Projects
home:sgz:branches:Mega-LLVM:24.03
openssh
_service:tar_scm:pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-comp...
Sign Up
Log In
Username
Password
Overview
Repositories
Revisions
Requests
Users
Attributes
Meta
File _service:tar_scm:pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch of Package openssh
diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ * or implied, of Jamie Beverly. */ +#include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <errno.h> #include <string.h> @@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv) case EOF: case '\0': if (len > 0) { - argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv)); - argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count])); + argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv)); + argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count])); strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len); memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1); len = 0; @@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char * { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++) - pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]); + free(argv[i]); - pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv); + free(argv); return; } diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include <stdio.h> @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist; struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */ - Key *key; /* public/private key */ + struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ int tried; int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat 2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include <stdio.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ #include "get_command_line.h" extern char **environ; +#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101 + /* * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary @@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count) if (count == 0) return NULL; - buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf)); + buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'"); strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG); @@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count) } void -agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count) +agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count) { size_t i; - pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf); + int r; - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count); + if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } -void -pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user, +static void +pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename) { u_char *cookie = NULL; @@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * char ** reported_argv = NULL; size_t count = 0; char * action_logbuf = NULL; - Buffer action_agentbuf; + struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL; uint8_t free_logbuf = 0; char * retc; int32_t reti; + int r; - rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random(); + rnd = arc4random(); cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd); while (cookie_len < 16) { cookie_len += 16; /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */ } - cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len); + cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len); for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) { - rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random(); + rnd = arc4random(); } cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd; rnd >>= 8; @@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * } else { action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform"; - pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */ + if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */ + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); } /* @@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1); time(&ts); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2); + if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1); - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len); - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user); - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser); - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename); - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */ - if(retc) - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd); - else - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ""); - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (retc) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (free_logbuf) { - pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf); + free(action_logbuf); + sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf); + } + /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */ + if (reti >= 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */ - if(reti >= 0) - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname); - else - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ""); - /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts); + /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(cookie); return; @@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); auth->fd = sock; - buffer_init(&auth->identities); + if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); auth->howmany = 0; return auth; @@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui int pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename) { - Buffer session_id2 = { 0 }; + struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL; Identity *id; - Key *key; + struct sshkey *key; AuthenticationConnection *ac; char *comment; uint8_t retval = 0; @@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename); if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid); + verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid); for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) { if(key != NULL) { - id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->key = key; id->filename = comment; id->ac = ac; - if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) { + if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) { retval = 1; } - pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename); - pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key); - pamsshagentauth_xfree(id); + free(id->filename); + key_free(id->key); + free(id); if(retval == 1) break; } } - pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2); + sshbuf_free(session_id2); ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac); } else { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted"); + verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted"); } - /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */ EVP_cleanup(); return retval; } diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat 2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200 @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, * a patch 8-) */ #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE - __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename); + __progname = xstrdup(servicename); #endif for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) { @@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, #endif } - pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0); + log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0); pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user); pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr); - pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user); + verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user); if(ruser_ptr) { strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1); @@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) { strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 ); - pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser ); + verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser ); } else #endif { if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())"); + verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())"); goto cleanexit; } strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1); @@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */ if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser); + verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser); goto cleanexit; } if( ! getpwnam(user) ) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user); + verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user); goto cleanexit; } @@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, */ parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input); } else { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys"); - authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys"); + verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys"); + authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys"); } /* @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, */ if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); /* * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent. @@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0"); int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1); if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth); + verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth); if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) { retval = PAM_SUCCESS; - pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); goto cleanexit; } } @@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user */ if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */ - pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); retval = PAM_SUCCESS; } else { - pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); + logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file); } } else { - pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" ); + logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" ); } cleanexit: diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "log.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "xmalloc.h" @@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ #include "pathnames.h" #include "secure_filename.h" -#include "identity.h" #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h" extern char *authorized_keys_file; @@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us } else { slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/'); if(!slash_ptr) - pamsshagentauth_fatal + fatal ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'"); owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1; if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1)) - pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long"); + fatal("Username too long"); strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len); if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid) @@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid; } authorized_keys_file = - pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, + tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid); strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1); - pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we + free(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free @@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, ".")); #endif authorized_keys_file = - pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", + percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h", getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname, "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL); } int -pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key) +pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key) { return pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H #include "identity.h" -int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *); +int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *); void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *); #endif diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -45,44 +45,46 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" -#include "buffer.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "compat.