e++) {
-		size_t t;
-		if (
-			(rv = _pkcs11h_util_escapeString (
-				NULL,
-				sources[e],
-				&t,
-				__PKCS11H_SERIALIZE_INVALID_CHARS
-			)) != CKR_OK
-		) {
-			goto cleanup;
-		}
-		n+=t;
-	}
-
-	if (sz != NULL) {
-		if (*max < n) {
-			rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-			goto cleanup;
-		}
-
-		n = 0;
-		for (e=0;sources[e] != NULL;e++) {
-			size_t t = *max-n;
-			if (
-				(rv = _pkcs11h_util_escapeString (
-					sz+n,
-					sources[e],
-					&t,
-					__PKCS11H_SERIALIZE_INVALID_CHARS
-				)) != CKR_OK
-			) {
-				goto cleanup;
-			}
-			n+=t;
-			sz[n-1] = '/';
-		}
-		sz[n-1] = '\x0';
-	}
-
-	*max = n;
-	rv = CKR_OK;
-
-cleanup:
+	rv = __generate_pkcs11_uri(sz, max, NULL, token_id);
 
 	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
 		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,
@@ -474,9 +508,6 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId (
 	IN const pkcs11h_certificate_id_t certificate_id
 ) {
 	CK_RV rv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
-	size_t saved_max = 0;
-	size_t n = 0;
-	size_t _max = 0;
 
 	/*_PKCS11H_ASSERT (sz!=NULL); Not required */
 	_PKCS11H_ASSERT (max!=NULL);
@@ -490,42 +521,7 @@ pkcs11h_certificate_serializeCertificateId (
 		(void *)certificate_id
 	);
 
-	if (sz != NULL) {
-		saved_max = n = *max;
-	}
-	*max = 0;
-
-	if (
-		(rv = pkcs11h_token_serializeTokenId (
-			sz,
-			&n,
-			certificate_id->token_id
-		)) != CKR_OK
-	) {
-		goto cleanup;
-	}
-
-	_max = n + certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size*2 + 1;
-
-	if (sz != NULL) {
-		if (saved_max < _max) {
-			rv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
-			goto cleanup;
-		}
-
-		sz[n-1] = '/';
-		rv = _pkcs11h_util_binaryToHex (
-			sz+n,
-			saved_max-n,
-			certificate_id->attrCKA_ID,
-			certificate_id->attrCKA_ID_size
-		);
-	}
-
-	*max = _max;
-	rv = CKR_OK;
-
-cleanup:
+	rv = __generate_pkcs11_uri(sz, max, certificate_id, certificate_id->token_id);
 
 	_PKCS11H_DEBUG (
 		PKCS11H_LOG_DEBUG2,