File _service:tar_scm:backport-01-CVE-2023-0361.patch of Package gnutls

File _service:tar_scm:backport-01-CVE-2023-0361.patch of Package gnutls (Revision 6140795383dfa6eee0d195125a50c43a)

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From 80a6ce8ddb02477cd724cd5b2944791aaddb702a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel

Remove branching that depends on secret data.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
---
 lib/auth/rsa.c | 10 ----------
 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
index 8108ee8..6b158ba 100644
--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
+++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int
 proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 		   size_t _data_size)
 {
-	const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
 	gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
 	int ret, dsize;
 	ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
@@ -235,15 +234,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
 	ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
 	        CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
 
-	if (ok) {
-		/* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
-		 * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
-		 * logging is disabled */
-		_gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
-	} else {
-		_gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
-	}
-
 	/* This is here to avoid the version check attack
 	 * discussed above.
 	 */
-- 
2.27.0