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "secure_filename.h" #include "uidswap.h" - -#include "identity.h" +#include <unistd.h> /* return 1 if user allows given key */ /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */ static int -pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key) +pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key) { - char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; + char *line = NULL; int found_key = 0; u_long linenum = 0; - Key *found; + struct sshkey *found; char *fp; + size_t linesize = 0; found_key = 0; - found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type); + found = sshkey_new(key->type); - while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { + while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) { char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */ + linenum++; /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; - if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { + if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ int quoted = 0; - pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); + verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); /* key_options = cp; */ for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') @@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE } /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++); - if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); + if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) { + verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); /* still no key? advance to next line */ continue; } } - if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) { + if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) { found_key = 1; - pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file, + logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file, linenum); - fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s", - pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp); - pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp); + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64); + logit("Found matching %s key: %s", + sshkey_type(found), fp); + free(fp); break; } } - pamsshagentauth_key_free(found); + free(line); + sshkey_free(found); if(!found_key) - pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found"); + verbose("key not found"); return found_key; } @@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ int -pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file) +pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file) { FILE *f; int found_key = 0; struct stat st; - char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; + char buf[256]; /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ - pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file); + verbose("trying public key file %s", file); /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */ if(stat(file, &st) < 0) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file); + verbose("File not found: %s", file); return 0; } @@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) { fclose(f); - pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf); + logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf); return 0; } @@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command, char *authorized_keys_command_user, - struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key) + struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key) { FILE *f; int ok, found_key = 0; @@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed else { pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user); if(pw == NULL) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s", + error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s", authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno)); return 0; } } - pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw); + temporarily_use_uid(pw); if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror + error ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s", authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); + error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); goto out; } /* open the pipe and read the keys */ if(pipe(p) != 0) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } - pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"", + debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"", authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username); /* * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and * run cleanup_exit() code. */ - pamsshagentauth_restore_uid(); + restore_uid(); switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: /* error */ - pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); close(p[1]); return 0; @@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */ if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, + error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID) @@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed #else if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) { #endif - pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid, + error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } @@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed #else if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) { #endif - pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid, + error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } @@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */ - pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); _exit(127); default: /* parent */ break; } - pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw); + temporarily_use_uid(pw); close(p[1]); if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); /* Don't leave zombie child */ while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR); @@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if(errno != EINTR) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, + error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } } if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status)); goto out; } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { - pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status)); goto out; } found_key = ok; out: - pamsshagentauth_restore_uid(); + restore_uid(); return found_key; } diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H #include "identity.h" -int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *); -int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *); +int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *); +int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *); #endif diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "log.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; - pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid); + verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid); if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, @@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); return -1; } - pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); + strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); - pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); + verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", + verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'", buf); break; } diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -37,10 +37,11 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" -#include "buffer.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "compat.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "secure_filename.h" @@ -48,54 +49,59 @@ #include "identity.h" #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h" +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST 54 + /* extern u_char *session_id2; extern uint8_t session_id_len; */ int -userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2) +userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2) { - Buffer b = { 0 }; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *pkalg = NULL; u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL; - u_int blen = 0, slen = 0; - int authenticated = 0; + size_t blen = 0, slen = 0; + int r, authenticated = 0; - pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key); + pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key); /* first test if this key is even allowed */ if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key)) - goto user_auth_clean_exit; + goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer; - if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0) - goto user_auth_clean_exit; + if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0) + goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer; /* construct packet to sign and test */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth"); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); - pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0) + if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0) goto user_auth_clean_exit; /* test for correct signature */ - if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1) + if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0) authenticated = 1; user_auth_clean_exit: /* if(&b != NULL) */ - pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b); + sshbuf_free(b); + user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer: if(sig != NULL) - pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig); + free(sig); if(pkblob != NULL) - pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob); + free(pkblob); CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(); return authenticated; } diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H -#include <identity.h> -int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *); +#include "identity.h" +int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *); #endif diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat 2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c 2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200 @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */ *p = '\0'; len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize); - pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded); + xfree(encoded); return len; } @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n"); return; } - buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len); + buf = malloc(2*len); n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]); @@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co } if (i % 70 != 69) fprintf(fp, "\n"); - pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf); + free(buf); } --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat 2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c 2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200 @@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ #include <string.h> #include "defines.h" -#include "key.h" +#include <includes.h> +#include "sshkey.h" #include "log.h" #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h" @@ -42,28 +42,28 @@ int authenticated = 0; const char method[] = "publickey "; - char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info); + char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info); char* saveptr; char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr); while (auth_line != NULL) { if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) { char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1; - Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key == NULL) { continue; } - int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str); + int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str); if (r == 1) { if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) { authenticated = 1; - pamsshagentauth_key_free(key); + sshkey_free(key); break; } } else { - pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r); + verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r); } - pamsshagentauth_key_free(key); + sshkey_free(key); } auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr); }
Locations
Projects
Search
Status Monitor
Help
Open Build Service
OBS Manuals
API Documentation
OBS Portal
Reporting a Bug
Contact
Mailing List
Forums
Chat (IRC)
Twitter
Open Build Service (OBS)
is an
openSUSE project
.
浙ICP备2022010568号-2